Tuesday, June 28, 2011

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Summer 2011, Volume XIII, Issue ii

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The Number of Wage and Hour Cases Going Up, Settlement Values Going Down

By Stephen S. Zashin*

Recent trends show the number of wage and hour lawsuits increased from 2007 to 2010. However, the settlement values for these cases have seen a sharp decline. The National Economic Research Associates, Inc. (NERA) discovered the recent trends by collecting data on 187 wage and hour cases. The collected cases include a number of allegations, such as off-the-clock work; unpaid overtime; missed, short, or late meal periods and rest breaks; employee misclassification; unpaid termination wages; failure to pay minimum wage; time shaving and improper tip pooling.

Not all the cases had a reported settlement value, but the 139 cases that did included settlements totaling $1.77 billion for an average settlement of $12.8 million per case and a median settlement of $4.3 million. During the three year period, the average settlement value declined in recent years from more than $20 million in 2007-2008, to approximately $10 million in 2009, to $7.6 million in 2010. The average per-plaintiff settlement also fell from about $8,000 in 2007 to just over $5,000 in 2010.

It is difficult to explain, for certain, the recent decrease in settlement values. One possible explanation are case-specific factors, such as the size of the potential class, the duration of the alleged class period, the number and type of allegations made in each case, and the jurisdiction involved. The number of class members participating and the duration of the class period have the greatest impact on settlement value, as settlement values increase significantly when there are a greater number of plaintiffs and/or longer class periods.

As the number of wage and hour lawsuits increase, employers must remain vigilant with their compliance efforts. If your company has any wage and hour concerns, please contact us.

* Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, is licensed to practice law in Ohio and New York. Stephen's practice encompasses all areas of employment and labor law and works extensively in defending class and collective actions. For more information about wage and hour laws or any other employment matter, please contact Stephen at 216.696.4441 or ssz@zrlaw.com.


Does Your Wellness Program Comply with the ADA?

By Jason Rossiter*

Many employers now sponsor Wellness programs for their employees. These programs serve employees by encouraging healthy habits and providing early warning of potential health concerns. They also help employers control health insurance costs. Broward County, Florida (the "County") implemented such a program. The program was voluntary, and those who participated filled out a Health Risk Assessment questionnaire and completed a finger-stick blood test to measure blood sugar and cholesterol levels. If the testing revealed certain potential health problems, the County's health insurer then offered the employee an opportunity to participate in "disease management coaching" and obtain free medications.

In 2009, the County began penalizing employees who chose not to participate in the Wellness program by charging them an extra $20 on each of their bi-weekly paychecks. In Seff v. Broward County, a County employee sued the County on behalf of a class of his co-workers, arguing that the $20 charge was a way to compel the employees to submit to the Health Risk Assessment questionnaire process, and thus forced them to undergo a medical-related inquiry in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

The ADA makes it unlawful for employers to make "inquiries" about their employees' medical or health conditions, unless the inquiries are job-related and consistent with business necessity. But the ADA contains a "safe harbor" for employers who establish, sponsor or administer "bona fide benefit plan[s] that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law." The employee in the Seff case argued that the $20 charge in essence forced employees to submit to medical inquiries in violation of the ADA, and that the safe harbor should not apply because the County's Wellness program was not truly based on any legitimate underwriting, classification, or administration risks, but instead on the County's desire to improve the health of its employees.

The court rejected these arguments and held that the safe harbor applied. The evidence showed that the County implemented the program "to classify various risks and decide what type of benefits plans will be needed in the future in light of these risks," and thus to determine "what kind of coverage will need to be provided … on a macroscopic level so it may form economically sound benefits plans for the future." In short, the County implemented the program on legitimate "insurance and risk assessment principles," rather than on "some independent desire for a healthy workforce," and thus was entitled to the benefit of the safe harbor.

Employers who sponsor Wellness programs should pay attention to this decision. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission has taken the position that any coercive element to a Wellness program – such as the $20 charge in the Seff case – renders the program potentially unlawful under the ADA. While the safe harbor in the ADA protects employers who sponsor or administer Wellness programs for bona fide risk assessment reasons, Seff demonstrates that the safe harbor does not protect employers who implement Wellness programs merely out of the altruistic desire for healthy employees.

If you have questions about whether your company's Wellness program might run afoul of the ADA, please let us know.

