Showing posts with label Technology Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Technology Policy. Show all posts

Saturday, May 1, 2010

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Summer 2010, Volume XII, Issue ii

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Unpaid Break Time for Nursing Mothers is Now Mandatory

By Michele L. Jakubs*
 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”). PPACA Section 4207 (“Section 4207”), “Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers,” amends Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act by requiring employers to grant employees who are also nursing mothers a reasonable amount of break time to express milk. The break time is unpaid and must be granted each time the employee has the need to express milk for up to one year following the birth of a child.

Employers must also designate a lactation area, other than a bathroom, that is out of sight, sufficiently private and free from intrusion.

Section 4207 does not apply to employers with less than fifty employees if compliance would impose an undue hardship on the employer. Factors for determining an undue hardship include the employer’s size, financial resources, nature of the work performed, or structure of the place of business.

Importantly, Section 4207 also does not preempt state laws that provide greater protections to nursing mothers. Several states have already implemented laws regarding the rights of nursing employees in the workplace. For example, the state of Indiana has enacted a law which protects nursing mothers in the workplace. This law has many similar provisions to those set forth in Section 4207, but it exceeds the scope of Section 4207 in that it applies to businesses with twenty-five employees or more, and it requires employers to provide a cold storage space or allow employees to bring their own portable cold storage device to store expressed milk. Ohio presently does not have a law protecting nursing employees in the workplace, but it does have a law protecting individuals nursing in public.

Section 4207 took effect immediately. However, the Department of Labor is currently establishing complimentary rules to clarify the law including enforcement procedures. Consequently, employers employing fifty or more employees should implement policies that comply with Section 4207 immediately if they have not done so already. Further, employers of all sizes should review state and local laws to ensure compliance with laws related to nursing employees.

*Michele L. Jakubs, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of employment litigation and wage and hour compliance and administration. For more information concerning changes to the Fair Labor Standards Act or any other employment issue, please contact Michele at 216.696.4441 or mlj@zrlaw.com.


Employee or Non-Employee That is the Question…

By Stephen S. Zashin*

Congress recently introduced the Employee Misclassification Prevention Act (“EMPA”) known as H.R. 5107 with its counterpart S. 3648. EMPA, if passed, would require employers to keep certain records concerning non-employees or independent contractors who perform labor or service for remuneration.

EMPA would amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by creating a special penalty for employers who misclassify employees as non-employees or independent contractors. The Department of Labor could impose fines as high as $5,000 per violation and “willful” violations would be subject to triple damages.

Presently, there are a multitude of different tests applied by various government agencies to determine whether a particular individual is an independent contractor or an employee; employers should apply the most stringent of these tests to avoid liability under the various laws for which this is an issue (including the FLSA as well as Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes).

In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) the U.S. Supreme Court examined twelve factors to determine whether the hired individual is an employee or independent contractor under common law agency principles. The Court considered most important the hiring party's ability to control the manner and means by which the work was accomplished, but stated that there were other relevant factors to look at and that no single factor outweighed another.

Employers should carefully review the following factors when determining whether a particular person should be deemed an independent contractor or an employee:
  1. The skill required;
  2. The source of the instrumentalities and tools;
  3. The location of the work;
  4. The duration of the relationship between the parties;
  5. Whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects
    to the hired party;
  6. The extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;
  7. The method of payment;
  8. The hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
  9. Whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
  10. Whether the hiring party is in business;
  11. The provision of employee benefits; and,
  12. The tax treatment of the hired party.
The consequences for making the wrong decision and misclassifying the person can be severe: liability for failure to withhold and pay the employer’s share of employment and social security taxes; liability for failure to make contributions to employee benefits plans; disqualification from retirement benefits plans; liability for wage-hour violations (such as failure to pay overtime); liability for health insurance claims under COBRA; and, liability for violations of employee’s rights under laws protecting employees from discrimination.

Employers may avoid misclassification problems by increasing the frequency of communication between workers and their employees. Employers should schedule recurring meetings with their workers to assess job duties and responsibilities; this can be done during annual performance reviews.

The passing of EMPA would heighten the importance of avoiding worker misclassification. Employers should clarify the terms of their relationship with workers and anticipate future changes. Employers who take a proactive approach to classification issues will help to minimize their risk of costly consequences and future litigation.

*Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, has extensive experience with employee classification issues. If you have classification questions or any other questions regarding employment or labor issues please contact Stephen S. Zashin at 216.696.4441 or ssz@zrlaw.com.


Handbook Disclaimer: Include One or Suffer the Consequences

By Lois A. Gruhin

Employers frequently rely on employee policy manuals and handbooks to disseminate important policies and practices. These manuals and handbooks may subject unsuspecting employers to contractual liabilities, especially when a properly crafted disclaimer is not included.

A recent Ohio Court of Appeals decision offers significant insight regarding the importance of including disclaimers in handbooks and policy manuals. According to the holding of Dunlap v. Edison Credit Union, Inc., an employer may avoid contractual liability for the contents of a handbook by including in the handbook an express disclaimer of contractual intent and a reservation of rights to change the contents of the handbook.

In Dunlap, a retiring employee sought compensation for 38.5 unused vacation days. She argued that a provision in the policy manual – “‘Employees will receive vacation pay for all unused vacation at the time of termination’” – entitled her to all of her accrued and unused vacation time dating back to 2000. In response, the employer argued that the manual was not a contract, but instead was merely a “set of guidelines.” The employer also argued that the purpose of the manual was only “to establish a framework around which the efforts of all employees can be coordinated.”

The employee manual in question contained the following additional language: “The Board of Directors and Credit Union Management may modify, suspend or delete any of the policies stated in the [policy manual] without notice. To be effective, such changes must be in writing and signed by the Manager.” Importantly, the manual also included a multi-part disclaimer:

The manual is a management guide to general human resource methods at the Credit Union. It does not promise that the policies mentioned will be applicable in any given instance. The manual does not change the employment-at-will relationship in any way.

The [manual] is not an employment contract and does not provide any enforceable contractual rights to the employee with respect to his/her terms or conditions of employment. Neither these guidelines, nor any written or oral polices, practices or procedures which may develop from these guidelines create either an express or implied employment contract.

