Showing posts with label Compensable Time. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Compensable Time. Show all posts

Thursday, May 27, 2021

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Volume XXIII, Issue i

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Breathe Easy: With Vaccinations on the Rise, Ohio Rescinds COVID-19 Health Orders on June 2nd

By Scott H. Dehart*

On May 12th, Governor DeWine announced that, effective June 2nd, Ohio will rescind the majority of its COVID-19 health orders. Accordingly, with limited exceptions, Ohio will no longer mandate the use of masks and social distancing, nor impose COVID-related capacity restrictions. Despite the State lifting its orders, businesses still may voluntarily continue to require mitigation measures. As Governor DeWine explained, “[l]ifting these health orders will not prevent a business from imposing its own requirements. In fact, based upon the experiences of other states, we expect that many stores or businesses may require social distancing and masking.”

Following Governor DeWine’s announcement, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) issued interim recommendations on May 13th (available here) stating that, in non-healthcare settings, fully vaccinated people can resume activities without wearing masks or social distancing. In response, Governor DeWine instructed the Director of Ohio’s Department of Health to amend existing orders in accordance with the CDC’s guidance. That amended order (available here) provides, among other things, that fully vaccinated people are no longer required to wear masks with limited exceptions, e.g. public transportation, and can resume activities without social distancing.

Ohio’s lifting of its COVID-19 health orders is a promising sign that the worst of the pandemic is behind us. However, Ohio employers now must decide what mitigation measures, if any, they wish to maintain. This presents a challenging decision, and employers should consider consulting with counsel on effective approaches for revising and communicating changes to their COVID-19 policies and procedures.

*Scott H. Dehart, a member of the firm’s Columbus office, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about Ohio’s pandemic health orders or the impact of COVID-19 on your workplace, please contact Scott at shd@zrlaw.com or (614) 224-4411.



Coming Soon: Covered Employers Must File EEO-1 Component 1 Reports by July 19, 2021

By Tiffany S. Henderson*

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) collects annual workforce demographic information from covered employers. However, due to the pandemic, the EEOC did not collect data last year. On March 19, 2021, the EEOC announced it was accepting EEO-1 Component 1 Reports (“EEO-1”) and that covered employers must file their 2019 and 2020 data by July 19, 2021.

What is an EEO-1? 

The EEO-1 is an annual report the EEOC requires covered employers to file that includes demographic data for employees sorted by job category, ethnicity, race, and gender. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires the filing. Last year was the first time the EEOC did not require covered employers to file a report. 

Which Employers Are Covered? 

The EEOC requires private employers with at least 100 employees to file an EEO-1. In addition, federal contractors with more than 50 employees that are not exempt under 41 CFR 60-1.5 must file an EEO-1.  

How Long Will Employers Have to File an EEO-1? 

The EEOC is accepting EEO-1s now, and employers must file their EEO-1s by July 19, 2021. This year’s EEO-1 filing period differs from years past, as the EEOC usually only allows employers 10 weeks to file. However, the EEOC recognized the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on the workforce and extended the deadline by two weeks to ensure employers have time to provide accurate and reliable data.

How do Employers File? 

Covered employers should visit the EEOC’s EEO-1 website which can be accessed here. Prior to filing, employers should have received 2019 and 2020 EEO-1 notification letters via U.S. mail that should have contained the “Company ID” and “Passcode” employers need to create user accounts.

Employers can file an EEO-1 either: (1) by entering the data into a secure form available at https://eeocdata.org/eeo1/signin; or (2) by uploading a data file using an EEOC-approved format available at https://eeocdata.org/eeo1.

Employers should be aware that they must file an EEO-1 for each year they were in business and met the filing requirement. Due to the pandemic, this year’s collection includes 2019 and 2020 data. Covered employers must file two EEO-1 reports beginning with 2019. The EEOC will certify the 2019 report and then employers can file their 2020 report.

Employers that have not received notification letters or that have questions about filing an EEO-1, including eligibility, should contact counsel or visit EEO-1 Help for more information.

*Tiffany S. Henderson practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about the EEO-1 or any employment law questions, please contact Tiffany at tsh@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.



Zip It: NLRB Provides Guidance on Confidential Investigations

By Jantzen D. Mace*

Maintaining confidentiality during a workplace investigation may seem like a common-sense practice to help ensure the integrity of the investigation. Yet, directing employees to do so can give rise to allegations of interference with employee rights under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Fortunately, in a recent decision, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) reinforced employers’ ability to issue reasonable directives to employees on maintaining confidentiality during workplace investigations.

In Alcoa Corp., 370 NLRB No. 107 (2021), an employer received reports that one of its employees made racially offensive comments and engaged in other disrespectful behavior. The employer began an investigation which included interviewing employees. During those interviews, a representative for the employer told each employee “to keep in mind that their interview conversation was confidential, to keep the conversation confidential, including from supervisors and other employees, and to decline to answer if others asked about the conversation.”

Based on the results of the investigation, the employer terminated the employee who made the offensive comments. The union representing the employee subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging, among other things, that the employer violated the NLRA by instructing employees to keep their interviews confidential.

Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found in favor of the union. As to the confidentiality directives, the ALJ held the employer unlawfully interfered with employees’ “right to discuss a workplace disciplinary matter.” The ALJ emphasized that the employer did not expressly advise the employees that they could discuss the interviews once the investigation ended. The employer appealed the ALJ’s decision to the NLRB.

In its decision, the NLRB reversed the ALJ and held the employer’s confidentiality directives were lawful. The NLRB relied on its recent decision in Apogee Retail LLC d/b/a Unique Thrift Store, 368 NLRB No. 144 (2019), which overruled prior holdings prohibiting employers from restricting discussion of ongoing investigations unless they could make “a particularized showing of a substantial and legitimate business justification.” Instead, the NLRB held that investigative confidentiality rules, that by their terms apply only for the duration of any investigation, are categorically lawful.

In support of its finding, the NLRB noted that no evidence or allegation existed that: (1) the employer’s directives were given pursuant to a general company policy or rule; (2) the directives applied to anyone other than the employees interviewed during the investigation; or (3) the directives prevented those employees, or any other employees, from discussing the events giving rise to the investigation. Notably, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ’s conclusion that the employer had to provide an express statement that employees could talk with others about the interviews once the investigation ended. Under the circumstances, the NLRB found that the employees would have reasonably understood that the confidentiality instruction lasted only through the duration of the investigation.

The NLRB’s decision in Alcoa Corp. reinforces employers’ ability to provide reasonable confidentiality directives to employees that interviewed as part of an internal investigation. In doing so, employers should not restrict employees’ ability to discuss the events giving rise to the investigation, or their ability to discuss the interviews once the investigation has ended. When conducting workplace investigations, employers should consider consulting legal counsel for advice on conducting them effectively while avoiding potential claims by employees or their unions.

*Jantzen D. Mace, a member of the firm’s Columbus office, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about workplace investigation issues, please contact Jantzen at jdm@zrlaw.com or (614) 224-4411.



To Pay or Not to Pay: DOL’s Opinion On Employee Travel and Training Time

By Lauren M. Drabic*

The Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”), recently issued two opinion letters interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) compensation requirements for work-related travel and voluntary training hours. Specifically, the WHD examined three work-related travel scenarios for a construction company’s non-exempt foremen and laborers, and six voluntary training or continuing education scenarios for a hospice care provider’s non-exempt employee. This article summarizes the WHD’s opinion letters to help employers gain a better understanding of their FLSA obligations in comparable scenarios.

Work-Related Travel 

In its recent opinion letter, the WHD addressed the following scenarios:

  1. Local Job Site: The foremen of a construction company must first retrieve a company truck from the employer’s principal place of business, drive it to a local job site, and then return the truck at the end of the day.

  2. Remote Job Site (1.5 – 4 hours of travel time): The employer pays for hotel accommodations and per-diem meal stipends for employees working at the job site. Each foreman retrieves a company truck from the employer’s principal place of business at the beginning of the job, drives it to the job site, and returns it at the end of the job. Laborers can drive their personal vehicles to and from the job site at the beginning and end of the job; or they can drive their personal vehicles to the principal place of business and ride to and from the job site with the foremen.

  3. Remote Job Site (1.5 – 4 hours of travel time): Same facts of the second scenario except the laborers choose to travel to and from the job site each day instead of staying at the hotel.
Generally, the FLSA requires employers to compensate employees for time suffered or permitted to work. Under the FLSA, travel time between home and work, typically, is not compensable. However, time spent traveling between an employer-designated reporting place to a separate work location could fall within the definition of compensable working hours. In Integrity Staffing Solution, Inc. v. Busk, the Supreme Court clarified employer FLSA obligations for preliminary and postliminary travel requirements. According to Busk, employees’ preliminary or postliminary travel is not compensable simply because the employer requires it. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that travel time is compensable if the purpose of the travel is “integral and indispensable to the [employee’s] principal activities,” meaning the activity must be:
1) “an intrinsic element” of the employee’s principal activities; and

2) one the employee “cannot dispense [with] if he is to perform his principal activities.”

Integrity Staffing Solution, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 518-19 (2014).