* Jason Rossiter practices in all areas of employment litigation and is licensed to practice law in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and California. For more information about Wellness programs or any other employment issue, please contact Zashin & Rich at 216.696.4441.


Maryland Joins Other States in Restricting Employer Use of Credit History


By Stefanie L. Baker

Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley signed Maryland's Job Applicant Fairness Act (the "Act") on April 12, 2011. The Act becomes effective October 1, 2011. Maryland joins Hawaii, Illinois, Oregon and Washington in the nationwide push to ban employer credit checks. Several other states are also considering restricting an employer's use of credit history, including: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Vermont.

The Act states that an employer may not use an applicant or employee's credit report or credit history in determining whether to:
  • Deny employment to an applicant;
  • Discharge an employee; or,
  • Determine compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
However, the Act allows an employer to use an applicant's credit report or credit history if its use is "substantially job-related." While the Act does not explicitly define "substantially job-related," it exempts certain jobs from the requirements of the Act including:
  • Positions involving money-handling (authority to issue payments, collect debts, transfer money, or enter into contracts);
  • Positions involving access to personal information of a customer, employee, or employer;
  • Confidential positions (access to company's trade secrets, intellectual property, personnel files);
  • Positions involving a fiduciary responsibility to the employer (authority to issue payments, collect debts, transfer money, or enter into contracts); and,
  • Managerial positions that control or direct part of the business.
Certain employers are exempt from the Act as well, including: any employer that is required to perform credit checks by federal or state law; financial institutions that accept deposits insured by a federal agency; and investment advisors registered with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission.

Under federal law, applicants must consent to a credit check in writing. In addition, if an employer uses a credit report under an exemption, the employer must disclose its use to an applicant or employee in writing. The Act does not prohibit employers from performing other employment-related background checks, including: driving records, criminal history investigations, and educational history investigations. However, employers must ensure these types of background checks do not include credit information.

An employee or job applicant who believes his or her employer or prospective employer violated the Act can file an administrative complaint with the Maryland's Commissioner of Labor and Industry. The Commissioner will attempt to resolve the dispute informally. If informal resolution is unsuccessful, the Commissioner may assess a fine against the employer of up to $500 for the first offense and up to $2,500 for a subsequent violation. Additionally, while the Act itself does not provide for a private cause of action in court, an employee likely could file a suit for wrongful termination or failure-to-hire under Maryland public policy.

Before October 1, 2011, Maryland employers should review their policies to make sure their use of a credit report complies with the Act.


Mandatory Breaks Required for Retail Employees in Maryland


By Michele L. Jakubs*

Maryland's Healthy Retail Employee Act (the "Act") went into effect March 1, 2011. The Act requires Maryland employers with 50 or more retail employees to provide breaks based upon the number of hours an employee works in a shift. Under the Act, a "retail establishment" is a "place of business with the primary purpose of selling goods to a consumer who is present at the place of business at the time of sale" and "retail employees" include those who are "engaged in actual sales, in a store." As such, employees who are not working in a "retail establishment," such as a corporate or other office, or do not sell are not covered by the Act and do not count toward the 50-employee requirement.

For purposes of applying the 50-employee rule, companies must include the total number of retail employees they have throughout Maryland. For example, a retailer that maintains several locations throughout the state must count all retail employees working throughout the state. However, the Act does not apply to employees who work at a single location with five or fewer employees, regardless of the number of employees the employer has throughout the state.

Covered employers must provide breaks as follows:
  • A 15-minute break for a shift of four to six consecutive hours;
  • At least a 30-minute break for a shift of 6 or more hours (an employer does not have to provide the 15-minute break if the employee is entitled to the 30-minute break); and
  • If the employee's shift is 8 or more consecutive hours, an additional 15-minute break for each additional 4 hours worked. For example, if the employee works 12 hours, the employee must get one 30-minute break plus one 15-minute break.
Restaurant employees and employees exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") are not entitled to breaks under the Act. In addition, employers are not required to provide breaks to employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement or employees with an employment policy that includes breaks equal to or greater than those required by the new law.

The Act allows for a "working shift break." For example, if the employee's work prevents the employee from being relieved during one of the employee's breaks, or the employee consumes a paid meal while working, the employee may waive the break. Employees may waive the "working shift break" by entering into a written agreement with their employer.