The Court of Appeals held that these disclaimers prevented the employee from recovering her vacation time. The Court held that while, in other circumstances, handbooks and policies might form the basis of an express or implied contractual obligation, that could not be the case here in light of the disclaimers, which specifically negated the possibility of contractual intent. Because of the disclaimers, therefore, the handbook became ”merely a unilateral statement of rules and policy which creates no obligations and rights.”

This decision clarifies that employers can avoid untended contractual obligations arising out of a handbook by including a well crafted disclaimer to make it clear that there is no intent to contract, and that the employer reserves the right to change the policies in the handbook at any time.


Up in Smoke: Employers Need Not Reasonably Accommodate Medicinal Marijuana Use

By David R. Vance*

The Supreme Court of Oregon recently ruled that an employer has no duty to reasonably accommodate medical marijuana use by employees.

The Oregon Medicinal Marijuana Act (“OMMA”) authorizes persons holding a registry identification card to use marijuana for medicinal purposes and exempts those persons from criminal prosecution. The Federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) does not authorize medicinal marijuana use and classifies marijuana as an illegal drug for which criminal charges may be imposed.

In Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, the employer, Emerald Steel Fabricators (“Emerald Steel”), hired a temporary employee as a drill press operator. Unbeknownst to Emerald Steel the employee used medicinal marijuana off the clock one to three times per day. Emerald Steel considered the employee for a permanent position but fired the employee when the employee disclosed his use of medicinal marijuana. Emerald Steel fired the employee despite the fact that he provided his registry card and documentation from his treating physician attesting that medical marijuana was the most successful form of treatment for his medical condition.

Two months later, the employee filed a complaint with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (“BOLI”). The employee claimed that Emerald Steel discriminated against him in violation of Oregon Revised Statute § 659A.112, which prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual because of a disability and requires an employer to make a reasonable accommodation to those with disabilities. BOLI found that the employee was not fired based on his disability, but ruled that Emerald Steel violated Ore. Rev. Stat. § 695A.112 by failing to reasonably accommodate the employee’s disability and denying employment opportunities to an otherwise qualified person.

On appeal, Emerald Steel argued that Ore. Rev. Stat. § 659A.112 must be interpreted consistent with its federal counterpart – the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Further, Emerald Steel argued that because the ADA prohibits protection to those engaged in illegal drug use and CSA classifies marijuana as an illegal drug the employee’s use of medical marijuana is not protected by Ore. Rev. Stat. § 695A.112. The Court of Appeals upheld BOLI’s reasoning that Emerald Steel did not properly preserve its argument at the administrative level. However, the Oregon Supreme Court disagreed and proceeded with review on the merits of Emerald Steel’s argument.

The Oregon Supreme Court ruled in favor of Emerald Steeling finding that employers are not required to reasonably accommodate the use of medicinal marijuana by employees, and employers do not engage in discrimination when terminating employees for use of medicinal marijuana. The Oregon Supreme Court recognized the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), that under the Commerce Clause Congress may prohibit the possession, manufacturing and distribution of marijuana even when state law permits it for medical use. The Oregon Supreme Court furthered reasoned that as a result of Gonzalez, CSA partially preempted OMMA to the extent that OMMA explicitly authorized use of a drug CSA classified as illegal. Therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that Ore. Rev. Stat. § 695A.112, similar to the ADA, does not protect those engaged in illegal drug use. Therefore, Emerald Steel was relieved of its obligation to reasonably accommodate the employee pursuant to Ore. Rev. Stat. § 695A.112.

Strictly speaking, this decision allows Oregon employers to use discretion without being subject to discrimination claims when hiring, retaining or discharging employees who use medicinal marijuana. However, this issue remains unsettled in other jurisdictions such as California with laws similar to OMMA. Therefore, employers operating in these jurisdictions should proceed with caution when making employment related decisions related to an employee’s use of medicinal marijuana.

*David R. Vance, a member of the firm’s Cleveland office, has extensive experience with drug and alcohol issues. For more information about reasonably accommodating employees or any other employment or labor issues, please contact David at 216.696.4441 or drv@zrlaw.com.


Alcoholics Who Violate a No Call / No Show Policy Are Not Protected by the ADA

By Patrick M. Watts
 
Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in VandenBroek v. PSEG Power CT LLC, that where regular attendance is an essential job function, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) did not protect an alcoholic employee who nonetheless repeatedly violated his employer’s attendance policy.

The plaintiff in the case, Bruce VandenBroek, worked as a boiler utility operator at Power Connecticut LLC (“PSEG”). PSEG maintained a no-call/no-show rule requiring employees to call their shift supervisor before the start of a missed shift so that PSEG could arrange coverage. In 2005, VandenBroek took FMLA leave to treat back pain and recover from back surgery. In February 2006, VandenBroek violated the no-call/no-show policy on two occasions. The day after VandenBroek violated the no-call/no-show policy for a second time, he informed PSEG he was entering a program for treatment of alcoholism and drug abuse.

On March 1, 2006, VandenBroek’s physician released him for work beginning March 6, 2006. On March 2, 2006, PSEG terminated VandenBroek for violating its no-call/no-show policy. VandenBroek filed suit against PSEG alleging violations of the ADA and FMLA. Specifically, he alleged PSEG discriminated against him by terminating his employment for conduct causally related to his disability and retaliated against him for taking leave afforded to him by the FMLA.

The Second Circuit upheld the District Court’s finding that VandenBroek failed to establish a prima facie case to support his discrimination claim. Essentially, the Second Circuit agreed with the lower court that VandenBroek was not “otherwise qualified” to perform his job because PSEG could not rely on his regular attendance. The Court reasoned that while attendance is essential to most jobs, it was particularly important in this case where attendance is necessary to prevent a power outage or explosion.

Further, VandenBroek improperly relied on Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991), which held that when an employer terminates an employee based on conduct caused by a disability, the employer terminates the employee because of the employee’s disability. The District Court distinguished Teahan, a case decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, because the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4), permits employers to “hold an employee…who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the…alcoholism of such employee.”

The Second Circuit also upheld the District Court’s decision that the employer did not retaliate against VandenBroek because he had taken FMLA leave, but rather terminated the employee for a legitimate business reason: violating the employer’s “no call/no show” policy. The Court found the employer’s decision to terminate VandenBroek was unrelated to his prior FMLA absences for back pain and nasal surgery. 