The WHD concluded that in each of the three scenarios, the foremen’s travel time to and from the employer’s principal place of business with the company truck is both integral and indispensable to their principal activities because (1) the employer mandates the pickup and return of the company truck as part of the foremen’s job responsibilities; and (2) the principal activities at the construction site require the company truck. Accordingly, the foremen’s travel time in the company truck to and from the employer’s principal place of business is compensable travel time under the FLSA regardless of jobsite location. 

Employer compensation requirements under the FLSA for employee travel time to remote job sites in another city depend on when and how employees travel. If an employee’s travel time is for a special one-day assignment, then the travel is compensable worktime. In these situations, the FLSA permits employers to account for the actual travel time or the average commute time that the employee would have used to travel to their usual work site and deduct it from the compensable travel time. Similarly, if an employer offers transportation but the employee chooses to utilize their own transportation, the employer can calculate compensable travel time with either (1) the amount of time the employee spent traveling; or (2) the amount of time that would have accrued using the employer’s offered transportation. If the travel keeps an employee away from home overnight, then travel that occurs during the employee’s normal working hours, even during typical nonwork days, is compensable work time because the travel is in place of the employee’s normal duties. On the other hand, travel that occurs after the employer relieves the employee for long enough “to use the time effectively for [the employee’s] own purposes” is not compensable, even if the employee uses the time to travel to an employer-provided lodging accommodation or to the employee’s home multiple hours away. 29 C.F.R. § 785.16(a).

Applying these principles to the second scenario, the WHD concluded that the laborer’s travel time to a remote jobsite is not compensable under the FLSA, unless the travel occurs during the laborer’s normal working hours. Further, the FLSA considers the travel time occurring between the jobsite and the hotel at the beginning or the end of the workday as part of the everyday commute, which is not compensable travel time. Additionally, since laborers have the option to travel to and from the job site with the foremen, the employer may choose to calculate the laborer’s compensable travel time using either the time that would have accrued if the laborer rode with the foremen or the laborers actual compensable travel time.

The WHD reached the same conclusion for the laborer’s travel time in the third scenario. When a laborer chooses to forego the hotel accommodation and drive between the remote job site and their home each day, the laborer is traveling during their personal time after the employer has relieved the laborer for the day. Therefore, the laborer’s travel time is not compensable under the FLSA.

Voluntary Training Time 

The WHD, in its recently issued opinion letter, states that according to the FLSA, employee “attendance at lectures, meetings, training programs and similar activities” is not compensable working time if it meets all four of the following criteria:

(a) Attendance is outside of the employee’s regular working hours;

(b) Attendance is voluntary;

(c) The course, lecture, or meeting does not directly relate to the employee’s job; and

(d) The employee does not perform any productive work during such attendance.

29 C.F.R. 987 § 785.27. Generally, training time that fails to meet any one of the above four criteria is compensable work time. However, the WHD recognizes two “special situation” exceptions to this general rule even when the training directly relates to the employee’s job. If an employee attends (1) a course offered by an independent bona fide institution of learning related to the employee’s job; or (2) an independent school, college or independent trade school to take courses related to the employee’s job, that time is not compensable for FLSA purposes so long as the other three criteria apply. If an employer mandates training, if the training (voluntary or not) occurs during regular working hours, or the employee performs productive work for the employee’s job duties during the training, then the training is compensable as work time. Employers may, however, establish policies prohibiting employees from participating in training courses during regular working hours.

In each of the following scenarios, the WHD assumed that employee attendance was voluntary, and that the employee did not perform any productive work. 

Scenario 1: A nurse participates in an on-demand webinar after working hours that directly relates to the nurse’s job and counts towards professional licensing requirements. The WHD concluded that this scenario is exempt as a special situation for a course offered by an independent bona fide institution of learning related to the employee’s job. Thus, the voluntary training time is not compensable. The WHD also noted that the special exception applies regardless of whether the course is offered by the employer or by a third party.

Scenario 2: An accounting clerk participates in an on-demand webinar after working hours that directly relates to the clerk’s job but has no continuing education component. The WHD stated that it did not have sufficient facts to issue an opinion because it could not determine whether an independent bona fide institution offered the training course. If an independent bona fide institution of learning offered the training course, the employee’s time is exempt as a special situation. Otherwise, the training is compensable for FLSA purposes.

Scenario 3: An accounting clerk participates in an on-demand webinar during working hours that directly relates to the clerk’s job but has no continuing education component. The WHD concluded this is compensable training time because the training takes place during working hours.

Scenario 4: An accounting clerk participates in an on-demand webinar during working hours that does not directly relate to the clerk’s job and has no continuing education component. The WHD concluded this is compensable training time because the training takes place during working hours.

Scenario 5: A nurse participates in an on-demand webinar during working hours that directly relates to the nurse’s job and counts toward professional licensing requirements. The WHD concluded this is compensable training time because the training takes place during working hours.

Scenario 6: A nurse participates in an out-of-state weekend conference that has some topics relating directly to the nurse’s job and professional licensing requirements and some topics that don’t. Travel time to the conference occurs during some of the nurse’s normal work hours, but the conference occurs outside of the nurse’s normal work schedule. The WHD concluded that the training time is exempt as a special situation and not compensable time. Additionally, the WHD stated that since the conference is not compensable work hours, travel to and from the conference is personal non-compensable travel time. 

While the above referenced opinion letters provide some helpful interpretation of employer requirements, they are not the law. If you have questions about your obligations, please contact counsel, as even small FLSA compliance errors can create significant liability.

*Lauren M. Drabic regularly advises clients on labor and employment matters, including FLSA compliance. If you have questions about wage and hour issues, please contact Lauren at lmd@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.



Z&R SHORTS

Please join Z&R in congratulating Jzinae N. Jackson

Z&R is proud to congratulate Jzinae N. Jackson, a Stokes Scholar Alumni, on joining the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association’s Louis Stokes Scholars Advisory Committee, which is committed to expanding diversity in the legal profession. To learn more about the Stokes Scholars Program and to read a recent feature on Jzinae by Court News Ohio, please click here.

Upcoming Speaking Engagements

June 2, 2021
Ryan C. Spitzer presents “CBD Products, Hemp and Employee Positive Drug Tests” for the Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association. Registration information for this webinar can be found via the following link: https://www.anymeeting.com/AccountManager/RegEv.aspx?PIID=E053DC80824F3E  

June 26, 2021
Jonathan J. Downes presents “Budgets, Revenues, Expenditures – Oh My!” at the 2021 Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association Summer Workshop. Information regarding the OPAA Summer Workshop can be found via the following link: http://www.ohiopa.org/training/summer2021.html  

September 14, 2021
Jonathan J. Downes presents “Bargaining for Results: Achieving Agreement while Maintaining Flexibility for Management” for the Ohio Association of Chiefs of Police in Hilliard, Ohio. Information regarding this full-day workshop can be found via the following link: https://oacp.org/bargaining-results2021/

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Volume XVII, Issue iii

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Quiet Changes to Employment Laws: Federal Agencies Recognize Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination

By Ami J. Patel*

In June, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that all states must issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in other states. The legalization of same-sex marriage affects the way employers provide benefits to same-sex employees. Marriage is not the only front on which LGBT rights are evolving. With much of the public and the media’s spotlight on changes in the law regarding same-sex marriage, people may not realize that several federal agencies already interpret anti-discrimination laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the Department of Labor (“DOL”), and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) all take the position that statutes and orders prohibiting sex discrimination, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity (e.g., identifying as transsexual or transgender). These federal agencies reason that discrimination on the basis of gender identity is a form of sex discrimination. The EEOC and the DOL have stated further that prohibitions against sex discrimination protect discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well. Therefore, an individual may file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, as a form of sex discrimination. Indeed, the EEOC has reported an increase in sexual orientation and gender identity-based charges, from 765 filed in 2013 to 1,093 filed in 2014.

Ohio’s anti-discrimination laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, but Ohio courts have yet to interpret state law to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. While Ohio courts generally interpret Ohio’s discrimination law to match federal anti-discrimination protections, Ohio’s 10th district appellate court ruled in its 2014 decision in Burns v. Ohio State Univ. College of Veterinary Med., 2014-Ohio-1190, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1101 (10th App. Dist. 2014), that the state’s prohibition of sex discrimination does not extend to sexual orientation discrimination. Given the rapidly changing legal landscape regarding LGBT rights, Ohio courts’ stance may soon shift. Regardless, employers should be aware that employees experiencing sexual orientation or sexual identity discrimination may seek recourse with state or federal agencies or the court system.

*Ami J. Patel practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about your employment policies in light of legal changes regarding LGBT individuals, please contact Ami at (ajp@zrlaw.com) or 216.696.4441.



How Much Is That Doggie In the Window? Or, Rather, How Much Do Employers Have to Pay Police Officers To Care For Those Police Doggies

By Brad E. Bennett*

Years ago, we watched with bated breath as the French mastiff Hooch helped Detective Scott Turner (Tom Hanks) apprehend a murderer. Sadly (*spoiler alert*), Hooch died in the film’s final minutes. However, had he lived and Detective Turner continued to use Hooch in police work, the Cypress Beach Police Department may have faced a question now facing many police departments, officers, and courts – should police departments pay for off-the-clock time spent caring for police dogs?