The Act does not address whether an employer must pay the employee for the required breaks. However, under Maryland law and the FLSA, short breaks of less than 20 minutes constitute compensable work time that must be included in the sum of all hours worked in a week.

If an employee believes their employer is violating the law, the Act provides a process for employees to file a complaint with Maryland's Commissioner of Labor and Industry. Remedies include an order directing compliance with the law and potential civil penalties of $300 to $600 per employee for each instance of non-compliance. Additionally, in limited situations, a covered employee may bring a court action to enforce the Commissioner's order and for recovery of treble damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. In order to avoid civil penalties, retailers in Maryland should review their break policies and employee handbooks to make sure they comply with these new requirements.

*Michele L. Jakubs, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of employment litigation and has extensive experience counseling employers on paid break time issues under the FLSA. For more information on Maryland's Healthy Retail Employee Act or any other FLSA compliance question, please contact Michele at 216.696.4441 or mlj@zrlaw.com.


Sexual Orientation: A Protected Class?


By George S. Crisci*

On April 25, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled that Shari Hutchinson's sexual orientation discrimination claim falls under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See Hutchinson v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of County Comm'r, No.1:08-CV-2966, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46633 (N.D. Ohio 2011). This is a potentially far-reaching decision and could prove to be the spring board for a federal law preventing workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Hutchinson, a lesbian, began working for Cuyahoga County at its Child-Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) in 2002. In 2008, she filed suit alleging, among other claims, CSEA denied her various promotions in favor of less qualified heterosexuals and that CSEA retaliated against due to her sexual orientation. Hutchinson brought her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), which prohibits the deprivation of federal rights by anyone acting under the color of state law. Hutchinson did not bring a claim under Title VII, which generally prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Cuyahoga County sought dismissal of the case on the basis that sexual orientation discrimination is not an actionable claim under Section 1983. The County based its argument, in large part, on the premise that Section 1983 mirrors Title VII and that since sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII it also is not a protected class under Section 1983. As a result, the County argued Hutchinson fails the first prong of her prima facie case in that she is not a member of a protected class. The Court, however, disagreed. While the Court acknowledged its past reliance on Title VII framework when analyzing Section 1983 claims, it ruled that rational basis review applied. The Court held "that an employee who alleges sexual orientation discrimination under § 1983 is not per se precluded from establishing an equal protection claim against her employer."

Public employers should take note of this ruling. While on its face, the ruling does not apply to private employers, they too should be aware of the court's finding. As with same-sex marriage, this case is evidence that the sexual orientation discrimination landscape is ever-changing.

* George S. Crisci, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about employment discrimination or any other labor or employment issue, please contact George at 216.696.4441 or gsc@zrlaw.com.


The EEOC Implements Regulations Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008


By David R. Vance*

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") released regulations regarding the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA") on March 25, 2011. The EEOC's regulations took effect May 24, 2011 and apply to all private, state, and local government employers with 15 or more employees. The regulations also apply to employment agencies, unions, and joint labor-management committees.

The ADAAA makes several important changes to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). While the ADAAA retains the ADA's basic definition of "disability" as "an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment," the regulations change the statutory interpretation of disability. Some of the regulation's major changes include the following:

Broad Coverage
It is now much easier for employees seeking the ADA's protection to establish the existence of a disability, as the regulation's interpretation broadens the definition of disability.

"Major Life Activities"
The regulations include two non-exhaustive lists expanding the definition of "major life activities." The first list includes many activities that the EEOC already recognized as major life activities (e.g., walking), as well as activities that the EEOC has not specifically recognized (e.g., reading, bending, communicating). The second list includes major bodily functions (e.g., "functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions"). Since these lists are non-exhaustive, the regulations include nine "rules of construction" to help employers determine if an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

"Substantially Limits"
The regulations make clear that "substantially limits" is to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage. Additionally, the regulation's interpretation of "substantially limits" requires a lower degree of functional limitation as compared to the standard previously applied by the courts. The third "rule of construction" explains that "the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment 'substantially limits' a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis." As a result, employees can show more easily that they have an impairment substantially limiting one or more major life activities.

Individualized Assessment
The regulations abolish any notion that certain medical conditions will "always" qualify as disabilities.

