Showing posts with label Breaks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Breaks. Show all posts

Friday, April 13, 2012

California Supreme Court: Employers Need Not “Police” Meal Breaks To Ensure They Are Taken

*By B. Jason Rossiter

In California, it is now (finally) clear what an employer’s responsibility is concerning meal breaks.
California Courts have been befuddled for some time concerning meal breaks. Specifically, what happened if a boss told an employee to take a meal break, but the employee got busy and forgot and worked through all or part of the break? Does the mere fact that the boss told the employee to go on break mean that the company satisfied whatever obligation it might have had to provide the employee with a break (assuming, of course, that the boss did not pester the employee to keep working during the break)?

Or, on the other hand, is it the company’s duty to actually make sure the employee takes a meal break when he or she is supposed to? If this is the case, then legions of employees in various industries, who performed a spot of work here and there during meal breaks, might have claims against their employers.  One wonders what a company must do to fulfill such a requirement, if it indeed were a requirement. Should companies tail their employees to the In-N-Out Burger?

After years of waiting, the California Supreme Court has finally answered this question in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court. The Court summarized its key holding at the very beginning of the 54-page opinion:
an employer’s obligation [to provide a meal break] is to relieve its employee of all duty, with the employee thereafter at liberty to use the meal period for whatever purpose he or she desires, but the employer need not ensure that no work is done.
The Court elaborated upon this holding a little later in its opinion (at pp. 36-37):
An employer’s duty with respect to meal breaks under both [Labor Code] section 512, subdivision (a) and [IWC] Wage Order No. 5 is an obligation to provide a meal period to its employees. The employer satisfies this obligation if it relieves its employees of all duty, relinquishes control over their activities and permits them a reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30-minute break, and does not impede or discourage them from doing so. What will suffice may vary from industry to industry, and we cannot in the context of this class certification proceeding delineate the full range of approaches that in each instance might be sufficient to satisfy the law.
On the other hand, the employer is not obligated to police meal breaks and ensure no work thereafter is performed. Bona fide relief from duty and the relinquishing of control satisfies the employer’s obligations, and work by a relieved employee during a meal break does not thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations and create liability for premium pay under Wage Order No. 5, subdivision 11(B) and Labor Code section 226.7, subdivision (b).
(Emphasis added). The underlined language is key and is what most California employers likely will focus on. So long as an employer gives its employees meal breaks when required, and legitimately relieves them of all responsibility and lets them do essentially whatever they want (the employee must be “at liberty to use the meal period for whatever purpose he or she desires”), the employer is not at risk of a meal break penalty merely because its employees might start working to some degree during their breaks. As the Court put it, “Proof an employer had knowledge of employees working through meal periods will not alone subject the employer to liability for premium pay; employees cannot manipulate the flexibility granted them by employers to use their breaks as they see fit to generate such liability.”

This holding creates a few new issues, however. California employers who have handbook policies that limit what employees can do during meal breaks might want to rethink those policies, since tying the employee’s hands and requiring them to take all breaks in the breakroom, etc., may no longer be wise, since it might not satisfy the “at liberty to use the meal period for whatever purpose he or she desires” requirement. California employers might also want to think about whether they should direct supervisors and managers to simply stay out of the breakroom (unless they are on breaks themselves), since a rather glaring hole in this holding is the possibility that employees might allege that their bosses coerced or pressured them into working, and those allegations become more feasible the more often supervisors visit the breakroom.  The court even mentioned this possibility by stating that “an employer may not undermine a formal policy of providing meal breaks by pressuring employees to perform their duties in ways that omit breaks.”

In its opinion, the Brinker court also addressed various issues regarding class certification, how to calculate when rest and meal breaks must be given, etc., but the issue above was what everyone was waiting to see resolved.

*Jason Rossiter practices in all areas of labor and employment law and has extensive experience handling employee break issues. He is licensed to practice law in California, Pennsylvania and Ohio. For more information about this and other changes to California law, contact Zashin & Rich at (216) 696-4441.

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Summer 2011, Volume XIII, Issue ii

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The Number of Wage and Hour Cases Going Up, Settlement Values Going Down

By Stephen S. Zashin*

Recent trends show the number of wage and hour lawsuits increased from 2007 to 2010. However, the settlement values for these cases have seen a sharp decline. The National Economic Research Associates, Inc. (NERA) discovered the recent trends by collecting data on 187 wage and hour cases. The collected cases include a number of allegations, such as off-the-clock work; unpaid overtime; missed, short, or late meal periods and rest breaks; employee misclassification; unpaid termination wages; failure to pay minimum wage; time shaving and improper tip pooling.

Not all the cases had a reported settlement value, but the 139 cases that did included settlements totaling $1.77 billion for an average settlement of $12.8 million per case and a median settlement of $4.3 million. During the three year period, the average settlement value declined in recent years from more than $20 million in 2007-2008, to approximately $10 million in 2009, to $7.6 million in 2010. The average per-plaintiff settlement also fell from about $8,000 in 2007 to just over $5,000 in 2010.

It is difficult to explain, for certain, the recent decrease in settlement values. One possible explanation are case-specific factors, such as the size of the potential class, the duration of the alleged class period, the number and type of allegations made in each case, and the jurisdiction involved. The number of class members participating and the duration of the class period have the greatest impact on settlement value, as settlement values increase significantly when there are a greater number of plaintiffs and/or longer class periods.

As the number of wage and hour lawsuits increase, employers must remain vigilant with their compliance efforts. If your company has any wage and hour concerns, please contact us.

* Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, is licensed to practice law in Ohio and New York. Stephen's practice encompasses all areas of employment and labor law and works extensively in defending class and collective actions. For more information about wage and hour laws or any other employment matter, please contact Stephen at 216.696.4441 or ssz@zrlaw.com.


Does Your Wellness Program Comply with the ADA?

By Jason Rossiter*

Many employers now sponsor Wellness programs for their employees. These programs serve employees by encouraging healthy habits and providing early warning of potential health concerns. They also help employers control health insurance costs. Broward County, Florida (the "County") implemented such a program. The program was voluntary, and those who participated filled out a Health Risk Assessment questionnaire and completed a finger-stick blood test to measure blood sugar and cholesterol levels. If the testing revealed certain potential health problems, the County's health insurer then offered the employee an opportunity to participate in "disease management coaching" and obtain free medications.