VandenBroek provides only limited guidance for employers making employment related decisions when dealing with employees suffering from alcoholism. Employers making decisions to terminate employees suffering from alcoholism because of poor attendance must be prepared to show specific reasons why attendance is an essential job function. Additionally, this issue has not been decided by the United States Supreme Court. As a result, employers operating outside the Second Circuit may not be afforded similar discretion.


The Enemy From Within: The Dangers of Unrestricted Technology

By Jason Rossiter*

In a time when most employees have unlimited access to the Internet, employers must establish a clear and concise electronic information policy to avoid disclosure of sensitive and confidential information by its employees. Without a clear and concise electronic information policy, employers risk infinite abuses of employee work time, exposure to viruses, loss of trade secrets, and misuse of employer owned property.

An effective electronic information policy includes an unambiguous statement regarding the employer’s expectations of computer use, data storage, and distribution of employer owned documents. Additionally, the policy must establish simple rules regarding use of employer issued e-mail accounts, cellular and smart phones, and personal digital assistants (“PDAs”), as well as a requirement to maintain the confidentiality of employer owned documents and proprietary information. Employers must also establish ownership of networks, computers, servers, files, e-mails, and phones to reduce an employee’s expectation of privacy when using employer owned property.

Any policy should clearly define the scope of permitted internet usage. Leaving internet use entirely within the discretion of an employee may lead to the very abuses that the policy is designed to eliminate. Employers should also describe what kinds of language, material, and images employees are permitted to transmit when using employer-provided networks and computing equipment, including mobile phones. The policy should make employees aware that the employer intends to utilize technology to monitor all activity and that employees have no expectation of privacy when using company-owned systems and networks.

The policy should also prohibit employees from syncing confidential business information, including customer lists, into “cloud” based Internet services without the employer’s permission. The policy should also prohibit employees from using their own personal smartphones, mobile broadband cards, online services such as Google Voice, or other such technologies as a means of circumventing the employer’s policies or of stealing confidential data.

Most importantly, employers should enforce all of these policies by implementing monitoring mechanisms.

Employers should distribute their policy to all employees and designate a contact person who can answer questions about it. Finally, since technology changes rapidly, employers should revisit their electronic information policies at least annually.

*Jason Rossiter has extensive experience drafting and editing electronic information policies. For more information about the ever changing technology issues facing employers or any other employment or labor issue, please contact Zashin & Rich  at 216.696.4441.


On the Edge: Government Employers Walk a Thin Line When Contemplating Searches of Technology Utilized by Their Employees

By George S. Crisci*

On June 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a government employer may search employee text messages sent from a government-issued pager, despite an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy when the search is motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose and it is not excessively intrusive in light of the purpose.

In City of Ontario, California v. Quon, No. 08-1332 (June 17, 2010), the employee, Jeff Quon, alleged that his employer, the City of Ontario, (“Ontario”) and Arch Wireless (“Arch”), the pager provider, violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) by searching the text messages he made on his government issued pager.

Ontario issued its police officers pagers with text messaging capabilities. The police officers, including Quon, signed Ontario’s computer policy, which stated that Ontario “reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.” The policy did not apply explicitly to the pager text messages, although Ontario informally informed its employees that it would treat the text messages in a similar manner.

Almost immediately after the pagers were issued, Quon exceeded the number of allowed text messages for the month. Quon reimbursed Ontario for the overages. Ontario told Quon that an audit of his text messages would not occur so long as he paid for the overages. This pattern continued for the next few months, which prompted the police chief to investigate whether Ontario’s text message contract with Arch met the department’s text messaging needs. Subsequently, the police chief and Quon’s supervisor requested and obtained two months worth of text message transcripts. Upon review, they discovered Quon used his pager mostly for personal use. As a result, Ontario allegedly disciplined Quon for violating its employment policies.

Quon filed suit alleging that Ontario and Arch violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the SCA by obtaining and reviewing his text messaging transcripts, and that Arch violated the SCA by turning over the transcripts. The District Court granted Arch’s motion for summary judgment on the SCA claim, but denied the motion of Ontario and Arch as it applied to the Fourth Amendment claim. The District Court applied a two part test – whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, and whether the text message audit was reasonable – to determine whether Ontario and Arch violated Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court determined that Quon had a reasonable expectation to privacy, but Ontario had not violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the search was reasonably conducted to determine the efficacy of Ontario’s text messaging plan. The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, and instead found that Ontario’s search, while conducted for a legitimate work-related reason, was unreasonable in its scope. Quon appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that Ontario did not violate Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court did not rule on whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regards to his text messages, but instead assumed he had such an expectation of privacy, and then determined that the review of the text messages was a reasonable search.

The Supreme Court held that a search conducted by a government employer is Constitutional if it is “justified at its inception and if the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the circumstances giving rise to the search.” The Court found that Ontario’s search was justified because it was reasonable for Ontario to conduct the audit to determine the adequacy of its contract with Arch. Additionally, the scope of the search was reasonable because it was an efficient and expedient way to determine whether Quon’s text messages were work-related.

Government employers should remain cautious when searching employee information stored in government issued/owned property. Additionally, government employers should keep searches involving personal employee information limited in its scope so as to avoid violating its employees’ Fourth Amendment rights. Government employers contemplating such a search may wish to consult counsel to address issues raised in Quon prior to conducting a search involving private employee information.

*George S. Crisci, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, represents employers in all facets of labor and employment law, in both the public and private sector. For more information concerning any labor or employment issue, please contact George at 216.696.4441 or gsc@zrlaw.com.


Z&R Shorts


George Crisci’s article entitled “Recent Developments in Public Sector Collective Bargaining” has been selected for inclusion in the 2010 edition of the OSBA CLE Institute’s The Best of Labor & Employment Law.

Stephen Zashin will be part of a panel presenting “Trial: Direct and Cross of an Expert Witness on Damages” at the 47th Annual Midwest Labor & Employment Law Seminar on October 14, 2010 at the Hilton at Easton Town Center in Columbus, Ohio.  For more information go to www.ohiobar.org.