Episodic Conditions and Ameliorative Effects
The regulations make clear that the current effects of a disability are not the only factors that an employer must consider in determining whether a medical condition is substantially limiting. Impairments that are episodic or in remission – cancer, epilepsy, hypertension, asthma, diabetes, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia – also qualify as disabilities if substantially limiting when active.

Reasonable Accommodation
An individual must have an actual disability or record of an actual disability in order to qualify for a reasonable accommodation. Therefore, an individual who claims he or she is "regarded as" disabled will not qualify for a reasonable accommodation.

"Regarded As" Claims
Going forward, most ADA claims will likely be "regarded as" claims. An applicant is "regarded as" disabled if he or she is "subject to an action prohibited by the ADA (e.g., failure to hire or termination) based on an impairment that is not transitory and minor." The ADAAA substantially expands employer liability under the "regarded as" theory by removing the requirement that an employee prove that the perceived impairment substantially limits a major life activity. An employer may still defend a "regarded as" claim by asserting that the impairment at issue, whether actual or perceived, is both transitory and minor.

With the ADAAA and the EEOC's recent regulations, it is significantly more difficult for employers to prove that an employee's medical condition does not qualify as a disability. Therefore, employers should instead focus their ADA compliance efforts on the interactive process and providing a reasonable accommodation.

*David R. Vance has extensive experience with ADA and ADAAA compliance. For more information on the ADA or ADAAA including providing a reasonable accommodation, please contact David at drv@zrlaw.com or 216-696-4441.


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Friday, June 24, 2011

As Long As We're Changing The Rules: National Labor Relations Board Publishes Proposed Rule to Shorten Time for Union Elections

*By Patrick J. Hoban
 
The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) published a proposed rule June 22, 2011 which will make sweeping changes to the existing rules and regulations governing the conduct of representation elections.

Current Board policy encourages the regional directors to hold representation elections within 45 days following the filing of a representation petition. NLRB election data from 2009-2010 shows that the median time between the filing of petition and election is 38 days, while the average time between the filing of petition and election was 57 days. The proposed amendments, however, would dramatically reduce the time period to hold a representation election. While it is unclear what the timeframe would be, some estimate the proposed rule could shorten the timeframe to between 14 and 23 days.

Under the proposed rule, a pre-election hearing would have to begin no more than seven days following the service of notice of the representation petition. An employer must state its position on any election-related issues that it plans to raise at the hearing. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) will identify any disputes – but not until after the hearing. A post-election hearing will be scheduled 14 days after the tally of ballots (or as soon thereafter as practicable) to address any objections to the composition of the bargaining unit or voter eligibility issues. The ALJ will only accept evidence at the hearing if he or she determines that there is a genuine issue of material fact.

Unlike the current rules, there will be no pre-election litigation of bargaining unit composition or voter eligibility issues unless a dispute affects at least 20 percent of the proposed bargaining unit. This is a dramatic change from the current form of pre-election litigation which often involves disputes over whether some employees are supervisors and thus ineligible to vote. Parties will be prohibited from requesting a review of these issues until after the election – even where parties challenge the bargaining unit composition prior to the election. The Board will have the discretion to refuse a request to review the regional directors’ unit composition and eligibility determinations, as opposed to the mandatory review under current rules.

Some other changes in the proposed rule include:
  • Employers must provide the union with a final list of eligible voters within two days, drastically shortened from the current seven days
  • Eligible voter lists must contain both phone numbers and email addresses which are not currently required; and
  • Unions may file election petitions electronically.
The Board’s most recent annual report states that 1,619 unionization elections were held in 2009, with unions winning 63.8 percent of the elections. Despite this relatively high union win rate, union officials assert the percentage would be far higher if the election process were not so “skewed and unfair.” Union officials are championing the proposed rule as a “modest step forward.” Some employers, however, say cutting the lead time before an election would make it harder, if not impossible, to effectively present the case for voting against unionization.

The proposed rule will undoubtedly give unions an advantage and already has generated sharp debate. Some argue this is a tactic by the Obama Administration to pursue, via rulemaking, some of the goals of the failed Employee Free Choice Act. The NLRB said its proposed changes aim to “curb unnecessary litigation; streamline procedure before and after elections; and enable the use of electronic communications.” The Board will accept public comments on the proposal for 60 days following the publication in the Federal Register.