In 2009, the County began penalizing employees who chose not to participate in the Wellness program by charging them an extra $20 on each of their bi-weekly paychecks. In Seff v. Broward County, a County employee sued the County on behalf of a class of his co-workers, arguing that the $20 charge was a way to compel the employees to submit to the Health Risk Assessment questionnaire process, and thus forced them to undergo a medical-related inquiry in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

The ADA makes it unlawful for employers to make "inquiries" about their employees' medical or health conditions, unless the inquiries are job-related and consistent with business necessity. But the ADA contains a "safe harbor" for employers who establish, sponsor or administer "bona fide benefit plan[s] that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law." The employee in the Seff case argued that the $20 charge in essence forced employees to submit to medical inquiries in violation of the ADA, and that the safe harbor should not apply because the County's Wellness program was not truly based on any legitimate underwriting, classification, or administration risks, but instead on the County's desire to improve the health of its employees.

The court rejected these arguments and held that the safe harbor applied. The evidence showed that the County implemented the program "to classify various risks and decide what type of benefits plans will be needed in the future in light of these risks," and thus to determine "what kind of coverage will need to be provided … on a macroscopic level so it may form economically sound benefits plans for the future." In short, the County implemented the program on legitimate "insurance and risk assessment principles," rather than on "some independent desire for a healthy workforce," and thus was entitled to the benefit of the safe harbor.

Employers who sponsor Wellness programs should pay attention to this decision. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission has taken the position that any coercive element to a Wellness program – such as the $20 charge in the Seff case – renders the program potentially unlawful under the ADA. While the safe harbor in the ADA protects employers who sponsor or administer Wellness programs for bona fide risk assessment reasons, Seff demonstrates that the safe harbor does not protect employers who implement Wellness programs merely out of the altruistic desire for healthy employees.

If you have questions about whether your company's Wellness program might run afoul of the ADA, please let us know.

* Jason Rossiter practices in all areas of employment litigation and is licensed to practice law in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and California. For more information about Wellness programs or any other employment issue, please contact Zashin & Rich at 216.696.4441.


Maryland Joins Other States in Restricting Employer Use of Credit History


By Stefanie L. Baker

Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley signed Maryland's Job Applicant Fairness Act (the "Act") on April 12, 2011. The Act becomes effective October 1, 2011. Maryland joins Hawaii, Illinois, Oregon and Washington in the nationwide push to ban employer credit checks. Several other states are also considering restricting an employer's use of credit history, including: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Vermont.

The Act states that an employer may not use an applicant or employee's credit report or credit history in determining whether to:
  • Deny employment to an applicant;
  • Discharge an employee; or,
  • Determine compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
However, the Act allows an employer to use an applicant's credit report or credit history if its use is "substantially job-related." While the Act does not explicitly define "substantially job-related," it exempts certain jobs from the requirements of the Act including:
  • Positions involving money-handling (authority to issue payments, collect debts, transfer money, or enter into contracts);
  • Positions involving access to personal information of a customer, employee, or employer;
  • Confidential positions (access to company's trade secrets, intellectual property, personnel files);
  • Positions involving a fiduciary responsibility to the employer (authority to issue payments, collect debts, transfer money, or enter into contracts); and,
  • Managerial positions that control or direct part of the business.
Certain employers are exempt from the Act as well, including: any employer that is required to perform credit checks by federal or state law; financial institutions that accept deposits insured by a federal agency; and investment advisors registered with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission.

Under federal law, applicants must consent to a credit check in writing. In addition, if an employer uses a credit report under an exemption, the employer must disclose its use to an applicant or employee in writing. The Act does not prohibit employers from performing other employment-related background checks, including: driving records, criminal history investigations, and educational history investigations. However, employers must ensure these types of background checks do not include credit information.

An employee or job applicant who believes his or her employer or prospective employer violated the Act can file an administrative complaint with the Maryland's Commissioner of Labor and Industry. The Commissioner will attempt to resolve the dispute informally. If informal resolution is unsuccessful, the Commissioner may assess a fine against the employer of up to $500 for the first offense and up to $2,500 for a subsequent violation. Additionally, while the Act itself does not provide for a private cause of action in court, an employee likely could file a suit for wrongful termination or failure-to-hire under Maryland public policy.

Before October 1, 2011, Maryland employers should review their policies to make sure their use of a credit report complies with the Act.


Mandatory Breaks Required for Retail Employees in Maryland


By Michele L. Jakubs*

Maryland's Healthy Retail Employee Act (the "Act") went into effect March 1, 2011. The Act requires Maryland employers with 50 or more retail employees to provide breaks based upon the number of hours an employee works in a shift. Under the Act, a "retail establishment" is a "place of business with the primary purpose of selling goods to a consumer who is present at the place of business at the time of sale" and "retail employees" include those who are "engaged in actual sales, in a store." As such, employees who are not working in a "retail establishment," such as a corporate or other office, or do not sell are not covered by the Act and do not count toward the 50-employee requirement.

For purposes of applying the 50-employee rule, companies must include the total number of retail employees they have throughout Maryland. For example, a retailer that maintains several locations throughout the state must count all retail employees working throughout the state. However, the Act does not apply to employees who work at a single location with five or fewer employees, regardless of the number of employees the employer has throughout the state.

Covered employers must provide breaks as follows:
  • A 15-minute break for a shift of four to six consecutive hours;
  • At least a 30-minute break for a shift of 6 or more hours (an employer does not have to provide the 15-minute break if the employee is entitled to the 30-minute break); and
  • If the employee's shift is 8 or more consecutive hours, an additional 15-minute break for each additional 4 hours worked. For example, if the employee works 12 hours, the employee must get one 30-minute break plus one 15-minute break.
Restaurant employees and employees exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") are not entitled to breaks under the Act. In addition, employers are not required to provide breaks to employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement or employees with an employment policy that includes breaks equal to or greater than those required by the new law.

The Act allows for a "working shift break." For example, if the employee's work prevents the employee from being relieved during one of the employee's breaks, or the employee consumes a paid meal while working, the employee may waive the break. Employees may waive the "working shift break" by entering into a written agreement with their employer.

The Act does not address whether an employer must pay the employee for the required breaks. However, under Maryland law and the FLSA, short breaks of less than 20 minutes constitute compensable work time that must be included in the sum of all hours worked in a week.

If an employee believes their employer is violating the law, the Act provides a process for employees to file a complaint with Maryland's Commissioner of Labor and Industry. Remedies include an order directing compliance with the law and potential civil penalties of $300 to $600 per employee for each instance of non-compliance. Additionally, in limited situations, a covered employee may bring a court action to enforce the Commissioner's order and for recovery of treble damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. In order to avoid civil penalties, retailers in Maryland should review their break policies and employee handbooks to make sure they comply with these new requirements.