Tuesday, June 3, 2008

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Spring 2008, Volume X, Issue ii

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TIMELINESS: Seventh Circuit Upholds 15-Day FMLA Medical Certification Requirement

By Stephen S. Zashin*

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld summary judgment in favor of an employer that terminated a married couple where each spouse failed to provide timely medical certification for their absences in accordance with the employer’s federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) policy. In Townsend-Taylor v. Ameritech Services, Inc., the employer terminated both Diedre Townsend-Taylor and her husband, Ronnie, due to excessive unexcused absences.

Though Ameritech conceded that it could not shirk its responsibilities under the FMLA by outsourcing the administration of its policy, Ameritech contracted with an entity – FMLA Processing Unit (“FPU”) – to administer its FMLA claims. Consistent with FPU’s policy, an Ameritech employee who requests FMLA leave is given a “Certification of Health Care Provider” form and is told that his doctor must submit the completed form to FPU within 15 days, the minimum time employers must afford employees under the FMLA, “unless it is not practicable under the particular circumstances to do so despite the employee's diligent, good faith efforts.” See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b). In practice, FPU gave employees 20 days before it considered the certification untimely.

In 2004, Ronnie Taylor missed several days of work to care for his child who had an infection. Upon his return on May 3, he requested FMLA leave and was given a Certification form. When FPU had not received a completed form on May 24, it issued a notice of denial of his FMLA leave request. The notice also provided that Ronnie would have an additional 15 days to submit proof of extenuating circumstances for his failure to timely file the Certification.

During the 15-day period for proof of extenuating circumstances, the child’s doctor sent FPU a letter indicating that he had either faxed directly to FPU or given to the child’s parents a completed Certification form on “at least 3 separate occasions.” FPU denied that it had received the Certification form. Ronnie suggested that he had used his wife’s form, crossing out her name and replacing it with his, when submitting the Certification to the child’s physician. In addition to the employee’s name, the preprinted form contained a barcode identifying the Ameritech employee. Ronnie speculated that, because he had used his wife’s form, the Certification was placed in her file and not his own. The Certification form was never found in Diedre’s FMLA file.

The Court was not persuaded. Finding the doctor and Ronnie’s speculation questionable (“it is hardly likely that he handed the same form to the parents three times”), the Court concluded that – by knowingly using the wrong form, his wife’s – Ronnie admittedly did not comply with FPU’s Certification requirement. The Court further rejected Ronnie’s argument that Ameritech should have allowed him to resubmit the physician’s Certification following the May 24 notice, holding that by allowing Ronnie to provide “the Certification within a new, extended deadline – a scenario that could, in theory, repeat itself ad infinitum … a ‘deadline’ (under the Regulations) would have no meaningful significance and no actual consequence.”

The Court similarly dismissed Ronnie’s claims that the FMLA policy – which required completion of the Certification by the medical provider – interfered with his FMLA rights. The Court reasoned that an employee could forge and/or embellish a doctor’s letter. By requiring the provider to complete the form, the employer permissibly adopted, “reasonable, non-burdensome measures for preventing fraud. Reasonable measures are not interferences with rights.” The Court concluded that if Ronnie was unsure as to whether his child’s doctor had submitted the form, he was within his rights prior to the expiration of the 20-day deadline to check with FPU to make sure that the completed form arrived. “If it has not arrived, he can obtain an extension of time sufficient to enable him to assure FPU’s receipt of the form. If his doctor does not cooperate – suppose he’s on vacation and as a result unable to submit the medical certification in time – that would be an extenuating circumstance that could excuse missing the deadline.”

Like her husband, Diedre similarly failed to adhere to FPU’s policy relative to the FMLA medical certification requirement. Mrs. Taylor missed several days of work due to an undisclosed back problem. Upon her return to Ameritech, she requested FMLA leave and received a Certification form. “She waited 12 days after receiving the form to give it to her doctor, who did not get the completed form to FPU for another nine days, with the result that Mrs. Taylor missed the deadline” by a single day. In the notice denying her FMLA leave, FPU provided Diedre 15 days to establish extenuating circumstances for the failure to timely file the Certification form. During that period, Diedre’s physician explained that her delay in returning the form resulted from the fact that she only worked two days per week.

For her part, Diedre testified that the day she presented the form to her doctor - 12 days after receiving it – was her first day off since returning to work. She also testified that her work hours were the same as the clinic where she was treated, from about 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. She later admitted, however, that the clinic would open as early as 7:00 a.m. and that she could have easily dropped the form off on her way to work. The Court dismissed Diedre’s excuses and held that, even if her work hours mimicked the clinic’s hours and her doctor was only available two days per week, she could have called the clinic and made arrangements to get the form to her doctor.

The Court further held that Ameritech’s response to Diedre missing the deadline by one day was “harsh” but that “hers was a case of the last straw. She had a history of failed attempts to justify absences as being authorized by the FMLA. Both Taylors were problem employees, and Ameritech was not required to exhibit more patience than the law and its own rules required.” The Court further concluded that “it is most unlikely that the back condition that precipitated her application for FMLA leave was a ‘serious health condition,’” as there was no evidence she suffered from a chronic serious health condition and “it appears that she missed only three days of work.”

As demonstrated by the holding of the Seventh Circuit, an employer may enforce reasonable time limits on an employee’s submission of FMLA medical certification. Absent timely submission of the certification – assuming no evidence of extenuating circumstances – an employer may treat the absence as an unapproved absence and impose discipline up to and including termination.

*Stephen Zashin is an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law and has extensive experience in defending employers in FMLA litigation, as well as counseling employers on FMLA compliance. For more information about medical certifications or other questions about the Family and Medical Leave Act, please contact Stephen at 216.696.4441 or ssz@zrlaw.com.


“It’s For Work!!” – Can a PDA Lead to Unintended Overtime Consequences?

By Michele L. Jakubs*

Advanced communication technology is becoming increasingly commonplace among all types of industries and employers. From virtual private networking (“VPN”) applications that allow employees a secure “log in” to their company’s server from a remote location using an internet connection, to company email becoming accessible anywhere, anytime with the use of a web-based interface, employees have more options available to them today to work from anywhere around the globe. Employers make work communications even easier when they provide their employees with a personal digital assistant, or PDA, such as a Treo, BlackBerry, or iPhone.