*Patrick J. Hoban, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, represents clients before the National Labor Relations Board and practices in all areas of labor relations. For more information about the proposed rule, representation elections, or the NLRB, please contact Pat (pjh@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.

Tuesday, June 21, 2011

United States Supreme Court Limits First Amendment Rights of Public Employees

*By George S. Crisci

In a decision released yesterday, the United States Supreme Court found that the First Amendment’s Petition Clause does not protect a public employee’s filing of a grievance or other legal proceedings against an employer unless the grievance involves a matter of public concern.  See Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania, et al. v Guarnieri, No. 09-1476, 564 U.S. ___ (2011).

The chief of police, Charles Guarnieri (“Guarnieri”), filed a union grievance challenging his termination.  An arbitrator awarded reinstatement.  After Guarnieri returned to work, the Borough of Duryea (“Duryea”) implemented several directives instructing him on how to carry out his position.  One directive prohibited Guarnieri from working overtime without the council’s “express permission.”  Guarnieri believed these directives were too restrictive and he filed a union grievance.  The arbitrator ordered Duryea to modify or withdraw some of the directives.

Guarnieri then filed suit against Duryea for violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Guarnieri claimed that he was subject to retaliation when Duryea instituted the directives upon his reinstatement.   Guarnieri also added a claim for denial of overtime to his suit.

The district court instructed the jury that the lawsuit and union grievances were “protected activity under the constitution,” and that the jury could find Duryea liable if there was an adequate connection between the protected activity and the alleged retaliation.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Guarnieri, awarding him over $90,000 in both compensatory and punitive damages, along with attorney’s fees.

Duryea appealed the verdict arguing that Guarnieri’s grievances and lawsuit did not address matters of public concern.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the verdict even though Guarnieri’s petition was solely a matter of private concern.

The United States Supreme Court held that the Third Circuit applied a more generous rule and remanded the case.  When a public employee sues a government employer under the First Amendment’s Speech Clause, the employee must show that he or she spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.  This test, known as the Connick-Pickering test, also involves a balancing of the First Amendment interests of the employee against the interest of the State in promoting efficiency.

While this case involved the Petition Clause, and not the Speech Clause, the Court reasoned that the two are closely related and there was no cause for divergence in this case.  Therefore, the lower courts should have applied the Connick-Pickering analysis to Guarnieri’s Petition Clause claims.  As a result, when a public employee petitions on a matter solely of private concern, the employee cannot pursue his First Amendment rights.

While this decision garnered far less attention than the Dukes v. Wal-Mart ruling also issued yesterday, Duryea promises to have a significant impact on public employees.  A government employer’s allegedly retaliatory actions against an employee do not give rise to liability under the Petition Clause unless the employee’s petition relates to a matter of public concern.  The holding requires courts to conduct a Connick-Pickering analysis for future Petition Clause claims brought by public employees.

*George S. Crisci, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, represents public employers in negotiations, grievances, arbitrations and practices in all areas of public and private employment and labor relations. For more information about this decision or labor law, please contact George (gsc@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.

Monday, June 20, 2011

So Long, Farewell: Does the Supreme Court's Decision In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. V. Dukes Spell the End of Employment Class Actions?

*By B. Jason Rossiter

In a landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court rejected an attempt by a number of Wal-Mart employees to pursue a nationwide class action on behalf of all female Wal-Mart employees, based on generic accusations that Wal-Mart maintained a company-wide policy of sex discrimination.

To bring any type of class action, one of the elements that a plaintiff must prove is – that there is some common issue of law or fact in common among all of the members of the proposed class. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, decided on June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court held that the female plaintiffs had to establish something more than merely "their sex and this lawsuit" in order to pursue a class-action. Instead, they must offer "significant proof" of a "specific" employment practice that affected everyone across the company and led to sex-based discrimination. In other words, there must be "some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those [nationwide employment] decisions together."

In Dukes, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' evidence was not sufficient to show that Wal-Mart used a specific identifiable employment practice on a nationwide basis that resulted in illegal discrimination:
The plaintiffs offered expert testimony that Wal-Mart supposedly employed discriminatory stereotypes in its decision-making.  The Supreme Court held that this testimony was "worlds away" from being "significant proof" of any specific company-wide practice, because the expert admitted he was unable to explain what percentage of Wal-Mart's employment decisions across the country "might be determined by stereotyped thinking... If [the expert] admittedly has no answer to that question, we can safely disregard what he has to say."