*Michele L. Jakubs, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of employment litigation and has extensive experience counseling employers on paid break time issues under the FLSA. For more information on Maryland's Healthy Retail Employee Act or any other FLSA compliance question, please contact Michele at 216.696.4441 or mlj@zrlaw.com.


Sexual Orientation: A Protected Class?


By George S. Crisci*

On April 25, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled that Shari Hutchinson's sexual orientation discrimination claim falls under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See Hutchinson v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of County Comm'r, No.1:08-CV-2966, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46633 (N.D. Ohio 2011). This is a potentially far-reaching decision and could prove to be the spring board for a federal law preventing workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Hutchinson, a lesbian, began working for Cuyahoga County at its Child-Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) in 2002. In 2008, she filed suit alleging, among other claims, CSEA denied her various promotions in favor of less qualified heterosexuals and that CSEA retaliated against due to her sexual orientation. Hutchinson brought her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), which prohibits the deprivation of federal rights by anyone acting under the color of state law. Hutchinson did not bring a claim under Title VII, which generally prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Cuyahoga County sought dismissal of the case on the basis that sexual orientation discrimination is not an actionable claim under Section 1983. The County based its argument, in large part, on the premise that Section 1983 mirrors Title VII and that since sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII it also is not a protected class under Section 1983. As a result, the County argued Hutchinson fails the first prong of her prima facie case in that she is not a member of a protected class. The Court, however, disagreed. While the Court acknowledged its past reliance on Title VII framework when analyzing Section 1983 claims, it ruled that rational basis review applied. The Court held "that an employee who alleges sexual orientation discrimination under § 1983 is not per se precluded from establishing an equal protection claim against her employer."

Public employers should take note of this ruling. While on its face, the ruling does not apply to private employers, they too should be aware of the court's finding. As with same-sex marriage, this case is evidence that the sexual orientation discrimination landscape is ever-changing.

* George S. Crisci, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about employment discrimination or any other labor or employment issue, please contact George at 216.696.4441 or gsc@zrlaw.com.


The EEOC Implements Regulations Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008


By David R. Vance*

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") released regulations regarding the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA") on March 25, 2011. The EEOC's regulations took effect May 24, 2011 and apply to all private, state, and local government employers with 15 or more employees. The regulations also apply to employment agencies, unions, and joint labor-management committees.

The ADAAA makes several important changes to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). While the ADAAA retains the ADA's basic definition of "disability" as "an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment," the regulations change the statutory interpretation of disability. Some of the regulation's major changes include the following:

Broad Coverage
It is now much easier for employees seeking the ADA's protection to establish the existence of a disability, as the regulation's interpretation broadens the definition of disability.

"Major Life Activities"
The regulations include two non-exhaustive lists expanding the definition of "major life activities." The first list includes many activities that the EEOC already recognized as major life activities (e.g., walking), as well as activities that the EEOC has not specifically recognized (e.g., reading, bending, communicating). The second list includes major bodily functions (e.g., "functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions"). Since these lists are non-exhaustive, the regulations include nine "rules of construction" to help employers determine if an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

"Substantially Limits"
The regulations make clear that "substantially limits" is to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage. Additionally, the regulation's interpretation of "substantially limits" requires a lower degree of functional limitation as compared to the standard previously applied by the courts. The third "rule of construction" explains that "the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment 'substantially limits' a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis." As a result, employees can show more easily that they have an impairment substantially limiting one or more major life activities.

Individualized Assessment
The regulations abolish any notion that certain medical conditions will "always" qualify as disabilities.

Episodic Conditions and Ameliorative Effects
The regulations make clear that the current effects of a disability are not the only factors that an employer must consider in determining whether a medical condition is substantially limiting. Impairments that are episodic or in remission – cancer, epilepsy, hypertension, asthma, diabetes, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia – also qualify as disabilities if substantially limiting when active.

Reasonable Accommodation
An individual must have an actual disability or record of an actual disability in order to qualify for a reasonable accommodation. Therefore, an individual who claims he or she is "regarded as" disabled will not qualify for a reasonable accommodation.

"Regarded As" Claims
Going forward, most ADA claims will likely be "regarded as" claims. An applicant is "regarded as" disabled if he or she is "subject to an action prohibited by the ADA (e.g., failure to hire or termination) based on an impairment that is not transitory and minor." The ADAAA substantially expands employer liability under the "regarded as" theory by removing the requirement that an employee prove that the perceived impairment substantially limits a major life activity. An employer may still defend a "regarded as" claim by asserting that the impairment at issue, whether actual or perceived, is both transitory and minor.

With the ADAAA and the EEOC's recent regulations, it is significantly more difficult for employers to prove that an employee's medical condition does not qualify as a disability. Therefore, employers should instead focus their ADA compliance efforts on the interactive process and providing a reasonable accommodation.

*David R. Vance has extensive experience with ADA and ADAAA compliance. For more information on the ADA or ADAAA including providing a reasonable accommodation, please contact David at drv@zrlaw.com or 216-696-4441.


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Saturday, May 1, 2010

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Summer 2010, Volume XII, Issue ii

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Unpaid Break Time for Nursing Mothers is Now Mandatory

By Michele L. Jakubs*
 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”). PPACA Section 4207 (“Section 4207”), “Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers,” amends Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act by requiring employers to grant employees who are also nursing mothers a reasonable amount of break time to express milk. The break time is unpaid and must be granted each time the employee has the need to express milk for up to one year following the birth of a child.

Employers must also designate a lactation area, other than a bathroom, that is out of sight, sufficiently private and free from intrusion.

Section 4207 does not apply to employers with less than fifty employees if compliance would impose an undue hardship on the employer. Factors for determining an undue hardship include the employer’s size, financial resources, nature of the work performed, or structure of the place of business.

Importantly, Section 4207 also does not preempt state laws that provide greater protections to nursing mothers. Several states have already implemented laws regarding the rights of nursing employees in the workplace. For example, the state of Indiana has enacted a law which protects nursing mothers in the workplace. This law has many similar provisions to those set forth in Section 4207, but it exceeds the scope of Section 4207 in that it applies to businesses with twenty-five employees or more, and it requires employers to provide a cold storage space or allow employees to bring their own portable cold storage device to store expressed milk. Ohio presently does not have a law protecting nursing employees in the workplace, but it does have a law protecting individuals nursing in public.

Section 4207 took effect immediately. However, the Department of Labor is currently establishing complimentary rules to clarify the law including enforcement procedures. Consequently, employers employing fifty or more employees should implement policies that comply with Section 4207 immediately if they have not done so already. Further, employers of all sizes should review state and local laws to ensure compliance with laws related to nursing employees.