The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) generally requires employers to compensate employees for all hours worked. “Work” includes “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer.” Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944). In addition, the FLSA requires that employers compensate employees for activities performed before or after the employee’s regular work shift if the “activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principle activity” for which the employee is employed. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956).

Courts and the Department of Labor have concluded that time-spent off-the-clock caring for police dogs constitutes work and an “integral and indispensable part” of the officer’s principle activity of employment.Specifically, time spent training the dog at home and the dog’s “care” are compensable.  U.S. Dept. of Labor Wage and Hour Opinion Letter August 11, 1993. “Care” includes: bathing, brushing, exercising, feeding, grooming, related cleaning of the dog’s kennel or transport vehicle, administering medicine for illness, and transporting the dog to and from the veterinarian. So how much time must an employer compensate law enforcement personnel for these activities and at what rate?

Generally, employers must pay employees a rate of at least one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1). However, employers may calculate law enforcement personnel overtime over a longer time-period, up to 171 hours in 28-day period. 29 U.S.C. §207(k). In addition, the FLSA allows employers and employees to agree upon different straight-time hourly rates where the employee performs “two or more kinds of work.” 29 U.S.C. §207(g). In the event an employer agrees upon a different straight-time hourly rate for dog-care, it must ensure that it only pays that different rate for dog-care and not law enforcement activities.

How much time a police department must compensate its personnel to care for police dogs varies by court.In one case, the court concluded the District of Columbia had to pay its officers 30-minutes per day (seven days/week) for “the care, feeding, and grooming” of the police dogs. Levering v. District of Columbia, 869 F. Supp. 24 (D.C. Cir. 1994). However, another court upheld the City of Cincinnati’s agreement, reached through a collective bargaining agreement, to compensate its canine officers for 17 minutes of straight-time per day. Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2001). There, in finding the agreement Cincinnati reached with its police union reasonable, the court considered the following additional benefits the City provided (among others): take-home vehicles; concrete-based fenced dog kennel at the officer’s home; payment of food and veterinary care; and the benefit of having a highly trained police dog as a family pet.

Employers that maintain police department canine units should review their compensation system to ensure they are properly compensating those caring for the canines. When determining what constitutes proper payment, in addition to an hourly rate, employers may consider other benefits provided. Employers should attempt to reach an agreement with personnel on a reasonable amount of compensation and contact counsel with questions.

*Brad E. Bennett, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices at the firm’s Columbus office.He is well versed in all areas of labor and employment law including FLSA compliance.If you have questions about the FLSA and police department canine units, please contact Brad (beb@zrlaw.com) at 614.224.4411.




My Employee Said What on Facebook?

By Drew C. Piersall*

“Ok we got Bin Laden . . . let’s go get Kasich next . . . who’s with me?” “[C]an’t believe what a snake my boss is. . . . he needs to keep his [creepy] hands to himself . . . just an all around d-bag!!” “If you are on public assistance, you may not have additional children and must be on birth control (e.g. an IUD).” These are statements that employees made on Facebook for which they received discipline, yet courts and an arbitrator reached different conclusions regarding the appropriateness of the discipline.

The decisions raise many questions. Can employers discipline employees for comments, posts, etc. that employees make while off-duty on non-employer social media sites? What standards apply to employee off-duty conduct? The arbitrator evaluating whether the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction had just cause to terminate the employee who made the Bin Laden comment above considered these issues. State of Ohio, Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., (Pincus, Mar. 6, 2013). There, four employees who worked in the same correctional institution “liked” the corrections officer’s Bin Laden Facebook comment, which he posted off-duty. The officer’s Facebook profile included his job location and public employee status. Once the employer learned of the comment, it investigated and ultimately discharged the officer. However, the arbitrator concluded that the officer’s statement was nothing more than empty words. In addition, the employer’s “E-mail, Internet, and On-line Services Use” policy did not place the employee on notice that the policy covered his off-duty conduct. As a result, the arbitrator concluded that while officer’s alleged threat justified a 14-month suspension, the employer did not have just cause to terminate his employment.

The First Amendment protects a public employee’s right “to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). A public employee must show the following to establish the First Amendment protected his or her speech: (1) the employee spoke as a private citizen rather than pursuant to official duties; (2) the speech involved a matter of public concern; and (3) the employee’s “interest as a citizen” in commenting on the matter outweighed the State’s interest, “as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2011).

Employees have raised the First Amendment as a defense to their social media posts in a number of contexts with varying results. For example, the court affirmed the discharge of the children’s services worker who made the above (and many other) comments about people who received public assistance. Shepherd v. McGee, 986 F.Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Or. 2013). The court reasoned that since her comments were banter “rather than speech intended to help the public actually evaluate the performance of a public agency,” they stood “on the periphery of First Amendment protection.” The court also emphasized the heightened government interest that existed since the employee held a “public contact role.” In addition, the employee’s statements impaired her ability to do her job – testify at proceedings, since her statements raised credibility issues for prosecutors.

In evaluating employee conduct, discipline, and social media use, it is helpful for employers to have social media and computer use policies. However, employers must be cautious about the content and prohibitions included in such policies. The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) analyzes whether employers violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which guarantees employees the right to join unions and engage in “concerted activity” for the purposes of “mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. §157. In the social media context, the NLRB considers whether an employee could reasonably construe a rule or policy to chill the employee’s exercise of their Section 7 rights.

The NLRB has shown it will go to great lengths to protect employee speech. In Three D, LLC v. NLRB, the Second Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s ruling that an employee’s Facebook post that the employer was “[s]uch an asshole” was concerted, protected activity. No. 14-3284, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18493 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2015). The NLRB found the activity concerted because it involved multiple employees and protected because it involved workplace complaints about tax withholdings. Furthermore, the statements were within the NLRA’s protection because the comment at issue did not mention, let alone disparage, the employer’s products. Therefore, at least according to the NLRB, an employee may call their boss an “asshole” on social media without repercussion.

Beyond controlling and responding to employee use of social media, the prevalence of social media bleeds into the hiring process. Social media provides employers with another forum to post jobs and conduct background checks. However, employers should engage in social media checks with caution. First, employers should consider the accuracy of the information (e.g., potential for false profiles or accounts). In addition, by viewing a prospective employee’s social media account, the employer may incidentally obtain information regarding the individual’s race, gender, national origin, religion, age, disability, or genetic background. This knowledge could expose the employer to claims of discrimination. Therefore, any employer who chooses to review prospective employees’ social media accounts should take the following precautionary steps: (1) ensure the person reviewing social media accounts is wholly uninvolved in making the hiring decision; (2) only review publicly available social media; and (3) do not request social media account passwords during the hiring process.

The growing prevalence of social media has created a host of potential issues for employers. Given social media’s fast-paced growth and ever-changing nature, employers should constantly keep abreast of the current status of the law.

*Drew C. Piersall works in the firm’s Columbus office and practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have any questions about employee use of social media, please contact Drew (dcp@zrlaw.com) at 614.224.4411.



Employment Practices Liability Insurance – Do Not Wait to Notify Carrier of Claims

By Stephen S. Zashin*

Employers that wait too long to report claims to an Employment Practices Liability Insurance (“EPLI”) carrier may lose coverage. A federal court recently determined that an employer violated its EPLI policy when it waited nearly two years to notify its insurance carrier of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”). E. Dillon Co. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 1:14-cv-00070, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76295 (W.D. Va. June 12, 2015). As a result, the insurance carrier did not have to provide coverage for the EEOC Charge and subsequent litigation.

The employer twice waited too long to provide notice of claims to its EPLI carrier. First, the employer waited almost 23 months after it received notice of a pending EEOC Charge (Apr. 4, 2011) before notifying the insurance carrier (Feb. 28, 2013). During that time, the EEOC dismissed the Charge (Apr. 28, 2012), reversed course and found reasonable cause to believe the employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (Sept. 27, 2012) and scheduled mediation (Mar. 14, 2013). Later, the employer waited approximately five months after it was served with a lawsuit related to the Charge (Sept. 9, 2013) to notify the insurance carrier of the lawsuit (Feb. 3, 2014). The employer provided notice of the lawsuit eight days before court-scheduled mediation was to occur.

The insurance carrier denied both claims after it concluded the employer failed to provide timely notice. The insurance policy covered any “Employment Claim,” which specifically included EEOC proceedings, and required the employer to provide written notice of claims “as soon as practicable.” The insurance carrier concluded that the employer’s decision to wait nearly 23 months and five months respectively to provide notice of the claims violated the “as soon as practicable” requirement.

The court agreed and concluded that the employer’s failure to provide timely notice constituted a material breach of the insurance agreement.The employer’s notification delay was unreasonable because the insurance agreement specifically defined “Employment Claim” to include EEOC proceedings. In addition, the delay prejudiced the insurance carrier, because the carrier: lost the chance to investigate the claims, to direct the employer’s defense, and t0 attempt to resolve the matter before the EEOC found reasonable cause; and the EEOC’s proposed Conciliation Agreement ($178,000 payment) diminished any settlement leverage the insurance company may have possessed.The court concluded the length of delay alone was sufficient to find that the employer materially breached the insurance agreement. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered other court cases which held that any delay beyond 75 days, without reasonable excuse, was unreasonable.