The plaintiffs pointed to the fact that Wal-Mart had a policy of giving discretion in pay and promotions decisions to local decision-makers.  The Supreme Court said that this was "very common" and "presumptively reasonable."  Giving decision-making discretion to local managers "should itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct," absent proof of "a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company," and the plaintiffs offered no such proof.

The plaintiffs offered statistical evidence showing disparities in pay between women and men.  The Supreme Court rejected this as well because the statistics were offered in a vacuum instead of being linked to a "specific employment practice" that created the alleged disparity.

Lastly, the plaintiffs offered anecdotal evidence of discrimination - individual examples of allegedly discriminatory events and statements.  The Supreme Court held that this evidence was also irrelevant because it was divorced from a single unifying employment practice, and was also "too weak to raise any inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel decisions are discriminatory."
Lastly, the Supreme Court held that because the plaintiffs sought individualized awards of back pay, it was improper for them to seek class certification without following the procedures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which requires that each member of the class receive the chance to opt out of the class, requires the plaintiffs to show that their common issues predominate over any individual questions, and also requires the plaintiffs show that the class action mechanism is the superior method of resolving the particular dispute.

As a result of this decision, are ambiguous, aggregate "nationwide" employee class actions possible after Dukes? Probably not. Dukes makes it clear that employees who wish to join together and pursue a class action cannot rely only on extrapolations from statistics, collections of anecdotal evidence, or expert testimony about corporate "culture" to meet Rule 23's "commonality" requirement.  Instead, they must point to concrete, specific, identifiable employment policies or practices that truly affected the purported class and that gave rise to the discrimination in question.  In other words, they must prove that they have something else in common apart from their protected status and their desire to sue their common employer.

*B. Jason Rossiter, has extensive experience in all aspects of workplace law, including defending employers in class action suits. For more information about class or collective litigation, please contact Zashin & Rich at 216.696.4441.

Thursday, June 9, 2011

Ohio Supreme Court Expands Workers' Compensation Retaliation Claims To Include Employees That Have Not Yet Filed or Pursued Workers' Compensation Benefits

*By Scott Coghlan

On June 9, 2011, The Ohio Supreme Court decided Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 2011-Ohio-2723. In this case, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when an injured employee suffers a retaliatory employment action after suffering an injury on the job but before the employee files a workers’ compensation claim or pursues such benefits.

Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.90 prohibits employers from retaliating against employees that have filed or pursued workers’ compensation claims. The statute only provides remedies to an injured employee who files a workers’ compensation claim prior to the employer engaging in the alleged retaliatory conduct. In Sutton, the employer fired the injured employee within one hour of reporting his injury to the president of the company but prior to his filing or pursuing a workers’ compensation claim. As a result, the injured employee was not protected by O.R.C. Section 4123.90.

Holding that the legislature did not intend to leave a “gap” in protection during which time employers could retaliate against injured employees, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that public policy prohibits employers from retaliating against injured employees that have yet to file for or pursue workers’ compensation benefits. The Court stated, however, that no presumption or retaliation arises from the fact that an employee is discharged soon after an injury. Instead, the injured employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the retaliatory nature of the discharge and its nexus with workers’ compensation.  The Court also limited the remedies available to those provided in O.R.C. Section 4123.90. Such remedies are primarily limited to reinstatement with back pay in the event of termination or lost wages in the event of demotion or other retaliatory conduct along with reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Injured workers are permitted to file for workers’ compensation benefits within two years of the date of injury. As a result, the Sutton decision changes the landscape for employers when terminating an employee who was injured at work but has not pursued workers’ compensation benefits. Moreover, the court failed to state whether the written notice requirements contained in O.R.C. Section 4123.90 apply to public policy workers’ compensation retaliation claims.

If you any questions regarding the Sutton decision or its impact on managing your workforce please contact us.

*Scott Coghlan, the chair of the firms’ Workers’ Compensation Group, has extensive experience in all aspects of safety and health matters and workers’ compensation law. For more information about retaliation claims, please contact Scott at 216.696.4441 or sc@zrlaw.com.