*Michele L. Jakubs, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of employment litigation and wage and hour compliance and administration. For more information concerning changes to the Fair Labor Standards Act or any other employment issue, please contact Michele at 216.696.4441 or mlj@zrlaw.com.


Employee or Non-Employee That is the Question…

By Stephen S. Zashin*

Congress recently introduced the Employee Misclassification Prevention Act (“EMPA”) known as H.R. 5107 with its counterpart S. 3648. EMPA, if passed, would require employers to keep certain records concerning non-employees or independent contractors who perform labor or service for remuneration.

EMPA would amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by creating a special penalty for employers who misclassify employees as non-employees or independent contractors. The Department of Labor could impose fines as high as $5,000 per violation and “willful” violations would be subject to triple damages.

Presently, there are a multitude of different tests applied by various government agencies to determine whether a particular individual is an independent contractor or an employee; employers should apply the most stringent of these tests to avoid liability under the various laws for which this is an issue (including the FLSA as well as Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes).

In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) the U.S. Supreme Court examined twelve factors to determine whether the hired individual is an employee or independent contractor under common law agency principles. The Court considered most important the hiring party's ability to control the manner and means by which the work was accomplished, but stated that there were other relevant factors to look at and that no single factor outweighed another.

Employers should carefully review the following factors when determining whether a particular person should be deemed an independent contractor or an employee:
  1. The skill required;
  2. The source of the instrumentalities and tools;
  3. The location of the work;
  4. The duration of the relationship between the parties;
  5. Whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects
    to the hired party;
  6. The extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;
  7. The method of payment;
  8. The hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
  9. Whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
  10. Whether the hiring party is in business;
  11. The provision of employee benefits; and,
  12. The tax treatment of the hired party.
The consequences for making the wrong decision and misclassifying the person can be severe: liability for failure to withhold and pay the employer’s share of employment and social security taxes; liability for failure to make contributions to employee benefits plans; disqualification from retirement benefits plans; liability for wage-hour violations (such as failure to pay overtime); liability for health insurance claims under COBRA; and, liability for violations of employee’s rights under laws protecting employees from discrimination.

Employers may avoid misclassification problems by increasing the frequency of communication between workers and their employees. Employers should schedule recurring meetings with their workers to assess job duties and responsibilities; this can be done during annual performance reviews.

The passing of EMPA would heighten the importance of avoiding worker misclassification. Employers should clarify the terms of their relationship with workers and anticipate future changes. Employers who take a proactive approach to classification issues will help to minimize their risk of costly consequences and future litigation.

*Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, has extensive experience with employee classification issues. If you have classification questions or any other questions regarding employment or labor issues please contact Stephen S. Zashin at 216.696.4441 or ssz@zrlaw.com.


Handbook Disclaimer: Include One or Suffer the Consequences

By Lois A. Gruhin

Employers frequently rely on employee policy manuals and handbooks to disseminate important policies and practices. These manuals and handbooks may subject unsuspecting employers to contractual liabilities, especially when a properly crafted disclaimer is not included.

A recent Ohio Court of Appeals decision offers significant insight regarding the importance of including disclaimers in handbooks and policy manuals. According to the holding of Dunlap v. Edison Credit Union, Inc., an employer may avoid contractual liability for the contents of a handbook by including in the handbook an express disclaimer of contractual intent and a reservation of rights to change the contents of the handbook.

In Dunlap, a retiring employee sought compensation for 38.5 unused vacation days. She argued that a provision in the policy manual – “‘Employees will receive vacation pay for all unused vacation at the time of termination’” – entitled her to all of her accrued and unused vacation time dating back to 2000. In response, the employer argued that the manual was not a contract, but instead was merely a “set of guidelines.” The employer also argued that the purpose of the manual was only “to establish a framework around which the efforts of all employees can be coordinated.”

The employee manual in question contained the following additional language: “The Board of Directors and Credit Union Management may modify, suspend or delete any of the policies stated in the [policy manual] without notice. To be effective, such changes must be in writing and signed by the Manager.” Importantly, the manual also included a multi-part disclaimer:

The manual is a management guide to general human resource methods at the Credit Union. It does not promise that the policies mentioned will be applicable in any given instance. The manual does not change the employment-at-will relationship in any way.

The [manual] is not an employment contract and does not provide any enforceable contractual rights to the employee with respect to his/her terms or conditions of employment. Neither these guidelines, nor any written or oral polices, practices or procedures which may develop from these guidelines create either an express or implied employment contract.

The Court of Appeals held that these disclaimers prevented the employee from recovering her vacation time. The Court held that while, in other circumstances, handbooks and policies might form the basis of an express or implied contractual obligation, that could not be the case here in light of the disclaimers, which specifically negated the possibility of contractual intent. Because of the disclaimers, therefore, the handbook became ”merely a unilateral statement of rules and policy which creates no obligations and rights.”

This decision clarifies that employers can avoid untended contractual obligations arising out of a handbook by including a well crafted disclaimer to make it clear that there is no intent to contract, and that the employer reserves the right to change the policies in the handbook at any time.


Up in Smoke: Employers Need Not Reasonably Accommodate Medicinal Marijuana Use

By David R. Vance*

The Supreme Court of Oregon recently ruled that an employer has no duty to reasonably accommodate medical marijuana use by employees.

The Oregon Medicinal Marijuana Act (“OMMA”) authorizes persons holding a registry identification card to use marijuana for medicinal purposes and exempts those persons from criminal prosecution. The Federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) does not authorize medicinal marijuana use and classifies marijuana as an illegal drug for which criminal charges may be imposed.

In Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, the employer, Emerald Steel Fabricators (“Emerald Steel”), hired a temporary employee as a drill press operator. Unbeknownst to Emerald Steel the employee used medicinal marijuana off the clock one to three times per day. Emerald Steel considered the employee for a permanent position but fired the employee when the employee disclosed his use of medicinal marijuana. Emerald Steel fired the employee despite the fact that he provided his registry card and documentation from his treating physician attesting that medical marijuana was the most successful form of treatment for his medical condition.

Two months later, the employee filed a complaint with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (“BOLI”). The employee claimed that Emerald Steel discriminated against him in violation of Oregon Revised Statute § 659A.112, which prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual because of a disability and requires an employer to make a reasonable accommodation to those with disabilities. BOLI found that the employee was not fired based on his disability, but ruled that Emerald Steel violated Ore. Rev. Stat. § 695A.112 by failing to reasonably accommodate the employee’s disability and denying employment opportunities to an otherwise qualified person.