Upon receipt of a potential claim, employers should carefully review their EPLI policy’s reporting requirements and work with their brokers to avoid losing coverage for failing to timely report.Finally, all employers should consider whether to purchase an EPLI policy.

*Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment law, is head of the firm’s Labor and Employment Groups.If you have questions about this article, please contact Stephen (ssz@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.



EEOC to Change Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act Regulations on Wellness Programs

By Patrick Hoban*

On October 30, 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking setting forth proposed changes to the regulations governing employer wellness programs in relation to Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”). GINA is a federal law that, in part, protects employees and applicants from discrimination based upon genetic information, including that of their family members. The proposed rule seeks to clarify the circumstances under which employers may offer inducements (i.e., wellness program incentives) in exchange for health-status information of employee spouses who participate in the employer’s group health plan.

A wellness program is “a program offered by an employer that is designed to promote health and prevent disease.” 42 U.S.C. 300gg-4(j)(1)(a). Wellness programs include a wide range of employer-sponsored services, from smoking cessation to workout programs to health assessments. Under GINA, wellness programs cannot condition employee inducements upon employee genetic information. “Genetic information” includes, among other things, information about employees and their family members’ (including spouses) genetic tests and family medical history.

Employers covered by GINA (i.e., those with 15 or more employees) are prohibited from requesting, requiring, or purchasing employee genetic information, unless a statutory exception applies. One exception allows employers to obtain genetic information as part of employer-provided voluntary health or genetic services, including wellness programs. This exception only applies if: (1) the provision of genetic information is actually voluntary (i.e., employees are not required to provide the genetic information and there is no penalty for not providing it); and (2) the individual provides “prior knowing, voluntary, and written authorization.” 29 C.F.R. 1635.8(b)(2)(i).

The EEOC’s proposed rule adds an additional requirement that an employer’s wellness program must be “reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease.” This means the wellness program “must have a reasonable chance of improving the health of, or preventing disease in, participating individuals, and must not be overly burdensome, a subterfuge for violating [GINA] or other laws prohibiting employment discrimination, or highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease.”

The EEOC’s proposed rule explains that, under GINA, employers can offer limited inducements for information about the current or past health status of an employee’s spouse covered by the employer’s group health plan. The provision of this information must be part of a “health risk assessment,” (e.g., medical questionnaire or examination to detect high cholesterol) conducted in connection with the spouse’s receipt of health or genetic services as part of the employer’s wellness program. The wellness program inducements may take various forms, from discounts or rebates to the avoidance of a premium surcharge. The total inducements offered under the wellness program may not exceed 30 percent of the total annual costs of coverage. To be valid, the provision of the spouse’s information must meet the requirements of GINA’s wellness program exception discussed above (i.e., voluntary and with prior written authorization). Furthermore, the information provided in exchange for the inducement must be limited to current and past health status and cannot include genetic information such as results of genetic tests.

The proposed exception for inducements is limited to employee spouses who are covered under the employer’s group health plan. Employers may not provide inducements in exchange for employee genetic information or their biological or non-biological child’s genetic information or current or past health status. Employers may offer inducements for completion of health risk assessments that ask questions about family medical history and other genetic information; however, the employer must make it clear that the inducement will be available regardless of whether the specific genetic information questions are answered.

Prior to announcing the proposed rule, the EEOC initiated litigation taking issue with multiple employers’ wellness programs. See, e.g., EEOC v. Honeywell Int’l. Inc., N0. 0:14-cv-04517 (D. Minn. 2014); EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., N0. 1:14-cv-01019 (E.D. Wis. 2014). In Honeywell, the EEOC sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing the company from imposing surcharge penalties on employees and spouses that did not participate in biometric testing for health data including cholesterol and nicotine levels. The EEOC argued that the wellness program violated GINA and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court denied the EEOC’s motion, but noted that “great uncertainty persists in how the [Affordable Care Act], [Americans with Disabilities Act] and other federal statutes such as GINA are intended to interact,” with respect to wellness programs.

The EEOC’s proposed GINA rule comes on the heels of an April 2015 proposed rule (discussed by Z&R here) addressing, in part, amendments to the EEOC’s regulations and guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act relating to employer wellness programs. The comment period for the proposed Americans with Disabilities Act rule closed in June. The EEOC may make revisions in light of the comments before voting on the final rule. The EEOC is accepting comments on its proposed GINA rule until January 28, 2016. Employers can anticipate continued developments, and litigation, in this nascent area of employment law.

*Patrick Hoban, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about wellness programs, please contact Pat (pjh@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.




Z&R SHORTS


Z&R Announces Its 2016 Super Lawyers and Rising Stars


Zashin & Rich is pleased to congratulate the following 2016 Super Lawyers:


Brad E. Bennett, George S. Crisci, Jon M. Dileno, Jonathan J. Downes, Michele L. Jakubs, and Stephen S. Zashin were named Super Lawyers. Helena Oroz, Ami J. Patel, and David R. Vance were named Rising Stars.



Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high-degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The selection process includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations.



Super Lawyers Magazine features the list and profiles of selected attorneys and is distributed to attorneys in the state or region and the ABA-accredited law school libraries. Super Lawyers is also published as a special section in leading city and regional magazines across the country.

Please join Z&R in welcoming two new attorneys to its Employment and Labor Groups.


Lisa A. Kainec Joins Z&R Cleveland
Lisa is a legal and human resources professional with 20+ years of experience in employment law across multiple industries including retail, healthcare, municipal, professional services, construction and manufacturing. Lisa has worked in-house as a human resources executive and senior employment counsel at Jo-Ann Stores. Lisa was a Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law. Lisa devotes her practice to providing practical strategies for proactive workforce management as well as vigorous defense of employee claims and litigation.

Brad E. Bennett Joins Z&R Columbus
Brad has 18 years of employment law experience as an attorney and human resources professional across multiple industries including healthcare, aviation, retail, public sector and construction.  He represents public and private sector employers in all aspects of labor and employment law.  In addition to his litigation practice, Brad represents public sector employers in collective bargaining, grievance arbitrations, and impasse proceedings. Additionally, Brad has drafted civil service rules for municipalities, represents public sector employers before the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR), and counsels public employers regarding compliance with Ohio’s Open Meetings Act and Public Records Act.  Brad is an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment.

Thursday, March 19, 2015

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Winter 2015, Volume XVII, Issue i

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Changes to Ohio’s Menacing, Stalking, and Protection Order Laws Help Employers Defend Against Threats of Workplace Violence

By David R. Vance*

Pursuant to recent legislation, Ohio employers now have an added defense to help prevent workplace violence: the ability to file for a protection order based upon an individual’s threats against the company or its employees. This change in the law provides employers an important tool to help protect employees and customers.

Ohio’s updated menacing, stalking, and protection order laws, which went into effect in September 2014, fixed a void that left employers in a compromised position when facing threats of workplace violence. Ohio’s prior menacing, aggravated menacing, and menacing by stalking laws prohibited individuals from knowingly causing another person (i.e., the victim) to believe that they would harm the victim (or their property, unborn child, or family member). The amended language now states that the victim’s belief that the offender will cause them harm may be based on the offender’s words or conduct directed at or identifying the victim’s employer.

In addition to the amendments to the menacing and stalking laws, the legislature added a provision (Ohio Revised Code § 2903.215) that allows employers of two or more alleged victims of a violation of Ohio’s menacing, aggravated menacing, or menacing by stalking laws to file a motion for a temporary protection order. In instances where a criminal proceeding against the offender is pending and the offender’s threat(s) or conduct identified the employer or was directed at the employer, the employer may file a motion for a temporary protection order in the already pending criminal proceeding. Additionally, in cases involving menacing by stalking, even when no criminal proceeding is pending, employers may file a petition for a civil protection order if the offender’s pattern of conduct identified the employer or was directed at the employer.

The changes to the laws arose in part out of concerns following an incident involving a Cincinnati-area company. After a former employee made threats to go on a shooting spree on the company’s premises, the former employee was charged with menacing. Eventually, the charge was dropped because the threats were directed generally at the company and not at specific employees. Under previous Ohio law, the company was without recourse to seek a protection order against the former employee.

The changes in the laws address the seriousness and reality of threats of workplace violence and provide needed legal recourse to employers faced with difficult and potentially deadly scenarios. Previously, employers would have to rely on the individuals targeted by a threat to seek a protection order against the offender. Now, employers have the ability to take legal action without relying on their employees, who may be hesitant or fearful of initiating legal action against an offender.

Employers should take all threats of workplace violence seriously and should seek guidance immediately upon learning of a threat. To help ensure the safety of their employees and customers, it is crucial that employers address threats in a timely manner and take necessary action, which may include seeking a protection order.

*David R. Vance, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about workplace protection orders or labor and employment law, please contact David (drv@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Train on Your Own Time: Firefighters Not Entitled to Overtime Pay for Hours Spent Training

By Jonathan J. Downes*

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which covers Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee, recently concluded a city did not have to pay firefighters for hours spent in paramedic training. Misewicz v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 771 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014). The city required firefighters to obtain paramedic certification but did not compensate them for the training time. Rejecting the firefighters’ arguments that the time constituted “hours worked” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the court found this time fell under an FLSA exception.