Oftentimes, employees with these devices and access to company technology “after hours” are exempt from federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and state regulations relative to overtime and the minimum wage. These include those employees that satisfy Department of Labor (“DOL”) criteria for “exempt” employees and pass three “tests” depending on (a) how much they are paid, (b) how they are paid, and (c) what kind of work they do. Exempt employees must be paid on a salary basis, must make at least $455 a week, and must perform exempt job duties such as executive, professional, and administrative functions. Determining whether an employee is exempt requires a case-by-case analysis of the employee’s job duties consistent with DOL guidance. While some job classifications (attorneys and other professionals, for example) are almost always exempt, others are not as clear (inside sales people are usually not exempt, while outside sales people are; similarly, while registered nurses are exempt, licensed practical nurses are not). When job duties overlap (a licensed engineer performing inside sales work, for example), an employer must analyze the employee’s position to determine whether or not the FLSA and state overtime and minimum wage requirements apply.

These considerations come into play when dealing with the case of a nonexempt employee that has access to company e-mail from home and/or is issued a PDA. A common example is the nonexempt clerical worker who checks and sends email from home either before or after work. When workers are given PDAs – with unfettered access to company communications at all hours – the situation can become even more problematic. The FLSA requires employers to compensate nonexempt employees for any time spent on work-related tasks, even if those tasks involve checking and responding to e-mail from the comfort of a living room couch. Prudent employers should articulate clear policies to ensure that they comply with overtime and minimum wage requirements.

To avoid paying overtime, employers should have a policy in place that nonexempt employees may not check e-mail or return phone calls outside of normal business hours unless they have advanced authorization. Absent approval, employees should not work these hours. When a nonexempt employee violates this policy, the employer should reprimand the employee consistent with company policy. The employer must, however, pay the employee in accordance with the FLSA for the overtime that the employee worked.

Conversely, if an employer wants nonexempt employees to respond to phone calls or emails outside of regular working hours, the employer should have a system in place that requires employees to properly track their time. Such a system should facilitate paying employees for all hours worked. Either way, employers should implement a clear policy and make sure that it universally enforces that policy. The worst thing for an employer to do is to recognize that nonexempt employees are checking e-mail and returning phone calls outside of regular working hours and ignore it.

Additionally, employers should think carefully about which company employees are given outside access to the company server and email via a PDA. To limit liability, employers should only make the devices available to those employees who actually need them. The great majority of employees who utilize this technology are exempt; however, as these practices become more common and nonexempt employees are “wired” through a PDA or home computer, employers should be wary of potential wage and hour violations.

*Michele L. Jakubs, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of employment litigation and wage and hour compliance and administration. For more information concerning compliance with any aspect of the FLSA, please contact Michele at 216.696.4441 or mlj@zrlaw.com.


LET YOU GO: How to Avoid Litigation When Terminating an Employee

By Patrick O. Peters

The great majority of employment discrimination lawsuits and administrative charges result following the termination of an employee’s employment. When an employee loses his/her job, the ex-employee has an increased economic incentive to consult with a plaintiff’s attorney and/or pursue litigation or administrative relief and loses the disincentive to litigation inherent in an ongoing employer-employee relationship. Moreover, the employee’s hurt feelings resulting from a sudden job loss can contribute to feelings of vengeful retaliation against the employer – justified or not – causing the employee to seek retribution in a legal forum.

The best defense against an employment discrimination and/or wrongful discharge lawsuit is developed prior to or at the time of termination, not after the lawsuit is filed. To that end, prudent employers should take steps to both avoid litigation and carefully execute the termination so as to increase their chances of defeating a discharged employee’s claims.

NO SURPRISES. Throughout an employee’s employment, employers should conduct regular performance evaluations and implement an objective system of discipline that includes documented reports of performance deficiencies. In addition, employers should clearly communicate their employment policies to employees, including any employee handbook, harassment policy, and the employee’s job description. Documents evidencing an employee’s employment history are vital to support an employer’s non-discriminatory motive for terminating an employee’s employment.

Immediately before terminating an employee, employers should consider suspending the employee to investigate any specific incidents that give rise to the termination. Employers have broad authority to conduct internal investigations. Employers should take advantage of this right, talk to as many supervisors, co-workers, and subordinates as necessary to learn all of the relevant facts.

Most importantly, employers should allow the subject employee an opportunity to respond prior to the official termination. The employee may admit some, most, or all of the accusations, and provide useful admissions that may benefit the employer in future litigation. Even if the employee admits nothing, the employer can limit the employee to one set of facts. It is better for employers to hear the employee’s side of story before a possible deposition, months if not years following the termination.

TELL THE TRUTH. The best advice an employer can follow when terminating an employee is to give an honest reason for the employee’s termination. This is not moral guidance, but sound legal counsel. As the saying goes, no good deed goes unpunished. Rather than identifying an employee’s performance deficiencies as the catalyst for his termination, an employer might choose to “soften the blow” and tell the employee that he is being let go due to a reduction in force, or an economic lay off. This is a common mistake. The worst thing that an employer can do when terminating an employee is to give a dishonest reason for the termination that later will be cited as “pretext” for discrimination, retaliation, and/or wrongful discharge.

The communicated reason for the termination should also mirror the employee’s documented performance deficiencies. Having a good reason for termination is not enough – the employer’s statements and documentation must square with that good reason, and contrary statements or documentation will work against it.

BE PROFESSIONAL AND BE PREPARED. While an employer should speak truthfully when discharging an employee, employers should not use the opportunity to be gratuitously cruel or mean-spirited. “Rubbing it in” does no good for the employer and can create hard feelings on the part of the employee that can later result in an administrative charge or employment litigation. The difference between having a lawsuit and not having one may result from how the employer communicated the discharge.

Prior to a termination meeting, employers should keep news of an employee’s impending discharge private and not allow the decision to “leak” out among the workforce. News of a termination should come from the employee’s direct manager or supervisor at the end of the work day, in a private meeting with a witness (an HR employee or other manager), with minimal disruption to other employees.