On appeal, Emerald Steel argued that Ore. Rev. Stat. § 659A.112 must be interpreted consistent with its federal counterpart – the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Further, Emerald Steel argued that because the ADA prohibits protection to those engaged in illegal drug use and CSA classifies marijuana as an illegal drug the employee’s use of medical marijuana is not protected by Ore. Rev. Stat. § 695A.112. The Court of Appeals upheld BOLI’s reasoning that Emerald Steel did not properly preserve its argument at the administrative level. However, the Oregon Supreme Court disagreed and proceeded with review on the merits of Emerald Steel’s argument.

The Oregon Supreme Court ruled in favor of Emerald Steeling finding that employers are not required to reasonably accommodate the use of medicinal marijuana by employees, and employers do not engage in discrimination when terminating employees for use of medicinal marijuana. The Oregon Supreme Court recognized the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), that under the Commerce Clause Congress may prohibit the possession, manufacturing and distribution of marijuana even when state law permits it for medical use. The Oregon Supreme Court furthered reasoned that as a result of Gonzalez, CSA partially preempted OMMA to the extent that OMMA explicitly authorized use of a drug CSA classified as illegal. Therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that Ore. Rev. Stat. § 695A.112, similar to the ADA, does not protect those engaged in illegal drug use. Therefore, Emerald Steel was relieved of its obligation to reasonably accommodate the employee pursuant to Ore. Rev. Stat. § 695A.112.

Strictly speaking, this decision allows Oregon employers to use discretion without being subject to discrimination claims when hiring, retaining or discharging employees who use medicinal marijuana. However, this issue remains unsettled in other jurisdictions such as California with laws similar to OMMA. Therefore, employers operating in these jurisdictions should proceed with caution when making employment related decisions related to an employee’s use of medicinal marijuana.

*David R. Vance, a member of the firm’s Cleveland office, has extensive experience with drug and alcohol issues. For more information about reasonably accommodating employees or any other employment or labor issues, please contact David at 216.696.4441 or drv@zrlaw.com.


Alcoholics Who Violate a No Call / No Show Policy Are Not Protected by the ADA

By Patrick M. Watts
 
Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in VandenBroek v. PSEG Power CT LLC, that where regular attendance is an essential job function, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) did not protect an alcoholic employee who nonetheless repeatedly violated his employer’s attendance policy.

The plaintiff in the case, Bruce VandenBroek, worked as a boiler utility operator at Power Connecticut LLC (“PSEG”). PSEG maintained a no-call/no-show rule requiring employees to call their shift supervisor before the start of a missed shift so that PSEG could arrange coverage. In 2005, VandenBroek took FMLA leave to treat back pain and recover from back surgery. In February 2006, VandenBroek violated the no-call/no-show policy on two occasions. The day after VandenBroek violated the no-call/no-show policy for a second time, he informed PSEG he was entering a program for treatment of alcoholism and drug abuse.

On March 1, 2006, VandenBroek’s physician released him for work beginning March 6, 2006. On March 2, 2006, PSEG terminated VandenBroek for violating its no-call/no-show policy. VandenBroek filed suit against PSEG alleging violations of the ADA and FMLA. Specifically, he alleged PSEG discriminated against him by terminating his employment for conduct causally related to his disability and retaliated against him for taking leave afforded to him by the FMLA.

The Second Circuit upheld the District Court’s finding that VandenBroek failed to establish a prima facie case to support his discrimination claim. Essentially, the Second Circuit agreed with the lower court that VandenBroek was not “otherwise qualified” to perform his job because PSEG could not rely on his regular attendance. The Court reasoned that while attendance is essential to most jobs, it was particularly important in this case where attendance is necessary to prevent a power outage or explosion.

Further, VandenBroek improperly relied on Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991), which held that when an employer terminates an employee based on conduct caused by a disability, the employer terminates the employee because of the employee’s disability. The District Court distinguished Teahan, a case decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, because the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4), permits employers to “hold an employee…who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the…alcoholism of such employee.”

The Second Circuit also upheld the District Court’s decision that the employer did not retaliate against VandenBroek because he had taken FMLA leave, but rather terminated the employee for a legitimate business reason: violating the employer’s “no call/no show” policy. The Court found the employer’s decision to terminate VandenBroek was unrelated to his prior FMLA absences for back pain and nasal surgery. 

VandenBroek provides only limited guidance for employers making employment related decisions when dealing with employees suffering from alcoholism. Employers making decisions to terminate employees suffering from alcoholism because of poor attendance must be prepared to show specific reasons why attendance is an essential job function. Additionally, this issue has not been decided by the United States Supreme Court. As a result, employers operating outside the Second Circuit may not be afforded similar discretion.


The Enemy From Within: The Dangers of Unrestricted Technology

By Jason Rossiter*

In a time when most employees have unlimited access to the Internet, employers must establish a clear and concise electronic information policy to avoid disclosure of sensitive and confidential information by its employees. Without a clear and concise electronic information policy, employers risk infinite abuses of employee work time, exposure to viruses, loss of trade secrets, and misuse of employer owned property.

An effective electronic information policy includes an unambiguous statement regarding the employer’s expectations of computer use, data storage, and distribution of employer owned documents. Additionally, the policy must establish simple rules regarding use of employer issued e-mail accounts, cellular and smart phones, and personal digital assistants (“PDAs”), as well as a requirement to maintain the confidentiality of employer owned documents and proprietary information. Employers must also establish ownership of networks, computers, servers, files, e-mails, and phones to reduce an employee’s expectation of privacy when using employer owned property.

Any policy should clearly define the scope of permitted internet usage. Leaving internet use entirely within the discretion of an employee may lead to the very abuses that the policy is designed to eliminate. Employers should also describe what kinds of language, material, and images employees are permitted to transmit when using employer-provided networks and computing equipment, including mobile phones. The policy should make employees aware that the employer intends to utilize technology to monitor all activity and that employees have no expectation of privacy when using company-owned systems and networks.

The policy should also prohibit employees from syncing confidential business information, including customer lists, into “cloud” based Internet services without the employer’s permission. The policy should also prohibit employees from using their own personal smartphones, mobile broadband cards, online services such as Google Voice, or other such technologies as a means of circumventing the employer’s policies or of stealing confidential data.

Most importantly, employers should enforce all of these policies by implementing monitoring mechanisms.

Employers should distribute their policy to all employees and designate a contact person who can answer questions about it. Finally, since technology changes rapidly, employers should revisit their electronic information policies at least annually.

*Jason Rossiter has extensive experience drafting and editing electronic information policies. For more information about the ever changing technology issues facing employers or any other employment or labor issue, please contact Zashin & Rich  at 216.696.4441.