Generally, the FLSA requires employers to pay their employees a minimum wage for all hours worked and pay overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours in a work week. Time spent attending employer-sponsored training programs is typically considered compensable as hours worked. However, U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations provide two exceptions. First, under Code of Federal Regulations Section 787.27, employers do not have to count “[a]ttendance at lectures, meetings, training programs and similar activities” as working time if: (1) attendance is outside the employee’s regular working hours; (2) attendance is in fact voluntary; (3) the training is not directly related to the employee’s job; and (4) the employee does not perform any productive work while at the training. In addition, pursuant to Code of Federal Regulations Section 553.226(b), training time for employees of state and local governments is not compensable if it occurs (1) outside regular working hours (2) at specialized or follow-up training (3) that is required for certification purposes of private and public sector employees whether by a particular governmental jurisdiction or by law.

In Misewicz, the case turned on whether the firefighters’ training time fell under the Section 553.226(b) exception. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit focused on whether the training was “required by law for certification.” Tennessee law does not require firefighters to be certified paramedics. However, Tennessee does require all employees performing paramedic-level care to obtain paramedic certification. Here, the city required all firefighters to obtain that paramedic certification within three years of employment.

The key issue was whether the exception’s “required by law for certification” requirement should focus on the employees’ job description or actual duties performed. The firefighters argued that the court should make its determination based on the employees’ job description which included duties that required state law certification. According to the firefighters, since the applicable job description was for fire recruits, state law did not require paramedic certification and the city should have to pay for their training time. The city argued the determination should hinge on whether state law required certification for the duties the employees actually performed. Once certified, firefighters spent one-half of their shift performing paramedic duties and responded to emergency medical services incidents much more frequently than fire suppression incidents.

Ultimately, the Misewicz Court ruled in the city’s favor: whether the training is “required by law for certification” hinges on whether the employer actually hired the employee to perform duties that require state certification, determined by whether the employer asks the employee to regularly perform those duties after training. Since the city hired the firefighters to perform both firefighting and paramedic duties, the exception applied. Therefore, the city did not violate the FLSA by failing to pay the firefighters for their paramedic training.

This is the first Sixth Circuit decision to interpret the FLSA “hours worked” Section 553.226(b) training exception. The Court rejected the argument that the city had to meet both “hours worked” training exceptions to escape liability under the FLSA. Therefore, employers do not have to compensate employees for training time if the employee training meets the Section 553.226(b) exception alone.

Public employers should review any compensation provided for training time. If employers pay for training necessary to obtain certification required by, for example, the Ohio Revised Code, the employer may not have to pay employees for that time. However, public employers must also remember to consider whether the employees utilize that certification in their day-to-day job. Employers should contact counsel with any questions about this “hours worked” training exception or the Misewicz decision.

*Jonathan J. Downes, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, has extensive experience advising public entities and employers. For more information about the Misewicz decision or the FLSA applied to public employers, please contact Jonathan (jjd@zrlaw.com) at 614.224.4411.


Paid Sick Days Ahead for All? The Healthy Families Act Reappears… Again

By Helena Oroz*

As the white fluffy stuff turns into hard, dirty, slowly melting stuff in cities and towns across our fair region, summer 2014 still seems like a distant memory . . . but one hot topic from our Summer ELQ remains hot as can be: paid sick leave.

Currently, three states – Connecticut, California, and Massachusetts – mandate paid sick leave, as well as a growing number of cities. Paid sick leave proponents got quite a boost from President Obama’s State of the Union Address on January 20, 2015, which was chock full of graphics, including one that showed thirty-two other countries are apparently more civilized than the United States when it comes to paid maternity leave. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sotu at 17:50). The graphic was on a split-screen with the President during the following portion of his speech:

Today, we are the only advanced country on Earth that doesn’t guarantee paid sick leave or paid maternity leave to our workers. Forty-three million workers have no paid sick leave. Forty-three million. Think about that. And that forces too many parents to make the gut-wrenching choice between a paycheck and a sick kid at home. So I’ll be taking new action to help states adopt paid leave laws of their own. And since paid sick leave won where it was on the ballot last November, let’s put it to a vote right here in Washington. Send me a bill that gives every worker in America the opportunity to earn seven days of paid sick leave. It’s the right thing to do.

That bill, the Healthy Families Act, was previously introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate in March 2013 but stalled in committee. In a joint statement issued January 14, 2015, Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) and Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) promised to reintroduce the bill in the coming weeks. On February 12, 2015, they kept that promise. The bill (H.R. 932/S. 497) requires:
  • employers with 15 or more employees for each working day during 20 or more workweeks a year to permit each employee to earn at least one hour of paid sick time for every 30 hours worked, up to a maximum of 56 hours (seven days) of paid sick time in a calendar year.
  • small employers (those with fewer than 15 employees) who opt out of proving paid sick time to provide at least 56 hours of unpaid sick time in a calendar year to each employee.
  • employers to allow employees to use the time to: (1) meet their own medical needs; (2) care for the medical needs of certain family members (including a domestic partner or the domestic partner's parent or child); or (3) seek medical attention, assist a related person, take legal action, or engage in other specified activities relating to domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.

The Act would vest investigative and enforcement authority in the Secretary of Labor, but also authorize civil actions for damages by employees against employers who violate the Act.

As expected, proponents of the bill argue that it is critical to help working families and to fill gaps left by the Family and Medical Leave Act and other leave laws. Opponents focus on potentially untenable costs, especially to small businesses, and the possibility of employee abuse.

Considering the current composition of the U.S. Congress, it also seems likely that this one-size-fits-all proposition will stall once more, so why all the commotion? Perhaps more important than the outcome of the bill is the momentum built around this issue. Even more states and cities are enacting or considering their own paid leave laws, just as President Obama has called on them to do, including the following:
  • Tacoma, Washington City Council voted on January 27, 2015 to require businesses in the city to provide their employees with at least three days of paid sick leave beginning in 2016.
  • Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Mayor Michael Nutter signed mandatory paid sick leave into law on February 12, 2015, requiring employers with ten or more employees to permit each employee to earn at least one hour of paid sick leave for every 40 hours worked, effective in 90 days.
  • State-wide mandatory paid sick time legislation requiring all employers to provide seven paid sick days per year is currently pending in Oregon (introduced prior to the State of the Union address).

Stay tuned.

*Helena Oroz, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about paid sick leave or labor and employment law, please contact Helena (hot@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


What Goes Around: Another Cold and Flu Season Comes to a Close

Patrick M. Watts*

Last year, as hospitals treated patients with the Ebola virus in the United States for the first time, many people worried about the spread of the dangerous virus. In particular, employers may have wondered how to accommodate employees affected by the virus or isolation periods intended to prevent spreading the illness. Should an individual be exposed to the Ebola virus, local and state public health authorities will likely monitor that person for signs of the virus and may recommend or require isolation during the virus’ 21-day incubation period. For more specific information, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) provides comprehensive information on preventing the spread of Ebola on its website. Thankfully, the Ebola virus has not spread in the United States. However, the annual cold and flu season remains a threat to employee health and employer productivity.

As cold and flu season comes to a close, employers can benefit from understanding employment laws addressing employee leaves due to illness. Cold and flu season can take a toll on employers, as illness affects employees’ attendance and productivity. Some reports tally the cost of lost productivity at up to seven billion dollars or 111 million missed work days. The flu also poses a serious threat to those with compromised immune systems, such as the elderly, those with cancer, and pregnant women. The contagious nature of the flu means that it can spread through offices quickly thanks to shared surfaces and human contact. Moreover, the CDC has stated that the flu vaccine appears to be less effective this year because of mutations to the current strain; so, even people who received the vaccine still may fall ill with the flu.

The two main employment-related laws implicated by cold and flu season are the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals in the workplace based on a disability or a perceived disability. The ADA applies when an employer makes disability-related inquiries of employees or requires medical examinations. A disability-related inquiry is one that is likely to elicit information about an individual’s disability (e.g., asking about a compromised immune system). The ADA prohibits disability-related inquiries and medical examinations unless they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. This occurs when an employer has a reasonable belief that an individual’s ability to perform essential job functions is impaired or that the individual is a direct threat to cause harm due to a medical condition. Except in the case of a severe flu pandemic (determined by the World Health Organization, Department of Health and Human Services, and CDC), neither of these exceptions apply in the case of common cold or flu, so employers should be careful about requiring medical examinations (including taking employee temperatures) and in wording inquiries regarding employee health. The ADA also prohibits employers from excluding individuals from the workplace based on a disability or perceived disability, so if an employer chooses to require ill employees to stay at home, it should apply the policy consistently.

By contrast, the FMLA allows up to 12 weeks of leave for serious medical conditions for employees who have worked at least 1,250 hours in a 12 month period for a covered employer. Typically, the FMLA does not cover colds or the flu unless it is severe or complications from the illness arise. The FMLA applies if the sick individual has been incapacitated for at least three full calendar days and either: (1) sees a doctor two or more times within 30 days; or (2) consults with a doctor and receives a regimen of continuing care (i.e., a prescription for medicine). Close family members of sick individuals also may qualify for FMLA leave to provide care for a parent, spouse, or child. Some employers may wish to prevent the spread of illness by accommodating sick employees with the option to work from home. However, employers ought to keep in mind that employees on FMLA leave cannot be required to work, even remotely, during leave.