At the termination meeting, employers should be firm and professional, but compassionate and respectful. Employers should summarize reasons for the termination and use specific examples. While employers should welcome questions and explain their rationale, they should avoid debating the decision with the employee.

TIE UP LOOSE ENDS. First, employers must make sure that the employee receives all owed compensation. Wage and hour litigation has increased rapidly and substantively favors the employee. Employees can often collect double or triple damages, costs of litigation, attorneys’ fees, and civil and criminal fines.

Second, employers should review and comply with any agreements they have with the employee. While most employees are “at will,” some employees have an employment contract or other agreement such as a non-competition/non-solicitation agreement. When planning for a termination, employers should review their obligations pursuant to these contracts and ensure that their actions comply with such agreements. Employers should also inform discharged employees of any ongoing obligations following the termination, such as a continued duty to protect the employers’ trade secrets.

Finally, depending on the circumstances, employers should consider offering severance pay in exchange for a release of claims from the employee. In some situations, offering a few weeks’ salary for the employee to waive any right to future litigation might save the employer thousands of dollars in litigation costs. Employers should ensure that their release documents are up to date and include any possible claims the employee might have.

In the end, it is impossible to predict the future with respect to litigation arising from an employee’s termination. Employers should plan and execute terminations carefully, however, to minimize their risk and exposure to litigation, and to maximize their chances of winning potential claims and lawsuits.

SURVEY SAYS – Some Employers Not Complying With The FMLA

By Patrick M. Watts

A recent study by the Families and Work Institute (“FWI”) found that many employers fail to comply with the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Interestingly, the difference between large employers (18%) – those with more than 1,000 employees – and small employers (21%) that failed to comply with the FMLA was statistically insignificant.

The FMLA requires covered employers, those with 50 or more employees within a 75-mile radius, to provide at least 12 weeks unpaid leave and job restoration benefits to covered employees in certain circumstances such as the employee and/or family member’s serious health condition, the birth of a child, or adoption and/or foster-care placement. In addition, the FMLA was recently expanded to include “qualifying exigencies,” as that term is to be defined by the Department of Labor, related to military service.

The 2008 National Study of Employers conducted by the FWI found that 24% of covered employers did not offer at least 12 weeks of paternity leave; 15% did not offer at least 12 weeks of maternity leave; 19% did not offer adoption and/or foster-care leave; and 16% did not offer FMLA benefits to their employees for the care of an employee’s spouse or children with serious health conditions.

Employers – especially growing employers who, as they add employees, become covered employers under the FMLA – should regularly update their leave policies and train their human resource personnel to ensure that they are complying with the FMLA. Moreover, employers with covered employees in different states must be aware of and comply with various state laws that may require both paid and unpaid leave. Finally, all covered employers should have their current FMLA policies updated to comply with the recently passed National Defense Authorization Act.

Z&R Shorts


Upcoming Speaking Engagements
June 19, 2008
Steve Dlott will present “Defending Workers’ Compensation Claims” to the Lake/Geauga Chapter of the Society for Human Resource Management (“SHRM”) as part of the “Effective HR – It’s All About People!” workshop on June 19, 2008 at the Radisson Hotel/Eastlake. For more information or to register, call (440) 392-2168 or email: info@lgashrm.org.

June 23, 2008
George Crisci will speak at the 8th Annual Northern Ohio Labor & Employment Law Conference at the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association on June 23, 2008. George will present “Public Collective Bargaining Developments” to the conference.

October 16 and 17, 2008
George Crisci and Stephen Zashin will speak at the 45th Annual Midwest Labor and Employment Law Seminar presented by the Ohio State Bar Association October 16 and 17, 2008 in Columbus. George will present “Public Collective Bargaining Developments” to the conference and Stephen will present an update on FMLA and other leave law.

Stephen Zashin admitted to the New York Bar Stephen Zashin was admitted to the New York State Bar and to the bar of the federal district court for the Southern District of New York.

Wednesday, July 12, 2006

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Summer 2006, Volume VIII, Issue iii

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RAIN ON YOUR COMPANY PARADE: Workers' Comp Liability Can Dampen Employer-Sponsored Social Events

By Steven P. Dlott

Summertime ranks a close second to the holiday season as the most popular time for employer-sponsored social events. Many of us fondly (or not so fondly) recall attending company picnics as kids. These days, events such as company-sponsored amusement park days are more common than company picnics. Regardless of the activity, every employer hosting a summer social event for its employees should be aware of its potential liability for employee injuries occurring during such an event.

Some employers mistakenly assume that an employee's voluntary participation in a company-sponsored recreational event eliminates any employer liability. While some states have adopted that concept, Ohio has not. The event also need not occur on the employer's premises to impose employer liability for an employee's injury.

The seminal case in Ohio, Kohlmayer v. Keller, involved an employee who injured himself during a company picnic and sued to participate in the workers' compensation fund. In finding the employer liable for the injury, the Ohio Supreme Court articulated the factors that indicated that the employee's attendance at the picnic was "logically related to his employment":
  • the employer sponsored the event;
  • the employer paid for the event;
  • the employer supervised the event; and
  • the employer's purpose was to provide employees with an outing to improve employee relations.
The Court reasoned that the "improved employee relationships" resulting from an employer-sponsored event benefited the employer and thus related to the person's employment:
[i]mproved employee relationships which can, and usually do, result from the association of employees in a recreational setting produce a more harmonious working atmosphere. Better service and greater interest in the job on the part of the employees are its outgrowths...Thus, business-related benefits...which may be expected to flow to the employer from sponsoring a purely social event for his employees, are sufficiently related to the performance of the required duties of the employee so that it is 'correct to say that the Legislature intended the enterprise to bear the risk of injuries incidental to the company event.'
As a result, the key to ascertaining workers' compensation liability for an employee injury at a company-sponsored event is the degree of employer involvement. Assuming the employer sponsored the event, the next question is whether the company paid for the event. Resolution of that issue becomes murky if the company paid for only a portion of the event (especially in the case of a company-sponsored amusement park day).

Courts will also consider the amount of employer supervision. The amusement-park-day example likely favors employers because employers rarely have any control or supervisory authority over the amusement park's site. However, the analysis might change if the company rented out an entire park or the particular site where an injury occurred (e.g., a picnic area). Finally, an analysis of whether the event produced "improved employee relationships" will almost always result in employer liability. An employer's very purpose in sponsoring such events is often to improve employee relations.