On the Edge: Government Employers Walk a Thin Line When Contemplating Searches of Technology Utilized by Their Employees

By George S. Crisci*

On June 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a government employer may search employee text messages sent from a government-issued pager, despite an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy when the search is motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose and it is not excessively intrusive in light of the purpose.

In City of Ontario, California v. Quon, No. 08-1332 (June 17, 2010), the employee, Jeff Quon, alleged that his employer, the City of Ontario, (“Ontario”) and Arch Wireless (“Arch”), the pager provider, violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) by searching the text messages he made on his government issued pager.

Ontario issued its police officers pagers with text messaging capabilities. The police officers, including Quon, signed Ontario’s computer policy, which stated that Ontario “reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.” The policy did not apply explicitly to the pager text messages, although Ontario informally informed its employees that it would treat the text messages in a similar manner.

Almost immediately after the pagers were issued, Quon exceeded the number of allowed text messages for the month. Quon reimbursed Ontario for the overages. Ontario told Quon that an audit of his text messages would not occur so long as he paid for the overages. This pattern continued for the next few months, which prompted the police chief to investigate whether Ontario’s text message contract with Arch met the department’s text messaging needs. Subsequently, the police chief and Quon’s supervisor requested and obtained two months worth of text message transcripts. Upon review, they discovered Quon used his pager mostly for personal use. As a result, Ontario allegedly disciplined Quon for violating its employment policies.

Quon filed suit alleging that Ontario and Arch violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the SCA by obtaining and reviewing his text messaging transcripts, and that Arch violated the SCA by turning over the transcripts. The District Court granted Arch’s motion for summary judgment on the SCA claim, but denied the motion of Ontario and Arch as it applied to the Fourth Amendment claim. The District Court applied a two part test – whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, and whether the text message audit was reasonable – to determine whether Ontario and Arch violated Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court determined that Quon had a reasonable expectation to privacy, but Ontario had not violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the search was reasonably conducted to determine the efficacy of Ontario’s text messaging plan. The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, and instead found that Ontario’s search, while conducted for a legitimate work-related reason, was unreasonable in its scope. Quon appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that Ontario did not violate Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court did not rule on whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regards to his text messages, but instead assumed he had such an expectation of privacy, and then determined that the review of the text messages was a reasonable search.

The Supreme Court held that a search conducted by a government employer is Constitutional if it is “justified at its inception and if the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the circumstances giving rise to the search.” The Court found that Ontario’s search was justified because it was reasonable for Ontario to conduct the audit to determine the adequacy of its contract with Arch. Additionally, the scope of the search was reasonable because it was an efficient and expedient way to determine whether Quon’s text messages were work-related.

Government employers should remain cautious when searching employee information stored in government issued/owned property. Additionally, government employers should keep searches involving personal employee information limited in its scope so as to avoid violating its employees’ Fourth Amendment rights. Government employers contemplating such a search may wish to consult counsel to address issues raised in Quon prior to conducting a search involving private employee information.

*George S. Crisci, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, represents employers in all facets of labor and employment law, in both the public and private sector. For more information concerning any labor or employment issue, please contact George at 216.696.4441 or gsc@zrlaw.com.


Z&R Shorts


George Crisci’s article entitled “Recent Developments in Public Sector Collective Bargaining” has been selected for inclusion in the 2010 edition of the OSBA CLE Institute’s The Best of Labor & Employment Law.

Stephen Zashin will be part of a panel presenting “Trial: Direct and Cross of an Expert Witness on Damages” at the 47th Annual Midwest Labor & Employment Law Seminar on October 14, 2010 at the Hilton at Easton Town Center in Columbus, Ohio.  For more information go to www.ohiobar.org.

Tuesday, July 10, 2007

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Summer 2007, Volume IX, Issue ii

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BREAKS AND REST PERIODS: What are employers required to pay for under the FLSA?

By Christina M. Janice

Under federal law, employers are not required to provide employees with a lunch break or a rest period. However, when employers do provide breaks, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) sets forth criteria that determine whether an employer must pay for that break. The Department of Labor (“DOL”) and the courts generally recognize two categories of breaks: rest and meal periods.

1. Rest Periods

DOL Regulations provide that rest periods of a short duration, running from 5 minutes to “about 20 minutes,” must be included as “hours worked” by an employee. However, break time does not qualify as hours worked when the break exceeds 20 minutes, the time is sufficient for the employee to use it for his own purposes, and the employer completely relieves the employee from duty.
Employers are not required to include unauthorized extensions of work breaks as hours worked when the employer has expressly and unambiguously communicated that: (1) the authorized break is for a specific length of time; (2) an extension of the break is against company rules; and, (3) the employee will receive discipline for an extension of the authorized break.

2. Meal Periods

DOL Regulations provide that bona fide meal periods do not count as hours worked. Generally, the meal period must last 30 minutes or longer, but may be shorter under certain circumstances. DOL Regulations require that during a meal period the employer must completely relieve the employee from duty for the purpose of eating a regular meal. While some courts strictly require that the employer completely relieve the employee from duty, others utilize the “predominant benefit” test to determine whether a meal period qualifies as hours worked.

Under the predominant benefit test, a meal period will qualify as hours worked if the predominant benefits serve the employer rather than the employee. In court, an employer has the burden to demonstrate that the employee received the predominant benefit of the meal period. Courts consider factors such as (1) the limitations and restrictions placed on the employees during the meal period, (2) the extent to which those restrictions benefit the employer, (3) the duties the employer holds the employee responsible for during the meal period, (4) and the frequency by which employer interrupts the meal periods.

As the restrictions and duties become greater during the meal period, the employer likely receives the predominant benefits. When analyzing whether meal periods should be included as hours worked, employers should thoroughly review restrictions on meal periods, the duties employees must perform during those periods, and the frequency that the employer interrupts the employee’s meal period.


U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down Title VII Pay Discrimination Claim Where Unlawful Action Occurred Outside of Charging Period

By George S. Crisci, Esq.*

According to the latest Census Bureau estimates, full-time year-round female workers make 77 cents for every dollar a male earns. This statistic has not gone unnoticed by advocacy groups who believe that this situation is caused by discriminatory employment practices and by plaintiffs’ attorneys who are all too willing to take up the cause by filing pay discrimination lawsuits. A decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court will make it more difficult to bring certain types of pay discrimination claims because they will be untimely. The decision, however, does not affect all pay discrimination claims. As explained below, therefore, the much better practice is for employers to avoid becoming vulnerable to such claims by engaging in a “self-audit” of their pay practices.

A discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) is not timely unless a charge of discrimination is filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days (or 300 days in states, such as Ohio, that have a comparable state agency) after the alleged discriminatory act or decision occurs (known as the “charging period”). Courts repeatedly have had to decide whether a discrimination claim is based upon conduct that occurred during the charging period or simply involves the continuing effects of prior conduct that occurred outside the charging period. In the latter instance, the claim is untimely. This issue arises frequently in pay discrimination cases, where the employee’s claim is based upon a decision that occurred long ago, but the effects of that action are felt every time the employee receives a paycheck. The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed this issue. The Court held that many of these pay discrimination claims are untimely unless the employee’s compensation is based upon a decision that occurred during the charging period.

In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., pay raises for salaried employees were based upon performance evaluations conducted by the employees’ supervisors. Plaintiff Lilly Ledbetter, who worked for Goodyear from 1979 to 1998, claimed that one of her supervisors had retaliated against her when she rejected his sexual advances during the early 1980’s by giving her negative performance evaluations and did so again during the mid-1990’s when he allegedly falsified deficiency reports about her work. This alleged retaliation impacted the amount of her pay increases. She also claimed that this retaliatory treatment had a continuing impact upon how much she was paid. However, she waited until 1998 (shortly before she retired) before complaining to the EEOC about her pay. By the time the case went to trial, the supervisor had died. She claimed primarily that “her pay was not increased as much as it would have been had she been evaluated fairly, and that these past pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her employment.” A jury agreed with Ledbetter and awarded her damages, but the appellate court reversed because her claims were untimely.

Ledbetter argued that her pay discrimination claims were timely for two reasons. First, she contended that each paycheck issued to her during the charging period that contained an amount that was based upon prior unlawful action was a separate act of discrimination (known as the “paycheck accrual rule”). Second, she focused upon a decision denying her a pay raise that occurred during the charging period that she claimed was unlawful because it “carried forward intentionally discriminatory disparities from prior years.”

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments because neither one was based upon an alleged intentional discriminatory act that occurred during the charging period. The Court explained that “[a] disparate treatment claim comprises two elements: an employment practice and discriminatory intent,” and both have to occur during the charging period for the discrimination claim to be timely. Thus, “[t]he EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place. A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent non-discriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from past discrimination.” The Court added, however, that “if an employer engages in a series of acts each of which is intentionally discriminatory, then a fresh violation takes place when each act is committed.” Ledbetter’s claim was untimely because she “makes no claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred during the charging period or that discriminatory decisions that occurred prior to that period were not communicated to her. Instead, she argues simply that Goodyear’s conduct during the charging period gave present effect to discriminatory conduct outside of that period. But current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination . . . .” The Court suggested that Ledbetter “should have filed an EEOC charge within 180 days after each allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her.”

The Supreme Court also noted that there are important exceptions to this rule. The most prominent is a claim that is based upon a “facially discriminatory pay structure that puts some employees on a lower scale because of” some unlawful classification such as race or gender. In distinguishing between the two, the Court explained that “an employer violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging period whenever the employer issues paychecks using a discriminatory pay structure. But a new Title VII violation does not occur and a new charging period is not triggered when an employer issues paychecks pursuant to a system that is ‘facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied.’ The fact that pre-charging period discrimination adversely affects the calculation of a neutral factor (like seniority) that is used in determining future pay does not mean that each new paycheck constitutes a new violation and restarts the EEOC charging period.”

Another important exception involves claims under the Equal Pay Act (EPA). The Court noted that such claims do not require the filing of a charge nor do they require proof of discriminatory intent. Although Ledbetter originally had filed an EPA claim, the trial court dismissed that claim and Ledbetter did not pursue it on appeal.

The timeliness requirements established in Ledbetter are very helpful to employers. Previously, employers were forced to defend against pay discrimination claims that were based upon conduct that occurred many years in the past. This can prove especially difficult when the evidence tending to prove or disprove such a claim has become stale or non-existent. Employers, however, must be cautious in applying these timeliness requirements because there are some noteworthy exceptions, such as a separate claim under the federal Equal Pay Act or a claim based upon a facially discriminatory pay policy.

Employers in Ohio also should remember that the Ledbetter decision applies only to claims under federal law. Ohio courts have not yet adopted the decision and its underlying reasoning for similar claims of pay discrimination under Ohio’s discrimination statute – Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code – and there is no guarantee that the Ohio Supreme Court will do so. Moreover, the limitations period for commencing a discrimination claim under Ohio law (which does not require a charge filing before commencing a lawsuit) is much longer: six years in most cases versus 300 days under federal law. Likewise, other states also may not adopt the Ledbetter reasoning.

Employers are strongly encouraged to seek legal counsel in determining whether the favorable timeliness requirements under Ledbetter apply to a pay discrimination claim or a pay structure issue.

Finally, although the result in Ledbetter is welcome news for employers, preventative action is essential to successfully defend pay discrimination claims that are timely filed. Employers are encouraged to conduct an “employer pay equity self-audit” which is designed to assist employers in analyzing their own wage-setting policies and establishing consistent pay practices for all.

*George S. Crisci is an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law. George practices in all areas of employment and labor law. For more advice on both other employment law inquiries and traditional labor law issues, please contact George at (216) 696-4441 or gsc@zrlaw.com.


MOVIN' ON UP: Congress Passes a New Minimum Wage

By Patrick O. Peters

On May 25, 2007, President Bush signed into law the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 (the “Act”). The Act serves to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) of 1938 and increases the federal minimum wage from $5.15 an hour to $5.85 an hour on July 24, 2007, to $6.55 an hour on July 24, 2008, and to $7.25 an hour on July 24, 2009. The FLSA provides rigorous regulations that apply to all employees that include child labor, recordkeeping, and enforcement provisions in addition to rules relative to overtime compensation and the minimum wage.

The new federal minimum wage will have no immediate impact on most employers in states, such as Ohio, that have a higher state minimum wage. In November 2006, Ohio voters approved Statewide Issue 2. Issue 2 is an Amendment to Ohio’s Constitution that raised the minimum wage from $5.15 an hour to $6.85 an hour and became effective January 1, 2007. Under the Ohio Amendment, Ohio’s minimum wage will adjust annually, beginning January 1, 2008, to reflect inflation as tracked by changes to the consumer price index.

Allegations of wage and hour violations comprise one of the largest areas of potential liability for employers. Wage and hour litigation has increased 300% over the past decade and lawsuits based on FLSA violations are one of the fastest growing sources of employment-based class/collective action litigation. Wage and hour violations that commonly result in litigation include: misclassifying employees as “exempt” and failing to pay them overtime; failing to pay non-exempt employees overtime, including overtime not approved in advance; failing to pay for time worked “off the clock,” including allowing employees to arrive early to prepare for work or stay late to “close up;” and granting compensatory or “comp time” in lieu of overtime pay.