While Ohio does not require employers to provide paid sick days to employees, some states mandate a certain number of paid sick days each year. Employers who wish to restrict or prevent the spread of a virus around the workplace have several options. Allowing employees who feel under the weather to work remotely may keep other employees from catching a contagious illness. Minimizing meetings and conferences also reduces the chances of employees coming into contact with individuals with the cold or flu. Finally, practicing simple hygiene habits, such as encouraging hand washing, covering one’s mouth when coughing or sneezing, and disinfecting frequently-used surfaces like telephones or door handles can help prevent the spread of germs. For more on the cold and flu, the Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, and World Health Organization all provide comprehensive information on the prevention and treatment of the cold and flu on their websites.

*Patrick M. Watts, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act or other questions related to employee leave, please contact Patrick at (pmw@zrlaw.com) or (216) 696-4441.


NLRB Pulls a Fast One: Final “Quickie” Election Rules for Union Elections Adopted

By George S. Crisci*

After a prior failed attempt beginning in 2011 to “modernize” its rules governing union elections, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recently adopted its final rules, which will make it significantly more difficult for employers to run an effective campaign against unionization. The rules, which have been published in the Federal Register, go into effect on April 15, 2015.

These “quickie” election rules amend the NLRB’s representation case procedures and, in most cases, will reduce the time between the filing of an election petition and the election date. As a result, the employer’s timeframe to educate its employees on the realities of union representation is limited.

Many of the critical changes limit the circumstances under which pre-election hearings will be held. For example, disputes regarding individuals’ ineligibility to vote (e.g., due to supervisor status) generally will not be resolved before the election. This bypassing of important legal issues potentially creates a “lose-lose” situation for employers. Employers may face liability for treating employees as supervisors during a campaign if the NLRB decides later those employees are not supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Similarly, employers may face liability if these employees participate in the campaign and the NLRB decides later that they are supervisors under the NLRA and that their involvement in the campaign constitutes “supervisor interference” with the election and grounds for holding a new election.

Important changes resulting from the new rules include the following:
  • Within two business days of receiving the petition for an election, employers must post a Notice of Petition for Election.
  • Pre-election hearings generally will be scheduled to be held eight days after service of the hearing notice.
  • Non-petitioning parties (e.g., employers or rival unions) must submit Statements of Positions one business day before the pre-election hearing identifying issues with the petition. Failure to identify an issue generally precludes litigation on the issue.
  • Along with the Statement of Position, employers must submit a preliminary list of prospective voters, identifying their job classifications, shifts, and work locations.
  • Issues for pre-election hearings generally will be limited to ones that are necessary to determine whether an election should be held.
  • Other issues, including voter eligibility (e.g., supervisor status), often will be resolved after the election.
  • In cases where a pre-election hearing is held, parties are no longer automatically entitled to file post-hearing briefs. Instead, the NLRB’s regional director has discretion to decide whether to allow post-hearing briefs.
  • Elections are no longer automatically delayed pending the outcome of a party’s request for review of the regional director’s decision following a pre-election hearing. Elections only will be stayed when ordered by the NLRB.
  • Employers must provide a final list of eligible voters (referred to as an “Excelsior List”), which now must include personal email addresses and phone numbers (if available to the employer) and must be submitted to the regional director within two days (formerly seven days) of the approval of an election agreement or the direction of an election.
  • Petitions for an election can now be filed electronically.

Since their adoption, the new election rules have become the subject of legal and congressional challenges. In two lawsuits, a number of pro-employer organizations have asked the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and the Western District of Texas to strike down the new rules. Both lawsuits assert that the NLRB’s new rules violate the NLRA and the Administrative Procedure Act. The lawsuit pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also asserts that the new rules violate employer free speech and due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. In addition to these legal challenges, the Senate and the House recently passed a “joint resolution of disapproval” of the new rules under the Congressional Review Act in an attempt to block the NLRB’s implementation of the rules. The resolution now heads to the President, who is expected to veto it. Zashin & Rich will provide periodic updates on the impact of these challenges on the enforceability of the NLRB’s new election rules as they proceed.

Overall, the NLRB’s new election rules change long-standing procedures governing the election process and reduce pre-election litigation (and the time associated with such litigation), while likely increasing post-election litigation. Employers subject to a union election should familiarize themselves with these changes to avoid making any procedural errors during the election process.

Employers must understand the impact that the new rules will have on their ability to run an effective campaign against unionization. Following the filing of a petition for an election, the time an employer has to lawfully educate employees on the perils of unionization is critical to countering the union’s efforts, which typically have been underway for months prior to an employer’s receipt of an NLRB petition. As the NLRB’s new election rules will greatly reduce the employer’s Post-Petition Campaign time, employers should develop strategies to avoid, anticipate, or counter unionization efforts before a union files a petition. In doing so, employers must be cautious and ensure that they are protecting their interests and not violating the NLRA. Employers no longer can afford to be surprised by the filing of an election petition because the very short timeline to conduct an election provides little opportunity to recover from such lack of knowledge. Once the NLRB’s quickie election rules take effect, non-unionized employers will have to implement an on-going, legitimate union-avoidance campaign to keep pace with union and NLRB efforts to unionize their workforce.

*George S. Crisci, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of private and public sector labor relations. For more information about the NLRB’s new election rules or labor and employment law, please contact George (gsc@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Z&R SHORTS


Congratulations!

Zashin & Rich is pleased to announce that the Ohio State Bar Association recently certified Helena Oroz and David Vance as specialists in Labor and Employment Law. 

Zashin & Rich is proud to announce that it has been named to the BTI Client Service A-Team 2015. Zashin & Rich received special recognition in “Best at Handles Problems” and “Best at Provides Value for the Dollar.” Additionally, BTI recognized Stephen Zashin, the head of the firm’s Labor and Employment Groups, as one of only 29 labor and employment “Client Service All-Star” attorneys in the country.

Best Lawyers®
Z&R is happy to announce the following Z&R Labor and Employment Group lawyers have been selected for inclusion in Best Lawyers in America 2015:

  • George S. Crisci – Employment Law Management, Labor Law – Management, and Litigation – Labor and Employment
  • Jon M. Dileno – Employment Law – Management
  • Jonathan J. Downes – Employment Law – Management and Labor Law – Management
  • Stephen S. Zashin – Labor Law – Management

Upcoming Speaking Engagements

Wednesday, April 1, 2015
Drew C. Piersall presents "The Intersection of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act and Workers' Compensation:  Managing Disabilities“ at 10:00 a.m. at the Ohio County Home Association's annual conference to be held at the Salt Fork Lodge and Conference Center in Cambridge, Ohio.

Wednesday, April 8, 2015
Jonathan Downes presents “Social Media”  at the JFSHRA - HR Bootcamp for Supervisors beginning at 9:30 a.m. at the Union County JFS Building.

Thursday, April 16, 2015
Jonathan J. Downes presents “Social Media Challenges for Law Enforcement and Public Employers” for the Miami Valley Risk Management Association in Mason, Ohio. See mvrma.com for details.

Monday, April 20, 2015
George Crisci presents “Determining Worker Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits” at the Unemployment Compensation from A to Z, which begins at 9:00 a.m. at the Doubletree Hotel in Independence, Ohio.
To register, go to http://www.nbi-sems.com.

Wednesday, May 6, 2015
Jonathan Downes and Drew Piersall present “Social Media – Employment Law Issues” and “The Intersection of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act and Workers' Compensation:  Managing Disabilities” at the 2015 OJFSDA Annual Training Conference at the Hyatt Regency Columbus on High Street. 

Friday, May 8, 2015
Jonathan Downes conducts Legal Update at the Ohio Association of Public Safety Directors Annual Conference at 11:15 a.m. at the Reynoldsburg Police Department.

Monday, June 8, 2015
Patrick Watts presents at the Lake, Geauga, Ashtabula SHRM Annual Conference.

Wednesday, December 10, 2014

Search & Employ: U.S. Supreme Court Holds Employees Not Entitled to Pay for Post-Shift Security Searches

By Michele L. Jakubs*

In the unanimous decision issued yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the time employees spend waiting to undergo and undergoing security screenings is not compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 8293 (Dec. 9, 2014). This decision reaffirms that not all work-related activities are compensable.

Under the FLSA, employers must pay non-exempt employees at least minimum wage for all hours worked up to 40 hours in a workweek and overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek. The Portal-to-Portal Act exempts employers from liability under the FLSA with respect to certain categories of work-related activities. Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers need not compensate employees for activities that are preliminary or postliminary to the employees’ principal work activities. Courts interpret the Portal-to-Portal Act to require compensation for preliminary or postliminary activities that are “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ principal work activities. For example, the time battery-plant employees spend showering and changing clothes because of exposure to toxic chemicals and the time meatpacker employees spend sharpening their knives is compensable because without these steps, the employees cannot safely or effectively perform their principal job activities.

The employees in Integrity Staffing claimed that under the FLSA they were entitled to pay for time spent waiting in line and going through employer-mandated security searches at the end of their shifts. The employees, whose duties included retrieving and packaging products for shipment to Amazon customers, argued that the employer conducted security searches to prevent employee theft and that the searches were solely for the benefit of the employer and its customers. The employees also argued that the time was compensable because the employer could have minimized the time associated with the security searches by adding more screeners and staggering the end of shifts.