Perhaps the best advice for an employer planning a summertime social event for employees is – less is more. The less company involvement, the greater the likelihood that a court will not hold an employer liable for an employee injury sustained during a company-sponsored activity.

SIXTH CIRCUIT CONFIRMS IT: Pregnancy Discrimination Act Does Not Demand Better Treatment for Pregnant Employees

By Michele L. Jakubs*

How does an employer accommodate a pregnant employee when the employee's condition affects her ability to work? In Reeves v. Swift Transportation, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently confirmed that employers must treat pregnant employees the same as all other employees--no better, no worse.

The employee in this case worked as a truck driver beginning in August 2002. When she applied for the job, the company informed her that the job required bending, twisting, climbing, squatting, crouching, and balancing. The company also informed her that the job sometimes required strenuous physical activity, including pushing or pulling up to 200 pounds of freight with a dolly, pushing up to 100 pounds without mechanical aid, and lifting sixty pounds over her head. During the application process, the employee represented that she could bear the level of physical strain that the job required.

In November 2002, the employee learned that she was pregnant. She saw her doctor, who restricted her to light work pending her first appointment with an obstetrician. When the employee returned to work with her doctor's note, the employer told her it had no light work for her to do and sent her home.

The employer had a policy of providing light-duty work--but only to employees who had been injured on the job. Injured employees received light-duty assignments like office work.

The employee visited her obstetrician, who told the employee that she could continue working if she performed light work only and did not lift more than twenty pounds. The obstetrician gave the employee a letter setting forth these restrictions.

The employee told her employer that she could not perform regular truck driver duties but continued to request special light duty work assignments. The employer continued to inform her that it had no light duty work for her. The employee continued to contact her employer every day to request light duty work, which the employer continued to inform her it did not have for her. The employee was also not entitled to leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act because she had worked for the company for less than one year. The employer terminated the employee in late November 2002.
The employee filed suit in federal court, alleging violations of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"). The PDA provides, in part:
[w]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work...
The lower court found in favor of the employer, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The employee attempted to argue that the employer's light-duty policy was direct evidence of discrimination. The Court disagreed because "the Act merely requires employers to 'ignore' employee pregnancies" and the employer's policy was "indisputably pregnancy-blind." It did not grant or deny light work on the basis of pregnancy, but on the non-pregnancy basis of whether there had been a work-related injury or condition. The court found, therefore, that the policy's express terms could not serve as direct evidence of discrimination.

The court then performed an indirect evidence analysis. The court found that the employee met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. The employer met its burden of establishing a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the employee, i.e., she could not perform the heavy lifting required of truck drivers.

The employee could not establish that the employer's reason was pretext for discrimination. As a result, her claim failed. The court also noted that the employee failed to produce evidence tending to prove a discriminatory motive, nor did she even allege that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. Finally, the court accepted the reasoning of other courts that the PDA requires only equal treatment.

The employer had two things going for it: a clear policy and supervisors who understood its application. Employers should have policies that are "pregnancy-blind." In addition, employers should ensure that their supervisors apply their policies uniformly. Finally, keep in mind that any analysis of a situation like this should include an understanding of other state and federal law implications. When in doubt, consult your legal counsel.

*Michele Jakubs practices in all areas of employment litigation. For more information about light-duty work policies or pregnancy discrimination, please contact Michele at (216) 696-4441 or mlj@zrlaw.com.

TURNING A BLIND EYE: When Technology Policies At Work Aren't Put To Work

By Helena Oroz*

Employee email and internet monitoring are really nothing new. Most employers have had such policies and practices in place for years. An employer's right to monitor the use of its own equipment and communication systems is pretty solid if employees are on notice. So why does a New Jersey state case involving internet monitoring have everyone so excited? Instead of a case about employee privacy, the court was confronted with questions about an employer's duty and liability to third parties when it turns a blind eye to harmful computer use.

The case. In Doe v. XYC Corporation, an accountant used his work computer to not only access pornographic websites but also to store and transmit child pornography. Several individuals at his company knew of the employee's activities but failed to take further action. The court's decision describes at least six incidents of managers learning of the employee's activities but doing virtually nothing. Starting in 1998 or 1999, the employer's Internet Services Manager and Senior Network Administrator noticed that the employee's computer log reports showed visits to porn sites, told the employee to stop, but informed no one else.

The employer's conflicting company policies concerning internet and email monitoring apparently also contributed to the inertia. In early 2000, the employee's immediate supervisor told the Senior Network Administrator that the employee was visiting inappropriate websites. The Administrator reviewed only the employee's logs, which again showed visits to porn sites, and informed the employee's supervisor and the Director of Network and PC Services. The Director told the Administrator to never again access employee internet logs. Her concern was a 1999 policy communicated to certain management personnel forbidding any employee from monitoring any other employee's computer use "just for the sake of monitoring."

However, the employer also had an email and internet policy that stated that all email messages were the property of the employer and reserved the employer's right to review and access all email messages. The policy further stated that employees were permitted to access only business-related websites and provided that any employee aware of a violation of the policy was to notify personnel. Further, the policy warned that violators would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination.

The employee continued his activities through 2000 and 2001. In March 2001, after a co-worker complained about the employee, the employee's supervisor learned that the employee was again accessing porn sites – as well as at least one that mentioned children. The employee's supervisor told the employee to stop his inappropriate computer usage. In June 2001, although he noticed that the employee had reverted to his old behavior, the supervisor told no one and left on a business trip. By the time he returned, the employee had been arrested on child pornography charges. Days before the arrest, the employee had transmitted three photos of his stepdaughter from his work computer to a child porn site to gain access to it.

The child's mother, who had married the employee the year before, sued the company. The mother alleged that the Company knew or should have known that the employee was using its equipment to view and download child pornography and had a duty to report the conduct to the proper authorities, which it breached. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that the company "acted as a reasonably prudent corporation" and had "no duty to investigate the private communications of its employees."