Employers should regularly conduct an audit of their wage and hour practices to minimize the risk associated with wage and hour violations. These audits include a thorough review of employee classification and payroll records and analysis of employment policies to ensure compliance with the FLSA. Taking proactive steps will help decrease an employer’s exposure to wage and hour liability, deter administrative agency investigation, and minimize exposure to litigation.

PUBLIC SECTOR UPDATE: Supreme Court Limits Unions' Rights to Use Non-Member Fees for Political Purposes

By Jon M. Dileno, Esq.*

On June 14, 2007, the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a Washington law that bars public-sector unions from spending non-members’ fees on political activity without first receiving their permission. In Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., the Court held that a state may require its public-sector unions to receive affirmative authorization before spending fees on political activities. Id. at syllabus.

While most states allow public-sector unions to levy fees on non-member employees in exchange for collective bargaining representation, the Court previously ruled that those fees may not be used for “ideological purposes not germane to the union’s collective bargaining duties.” Davenport, supra., citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235-236 (1977). These ideological purposes include unions’ political activity.

Under the Washington state law, the non-members had to grant the union permission in order for the union to use non-member fees for a purpose other than collective bargaining.

The Supreme Court held that “courts have an obligation to interfere with a union’s statutory entitlement no more than is necessary to vindicate the rights of non-members does not imply that legislatures (or voters) themselves cannot limit the scope of that entitlement.” Id. (emphasis in original). The ruling paves the way for further restrictions on public-sector unions relative to the collective bargaining fees they generate from non-members.

*Jon M. Dileno represents employers in the full spectrum of labor and employment matters in both the public and private sector. Jon’s experience in collective bargaining matters extends beyond negotiating labor contracts and covers the full gamut of collective bargaining proceedings. For more information concerning public sector collective bargaining or any other labor issue, please contact Jon at (216) 696-4441 or jmd@zrlaw.com.


TO PAY OR NOT TO PAY: Summer Interns under the Fair Labor Standards Act

By Patrick M. Watts

Generally, summer interns are employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and are entitled to minimum wage and overtime protection. However, if interns qualify as “trainees,” rather than employees, the wage and hour requirements of the FLSA do not apply.

The U.S. Supreme Court has established a six factor test to determine trainee status. If the relationship between the employer and the intern meets all six criteria, the employer can treat the intern as a trainee. An intern is a trainee if: (1) the training is similar to training that would be offered at a vocational school (even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer); (2) the training is for the intern’s benefit; (3) the intern does not displace regular employees (but may work under close supervision); (4) the employer receives no immediate advantage from the intern’s activities; (5) the intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the completion of the training; and, (6) the employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to wages for the training.

In addressing the substance of the training, courts and the Department of Labor (“DOL”) compare the curricula from community colleges and other similar institutions to determine if the employer’s training is similar. They next consider whether the skills learned are useful to the individual and transferable to other employers. For instance, one court determined that employees received general and non-transferable training when the employees assisted truck drivers by riding in trucks, moving boxes, learning general vending machine maintenance, and completing general paperwork. Equally important in the analysis is whether the intern has filled a position normally held by an employee.

The most important consideration relative to an intern’s status is the benefit of the intern’s work. In order for an intern to qualify as a “trainee,” an employer must provide training and cannot receive productive work from the intern. One court held that an employer received an immediate advantage when an intern performed productive work and the only cost to the employer was for supervision. Other courts have held that when an intern’s duties consist of simply assisting other employees, the employer receives an immediate advantage.

Courts have, however, held that employers are permitted to receive the immediate advantage of a well-trained applicant pool as a result of their training programs. While entitlement to a future position with an employer is prohibited, if an employer decides to hire a trainee, the employer does not have to compensate him until the training program has ended.

Finally, both the employer and the intern must understand that the trainee will not receive compensation for the training. While a written agreement is not required, a prudent employer attempting to meet each of the above factors should obtain written confirmation of this understanding.

Situations that satisfy each of the above requirements are limited. Generally, summer interns hold jobs that fall within the protections of the FLSA and are not “trainees”. Under most circumstances, employers must adhere to wage and hour requirements relative to summer interns as employees.

Z&R SHORTS

Zashin & Rich welcomes two attorneys to its Employment and Labor Group
Zashin & Rich recently welcomed two attorneys to the firm and to its expanding Employment and Labor Group. Jon Dileno represents employers in the full spectrum of labor and employment matters in both the public and private sector. Jon serves as chief negotiator for some of the most high profile labor negotiations in Ohio. Jon has also successfully defended both private employers and public entities in numerous cases involving discrimination, retaliation, wrongful discharge, intentional tort, and defamation.

Jon received his undergraduate degree, cum laude, from Baldwin Wallace College and his law degree from Tulane University, cum laude, where he received the Outstanding Labor Law Student Award. Jon is admitted to practice law in the State of Ohio, the United States District Court for the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Patrick Peters also recently joined Zashin & Rich. Pat's practice areas include labor relations, equal employment opportunity, employment discrimination, and all other employment related torts. Pat earned his B.B.A. from the University of Notre Dame and went on to earn his law degree, cum laude, from Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Pat is admitted to practice law in the State of Ohio and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

Please join us in welcoming Jon and Pat to Z&R!

Upcoming Seminars On June 28, 2007, Stephen Zashin and Steven Dlott will present “Interplay: Solving the FMLA, ADA and Workers’ Compensation Leave of Absence Puzzle” to the Greater Cleveland Safety Council. The event will be held at the Holiday Inn South, 6001 Rockside Road, Independence, Ohio with registration at 11:15a.m. and a luncheon meeting to follow at 11:30.am. Cost, including lunch, is $22 for members of the Council and $27 for non-members. Please contact the Greater Cleveland Safety Council at (216) 621-0059 or gcsafety@ameritech.net for more information.

On August 7, 2007, Stephen Zashin and George Crisci will speak to the Council on Education in Management’s Ohio FMLA Update 2007 seminar. Stephen will present “The Tangled Web of the FMLA, ADA, Workers' Comp, and Other Leave Laws: Pulling the Threads Apart.” George will present “Weeding-Out Fraudulent Claims and Avoiding Intermittent Leave Abuse: Effectively Using Recertification, Second and Third Opinions, and Fitness-for-Duty Examinations.” The seminar will be held in Cuyahoga Falls. To register or for more information visit www.counciloned.com or contact the Council on Education and Management at (800) 942-4494 or registration@counciloned.com.