The case came before the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which agreed with the employees that the time was compensable. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the employer required the employees to perform the activity at issue. The Supreme Court rejected this analysis as it extended coverage to activities that Congress clearly meant to exclude from compensation under the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Supreme Court also noted that an analysis focused on whether the activity is for the employer’s benefit is similarly overbroad.

In finding the security search time not compensable, the Supreme Court stated that the screenings were not the employees’ principal work activities (i.e., retrieving and packaging products) and were not integral and indispensable to their principal activities. The Supreme Court highlighted that the employer employed the employees to retrieve products from warehouse shelves and package those products for shipment. The employer did not employ its employees to undergo security screenings. In addition, the screenings were not an intrinsic element of the employees’ job. The employer could have eliminated the screenings altogether without impairing the employees’ ability to complete their work. Therefore, the employer was not required to compensate employees for this time under the Portal-to-Portal Act. Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the employees’ argument related to the employer’s alleged failure to minimize the security search time, stating that such issues are suited for the bargaining table and not an FLSA lawsuit.

The Integrity Staffing decision highlights the potentially complicated analysis employers must conduct when determining whether or not to compensate employees for time spent performing work-related activities. Employers should seek legal advice in making these determinations as they could lead to liability under the FLSA and similar state laws.

Michele L. Jakubs, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information on the FLSA’s wage and hour requirements, the Portal-to-Portal Act, or the Integrity Staffing decision please contact Michele | mlj@zrlaw.com | 216.696.4441

Thursday, June 19, 2014

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Summer 2014, Volume XVI, Issue ii

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Fun Fact: Holiday and Vacation Time Does Not Count as Hours Worked Under the FMLA

By Patrick M. Watts*

When an employee receives holiday and vacation pay, should that count towards the Family and Medical Leave Act’s 1,250 “hours of service” eligibility requirement? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which covers Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee, doesn’t think so. In Saulsberry v. Federal Express Corp., the Sixth Circuit concluded that only the hours an employee actually works count towards the 1,250-hour eligibility requirement. 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 819 (6th Cir.).

The employee in Saulsberry requested FMLA leave for vertigo. His employer denied the request because he “had not met the FMLA’s 1,250-hours-worked-requirement.” The FMLA defines an “eligible employee” as “an employee who has been employed . . . for at least 12 months by the employer . . . and . . . for at least 1,250 hours of service . . . during the previous 12-month period.” 29 U.S.C. §2611(2)(A).

Here, the employee met the 12-month tenure requirement but did not also meet the 1,250 “hours of service” within the previous year requirement. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the employee had to prove “he actually worked 1,250 hours.” He argued he met this requirement by pointing to an employee report that stated he “put in” 1,257 hours within the year. However, the report included two different hours totals on subsequent lines. One line listed the total hours paid and the following line included an hours worked total. An employer representative stated the employer records demonstrated that the employee worked 1,136 hours during the preceding 12 months. The court carefully considered the distinction between the hours the employee actually worked and the hours for which he was paid. The employee admitted the total hours paid included vacation and holiday pay he did not actually work. In addition, the employee stated he believed his employer kept an accurate account and record of his hours worked. Since the employee did not work the requisite 1,250 hours, the court held the employee was not entitled to FMLA leave and upheld dismissal of his FMLA claim.

This case serves as an excellent reminder that hours worked and not hours paid determine an employee’s eligibility for FMLA leave. Employers should keep detailed and accurate records of hours worked, as compared to hours paid.

*Patrick M. Watts, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor & employment law and has extensive experience dealing with the FMLA. If you have any questions about the FMLA’s requirements, standards, or application, please contact Patrick (pmw@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Donning and Doffing: To Compensate or Not To Compensate

By Michele L. Jakubs*

To compensate or not to compensate, that is the question for “donning and doffing” clothing and gear prior to and after work. Truth be told, Shakespeare’s version was a much easier question to resolve. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp. sheds light on this issue that has troubled employers since the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014). The issue before the Court was whether “donning and doffing” certain protective gear was compensable pursuant to the FLSA. The 12 items that were in question: flame-retardant jacket, pants, hood, hardhat, snood (hood that covers neck and shoulder area), wristlets (detached shirtsleeves), work gloves, leggings, metatarsal (steel-toed) boots, safety glasses, earplugs, and a respirator. The Court found that only the safety glasses, ear plugs, and respirator were not clothes under the Act.

The distinction of whether the items were clothes was important because pursuant to Section 203(o) of the FLSA, non-compensable time includes “time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). The collective bargaining agreement at issue did just that. The Court determined that 9 of the 12 items were subject to exclusion because they “cover the body and are commonly regarded as articles of dress.” The Court found that the parties could collectively bargain away compensation with respect to these items.

The remaining three items were compensable, and per the collective bargaining agreement, the employer could not exclude them; however, the time spent putting on these “non-clothes” was not the majority of time spent “donning and doffing” gear. Therefore, the employer did not need to compensate for this time. Conversely, if the majority of the time is spent “donning or doffing” non-clothes, the time spent “donning or doffing” clothes becomes compensable.

Clearly, employers should ensure that employees are paid for all time worked. As a result, employers must fully understand what constitutes compensable time under the FLSA.

*Michele L. Jakubs, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, has extensive experience counseling employers on state and federal wage and hour laws. For more information about “donning and doffing” or the FLSA, please contact Michele (mlj@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Say What? EEOC Takes Issue with CVS's Separation Agreement Language

By Ami J. Patel*

The EEOC recently flexed its statutory muscle by suing CVS for allegedly interfering with its employees’ access to the EEOC. According to the lawsuit, the company’s separation agreement interfered with employees’ right to communicate with, participate in proceedings conducted by, and file charges with the EEOC. Since these restrictions allegedly violate Section 707 of Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC was able to seek immediate relief through a federal lawsuit. Section 707 prohibits employers from "engag[ing] in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment" of any rights Title VII secures.

In the complaint, the EEOC claimed the following provisions in the separation agreement created a “pattern or practice of resistance:”
  • Cooperation provision: requires employees to “promptly notify” the company’s general counsel if the employee receives an inquiry related to any “civil, criminal, or administrative investigation.”
  • Non-Disparagement provision: prevents employees from making statements that disparage the company.
  • Non-Disclosure and Confidential Information provision: prohibits employees from disclosing confidential information without express authorization from the company’s HR director. Confidential information includes “information concerning the Corporation’s personnel, including . . . affirmative action plans or planning.”
  • General Release of Claims provision: provides for an all-encompassing release of claims, including a release from any charges (e.g., EEOC Charge) and specifically includes “any claim of unlawful discrimination of any kind.”
  • No Pending Actions; Covenant Not to Sue provision: states the employee has not filed and agrees not to file any action, including a complaint (e.g., EEOC complaint), against the company.
  • Breach of Employee Covenants and Injunctive Relief provision: requires the employee acknowledge that any separation agreement breach will “result in irreparable injury” to the company and requires the employee to reimburse the employer for reasonable attorney costs if the company obtains an injunction against the employee.
While the EEOC argued these provisions rendered the employer’s separation agreement unlawful, it minimized or ignored provisions that protected the employees’ rights. For example, the “No Pending Actions; Covenants Not to Sue” provision expressly stated an employee is not prohibited from participating in an agency proceeding “enforcing discrimination laws” or from cooperating with any investigation. In bringing its lawsuit, the EEOC emphasized that the separation agreement did not repeat this language elsewhere in the agreement.

In filing its complaint, the EEOC touted that its most-recent “Strategic Enforcement Plan” identified “preserving access to the legal system” as a top priority. On April 30, 2014, the EEOC again demonstrated its commitment to this priority by suing CollegeAmerica based on its separation agreement. Similar to CVS, CollegeAmerica included the following in its severance agreements: 1) a non-disparagement provision; 2) an agreement not to file complaints against the employer; 3) an agreement not to assist others in claims against the employer; and 4) a release of all claims. The EEOC, in part, based its lawsuit on the employer’s demand that one former employee return her severance pay for allegedly violating the non-disparagement clause. In addition, the employer sued the former employee for filing an EEOC charge.

These lawsuits demonstrate that the EEOC likely will continue to pursue these types of claims. Companies should review their employee separation and severance agreements in light of these recent lawsuits filed by the EEOC.

*Ami J. Patel, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about your severance or separation agreements, please contact Ami (ajp@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Paid Sick Days: Are Employers Facing an Epidemic?

By By Sarah K. Ott*

The issue of a fair minimum wage has been a popular one in headlines and political debates in the last year or so, as cities, states, and the federal government address whether or not to raise it. With less media attention, another wage issue has been gaining momentum among communities: paid sick days. On April 1, 2014, 200,000 New Yorkers became eligible for paid sick days when the Earned Sick Time Act took effect. Generally, the act requires all businesses with five or more employees to provide 40 hours of paid sick leave to employees who work more than 80 hours in a calendar year. The law also requires employers of fewer than five employees to provide 40 hours of unpaid sick leave. The list of family members for whom an employee may use paid sick leave includes children, spouses, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, and siblings.