On appeal, the court first addressed the fact that the employer had the ability to monitor employee Internet use. Second, the court addressed the employer's right to monitor employee Internet use. The company had a technology policy in place, the employee was aware of it, his office had no doors, and his screen was visible to everyone. The court held that the employee "had no legitimate expectation of privacy that would prevent his employer from accessing his computer to determine if he was using it to view adult or child pornography." Next, the court determined that the employer was on notice of the employee's activities and that further investigation would have "readily uncovered the full scope of Employee's activities." Individuals at the Company were also aware that the employee resided with a young child.

Finally, the court had to determine the heart of the matter – did the employer have a duty to act on its knowledge? The court concluded that the duty exists, based on the strong public policy against child pornography reflected in state and federal laws, coupled with the public policy favoring exposure of crime. The court thus agreed with the plaintiff that the company had a duty to report the employee's activities to the proper authorities and to take effective internal action to stop the employee's activities, whether by termination or otherwise.

The court also rejected the trial court's analysis of the employer's duty to control the employee while he was acting outside the scope of his employment to prevent him from harming others. The court determined that the employer was "under a duty to exercise reasonable care to stop Employee's activities, specifically his viewing of child pornography, which by its very nature has been deemed by the state and federal lawmakers to constitute a threat to 'others;' those 'others' being the children who are forced to engage in or are unwittingly made the subject of pornographic activities." The court remanded the case for determination of proximate cause.

The analysis. Analyses of Doe have resulted in fearful employers wondering how far courts may eventually extend this duty to report employee activities to authorities. While the duty discussed in Doe may be new, the case reinforces "dos and don'ts" that already exist:
  • DO promulgate an effective technology policy and ensure that all employees are aware of it. While it is not necessary or desirable to have employees feel like "Big Brother" is constantly watching their every move, you do need to ensure that employees are on notice that their workplace communications are subject to monitoring.
  • DO enforce your technology policy. Determine in advance what the internal course of action will be if you discover an employee accessing inappropriate websites or the like.
  • DON'T have conflicting policies in place. You cannot issue or review your technology policy in a vacuum – ensure that your policies are in sync with each other to avoid confusion and misapplication.
  • DON'T assume that a verbal warning will end what could be compulsive, destructive, or even harmful behavior.
  • DON'T turn a blind eye to criminal behavior. This is really the baseline rule illustrated by the Doe case.
*Helena Oroz practices in all areas of employment law and compliance issues.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE: It Is Just for At-Will Employees

By Robert W. Hartman

For a while, under Ohio law it was a foregone conclusion that only an at-will employee could bring a lawsuit alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The Ohio Supreme Court first recognized an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine – when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason that violates Ohio's public policy – in 1989 in Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc. 

Then, in 2003, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School District, and no one was sure anymore. In Coolidge, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an employee receiving temporary total disability under the Workers' Compensation Act may not be discharged solely on the basis of absenteeism if the inability to work is directly related to the condition for which the employee is on disability. The employee in that case was a teacher who was subject to a collective bargaining agreement, so the question became: could unionized employees bring claims for wrongful discharge?

The employee in Urban v. Osborn Manufacturing, Inc. apparently thought this was the case--and brought her case for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy to court. The employee was a union member and subject to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Under the terms of the CBA, she could not be fired without just cause. The CBA also provided a comprehensive dispute resolution program for disputes concerning discipline or termination.

The employee initially worked as an operator, but the employer eliminated the position and transferred her to another department. The employee complained to management that her new work area was infested with pigeon droppings and asked the company to remove the droppings. The employee told her supervisor that she would contact the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) if the company did not remove the droppings. The employee never filed a formal complaint with OSHA, but continued to complain to her employer. She next complained to the company president about the droppings.

At about the same time, the employee began receiving warnings about her work performance. About one month later, the employer terminated the employee for continued poor performance. The employee's union filed a grievance on her behalf but later withdrew it. The employee then filed suit in court alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in the employer's favor.

On appeal, the employee argued that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim. The employee urged the court to ignore prior cases that declined to extend wrongful discharge to union employees. In 1995, in Haynes v. Zoological Society of Cincinnati, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a CBA specifically limited the power of the employer to terminate the employee, and thus took the employee outside the context of employment at-will, and outside the class of employees for whom the wrongful-discharge tort provides protection.

The employee nonetheless urged the court to expand the holding in Coolidge to find that members of a union who are subject to a CBA can assert a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court rejected this argument, stating that " Coolidge does not address a union employee of a private employer nor does it allow any other expansion of wrongful termination claims outside the at-will context." The court also noted that the employee's CBA provided her with a comprehensive grievance procedure, and that she "cannot now claim wrongful discharge merely because she was dissatisfied with the outcome of the grievance process." Moreover, even if she were an at-will employee, the court was not convinced that the employee alleged facts demonstrating that her employer's act of terminating her contravened a "clear public policy." There was no evidence that she was terminated for any reason other than poor performance.

The court concluded that the employee could not bring a claim for wrongful discharge because she was not an at-will employee, finally ending the mystery of Coolidge's meaning, at least to this court of appeals.

GIVE ME AN S-S-N-V-S... Social Security Administration Implements New Online Verification System

By Lois A. Gruhin

It doesn't spell anything, but it stands for Social Security Number Verification System, or SSNVS for short. The Social Security Administration recently implemented the new online system for easier employer verification of employee social security numbers.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“The Act) requires employers to verify both the employment eligibility and identity of all new hires. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (now called the Citizenship and Immigration Service) designated the Form I-9 for this purpose.

The Act's implementing regulations provide for three lists of documents to accomplish verification. Acceptable "List A" documents establish both identity and employment eligibility. Acceptable "List B" documents establish identity only. Acceptable "List C" documents establish employment eligibility only. A "U.S. social security card issued by the Social Security Administration" is among the "List C" documents and is often used in conjunction with a "List B" document to establish new hire employment eligibility and identity.

SSNVS allows employers to verify those social security numbers quickly, via the internet, and in large numbers if desired. The new online system offers registered employers the ability to either:
  • receive instant verification of up to ten names and social security numbers per screen; or
  • receive results usually within one business day for uploaded batch files of up to 250,000 names and social security numbers.
The SSNVS may be used only to verify current or former employees and only for wage reporting purposes. Registration is required and may be completed at www.socialsecurity.gov/bso/bsowelcome.htm .