As goes New York City, so goes the rest of the country? Yes and no. Like with minimum wage, cities and states are taking the lead on whether employers must provide paid sick days. While no federal law requires employers to provide paid sick leave, the Family and Medical Leave Act generally requires employers to provide unpaid sick leave. Connecticut is the only state that requires employers to offer paid sick days to employees, but it may not be the only state for long. California has a bill pending in the state legislature that would offer one paid sick day for every 30 days worked. Several cities, including Seattle, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Portland, Newark, and Jersey City have enacted paid sick day laws for their citizens. Of course, these measures are not without opposition. Eleven states (Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin) have passed legislation making it illegal for cities or municipalities to enact paid sick leave laws.

If you are an employer, you may be wondering if your company’s sick leave policy is compliant and whether Ohio is contemplating similar steps. Currently, Ohio does not mandate paid sick leave, and none of the cities in the state have enacted ordinances requiring it. In 2008, the Ohio Healthy Families Act, which would have required employers with 25 or more employees to provide seven days per year of paid sick leave, was removed from the ballot. The main supporter, Service Employees International Union, withdrew the measure in order to focus on a federal paid sick leave law that never passed. No laws mandating paid sick leave are pending in the Ohio state legislature or any of its major cities, but if the national trend continues, the issue will surely arise soon.

*Sarah K. Ott practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about paid sick leave laws, please contact Sarah (sko@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Implications of Assisted Reproductive Technology on Pregnancy and Gender Discrimination

By Drew C. Piersall*

In 1978 the first human was born after being conceived by in vitro fertilization (IVF). That same year, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) to prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy. This amendment, known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), protects pregnant women from employers’ discriminatory actions including refusals to hire and discharges. The scope of the PDA is unclear when applied to women utilizing assisted reproductive technology that are not yet pregnant. Regardless of the PDA’s impact, employers are not free to discriminate against these women based on their intention to become pregnant, as discrimination based on “child-bearing capacity” is illegal under Title VII.

Under the PDA, covered employers cannot discriminate against employees or applicants “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” In analyzing claims under the PDA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit generally requires the plaintiff to prove: (i) she was pregnant; (ii) she was qualified for her position; (iii) her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (iv) there was a nexus between her pregnancy and her employer’s employment decision. Under this framework, PDA coverage would not extend to individuals undergoing assisted reproductive technology treatments that have not yet become pregnant. However, the individual may still have a viable claim under Title VII for gender discrimination based on her child-bearing capacity.

A federal district court in Michigan recently addressed the intricacies of a discrimination claim involving assisted reproductive technology. In that case, the plaintiff, who worked as a lead dental instructor, notified her supervisor she planned to become pregnant by IVF. During the plaintiff’s IVF treatment, her supervisor demoted her to the position of teaching assistant so she could sit while working because she was, in her supervisor’s words, “being pumped with so many hormones.” After taking a week of vacation leave after completing her procedure, the plaintiff miscarried upon returning to work. The next day, the plaintiff’s supervisor demoted the plaintiff, later stating she was too “focused on babies” because she intended to use IVF again and was emotionally unstable as a result of her IVF treatments. The plaintiff alleged her supervisor eventually terminated her based on her gender and pregnancy.

Relying on the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of PDA claims, the court refused to reach the conclusion that non-pregnant plaintiffs utilizing IVF can successfully bring claims under the PDA. First, the court held that the plaintiff stated a plausible claim under the PDA with respect to her demotion following her miscarriage, as she was actually pregnant and a miscarriage is a pregnancy-related condition. With respect to the plaintiff’s termination, which she alleged was based on her intention to become pregnant again, the court analyzed the claim not as a PDA claim, but rather as a Title VII gender discrimination claim. In doing so, the court recognized child-bearing capacity is a solely female characteristic, and therefore, discrimination based on child-bearing capacity is the very type of gender-based discrimination Title VII prohibits.

Employers should be cautious when making employment decisions that affect employees who express their intent to become pregnant or who utilize assisted reproductive technology. Even though employees utilizing assisted reproductive technology may not yet be pregnant, they are still protected from discriminatory actions directed at their attempts to become pregnant. While courts may be reluctant to analyze such claims under the PDA, employees who utilize assisted reproductive technology might state a claim under Title VII.

*Drew C. Piersall practices in the firm's Columbus office. He has extensive experience counseling employers on Title VII and the PDA. For more information about these topics or any other labor and employment need, please contact Drew (dcp@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


You Can't Use That! Right? Wrong. Use of Unemployment Hearing Evidence in Subsequent Litigation

By David P. Frantz*

Consider the following scenario: an employer terminates an employee for just cause. The employee subsequently files for unemployment compensation and the employer challenges the application. The case goes to hearing where the hearing officer concludes that the employer terminated the employment of the employee for just cause. Unhappy with the result, the employee sues the employer in federal court. Can the federal court consider evidence and determinations made during the unemployment compensation process? One Alabama federal court recently answered that question with a resounding yes.

In Franks v. Indian Rivers Medical Health Ctr., the district court judge dismissed a former employee's Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) lawsuit based on the "collateral estoppel" doctrine, which generally provides that when a valid and final judgment determines an issue, the same parties cannot litigate that issue again. 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15544 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2014). The Franks judge concluded that since the Alabama unemployment commission already determined the employer terminated its employee for dishonesty, the employee’s subsequent FMLA claim also failed. Although the Franks judge ruled in the employer’s favor, the decision highlights the potential pitfalls of challenging a former employee’s request for unemployment compensation. Evidence submitted, testimony introduced, and even a hearing officer’s decision itself may be utilized in subsequent litigation where the stakes are typically higher.

Ohio Revised Code §4141.21 prohibits evidence submitted during the unemployment compensation process from admission in any court proceeding. Nonetheless, federal courts in Ohio have concluded that evidence submitted in the unemployment compensation process is "not absolutely privileged and should not be stricken." Klaus v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Ohio, 437 F. Supp. 2d 706 (S.D. Ohio 2006). For example, the Klaus court admitted the employer's unemployment compensation statements in a later gender discrimination lawsuit. The employer initially had stated it terminated the former employee for "lack of production." However, the employer later stated it terminated the employee because the company was "winding up a line of business." Finding these statements at odds, the court commented that maintaining the O.R.C. §4141.21 privilege would enable parties to hide information in the unemployment compensation process. Thus, Ohio employers should be careful about what evidence, testimony, and information they submit when challenging a request for unemployment compensation.

So, how should an employer approach the unemployment compensation process when it anticipates future litigation? The safest bet is to involve counsel early. To the extent an employer challenges a request for unemployment compensation, it is imperative the employer has a clear understanding of what led to the claimant’s separation and provides accurate information. An employer never wants to be in a position in which they are trying to explain away earlier inaccurate submissions.

*David P. Frantz practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about the unemployment compensation process, please contact David (dpf@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Right to Return: Equivalent Positions After FMLA Leave

By Stephen S. Zashin*

Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), employees are entitled to return to their same job or an equivalent position after taking leave. As recently demonstrated by a federal court in Arizona, the degree of equivalence under the FMLA can be construed strictly against an employer.

Under the FMLA, covered employers generally must provide eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for personal medical reasons or to tend to the medical needs of a family member. In order to ensure that employees are not punished for taking this leave, the FMLA requires employers to reinstate employees returning from leave to either: (1) the position the employee held before taking leave; or (2) a different position that is equivalent in benefits, pay, and conditions of employment. Employers must use caution when assigning a returning employee to a position different from the one the employee held before taking leave.

In order to comply with the “equivalent position” requirement, identical job title alone will not likely suffice, at least according to a federal court in Arizona. Prior to taking FMLA leave, an employee of a collection agency worked as a collector on an account for a major bank. In that position, she received a 35% commission on collections. After returning from leave, her employer assigned her to another account collecting for credit card companies. She only received 28% commission in her new assignment, but her employer argued her new position provided her an opportunity to earn more due to a higher rate of collection on the credit card accounts. Despite the fact that the employee was a “collector” both before and after her leave, a federal district court in Arizona held she had presented a triable claim under the FMLA based upon whether the employer assigned her to an “equivalent” job.

Upon an employee’s return from FMLA leave, employers often are faced with limited options regarding job placement. The most risk-adverse approach is to place the returning employee into the exact position the employee held before taking leave, without altering any conditions of the position (e.g., wages, benefits, etc.). However, this approach may not be possible in all situations. As an alternative, the employer may place a returning employee into an equivalent position but should proceed cautiously when doing so and ensure the position is equivalent in benefits, pay, and other employment conditions.

*Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law and the head of the firm's labor and employment group, has extensive experience counseling employers on FMLA compliance issues. For more information about the FMLA or any other labor and employment need, please contact Stephen (ssz@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Z&R SHORTS


Zashin & Rich is pleased to announce the addition of Sarah K. Ott to the firm's Employment and Labor Group in its Cleveland office.


Sarah's practice encompasses all areas of labor and employment law, including employment discrimination, legal compliance, and labor relations. As a student at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Sarah won an award for excellence in legal negotiations. Prior to joining Zashin & Rich, Sarah practiced in the area of general litigation with a Cleveland-area solo practitioner. While in law school, she interned for two judges in the Southern District of Ohio and at the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency.

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