Showing posts with label Union Relations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Union Relations. Show all posts

Friday, June 12, 2015

BNA's Health Law Reporter™ | Challenge to NLRB Election Rule Fails; Employers Urged to Prepare New Game Plan

June 11, 2015 | Lawrence E. Dubé and Peyton M. Sturges | Download PDF
Reproduced with permission from BNA's Health Law Reporter, 24 HLR 735 (June 11, 2015).
Copyright 2015 by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (800-372-1033)

In a decision with significant implications for healthcare employers, a federal trial court June 1 found NLRB amendments to its representation case rules are neither unlawful nor arbitrary (Associated Builders & Contractors of Tex., Inc. v. NLRB, 2015 BL 174029, W.D. Tex., No. 1:15-cv-26, 6/1/15).

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected a challenge by a coalition of Texas business groups to the National Labor Relations Board's rules, dubbed by employers as ''quickie'' or ''ambush'' election rules, saying there was no evidence backing claims that the NLRB adopted the rule changes to favor organized labor. The plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate that they were entitled to an injunction blocking enforcement of the rule changes, the court said.

Health-care labor attorneys have followed the case, and a second pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, closely because they have broad implications for hospitals and other health-care provider employers. The attorneys have warned that the rules make providers more vulnerable to union organizing efforts because they significantly expedite the holding of elections following the filing of a petition and tie an employer's hands in a number of respects that limit its ability to respond to a union organizing effort (24 HLR 506, 4/23/15).

Although the plaintiffs immediately filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit June 5 (No. 15-50497), attorneys told Bloomberg BNA that health-care providers and other employers shouldn't assume that the rules will eventually be struck down. Instead, employers should prepare now for the very real possibility that these rules are here to stay, they said.

High Stakes in Health Care.


Patrick J. Hoban, with Zashin & Rich, Cleveland, said the stakes for healthcare and other employers are high because the rules "significantly reduce the time employers will have to mount their own campaign and counter the misinformation that the union will have been feeding the employees for months prior to filing the petition." Combined with the added administrative and procedural burdens placed on employers in the first week after a petition is filed, "it will be a whole new ball game," he told Bloomberg BNA.

In addition to implementing a union avoidance strategy including regular employee training, Hoban advised employers to review and update their employee handbooks, particularly provisions regarding solicitation, distribution, posting, conduct and electronic mail use to comply with NLRB standards.

"In short, employers who would avoid unionization should essentially run a continuous union-avoidance program," he said.

Hoban also pointed to data recently released by the NLRB that document what many had feared: that implementation of the rule will lead to more petitions and a significant reduction in the number of days between the filing of a petition and an election.

His firm's review of the data shows:

  • from April 14 to May 14, 2015, the NLRB received 280 election petition filings;
  • this number is up from 212 representation petitions filed from March 13 to April 13, 2015 before the rule took effect;
  • the monthly average of representation petition filings for 2012 and 2013 were 164 and 165 respectively;
  • for representation petitions filed since April 14, 2015, elections are being scheduled for a median of 23 days after the petition was filed;
  • in 2012 and 2013, elections were typically held 38 days after a petition was filed.

"For health-care organizations, pre-planning work can be staggering but it is critical to simply being able to play the game." —GREG ROBERTSON, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, RICHMOND, VA.

The NLRA guarantees employers the right to oppose unionization and explain to their employees why unionization isn't in their best interests. But even though the trial court's Associated Builders & Contractors ruling found the rules weren't pro-union, "the data suggests otherwise," Hoban said.

Greg Robertson, with Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Va., agreed that the decision, though not the final word, suggests health-care and other employers need to prepare for the new election rule's requirements and pace.

"While the ruling is a blow to the employer community's opposition to the new rules, it is not the end of the road," he said. He pointed to the plaintiff's filing of an appeal and the case pending in the federal court in Washington.

The court in the latter case, however, already denied a request for a temporary restraining order and expressed skepticism concerning the plaintiffs' claims at a May 15 hearing (24 HLR 654, 5/21/15).

"Ultimately, employers cannot count on the success of the legal challenges to the board's election rules in federal court," Robertson said. "Employers should remain proactive and prepared to run an effective campaign within a time frame that will likely become more constricted in the next few months," he added.

Robertson told Bloomberg BNA that the increased pace creates a real urgency from an employer standpoint and that a two week election process can be logistically challenging for employers who aren't adequately prepared. "For health-care organizations, pre-planning work can be staggering but it is critical to simply being able to play the game."

Even simple things can become a nightmare for health-care providers facing a short election cycle, Robertson said. He cited the employer's need to organize meetings with employees of one or more bargaining units in order to provide them with the employer's perspective but said it can be difficult if not impossible to assemble prospective bargaining unit members for such a meeting given patient care imperatives.

"Whether it is meetings with registered nurses, housekeeping, dieticians or some other prospective unit, health-care employers need to figure out in advance how they will organize these meetings without disrupting patient care," he said.

Election Rule Changes Now in Place.


In dismissing the case, the court rejected arguments of the Associated Builders and Contractors of Texas Inc. and other groups that claimed the board exceeded its power under the National Labor Relations Act by adopting rule changes that may limit parties from litigating some representation case issues until well after employees cast ballots on union representation.

"The New Rule grants significant deference to the Board and the Regional Directors in applying the very provisions Plaintiffs challenge," the court said. That fact made it very difficult for the groups to argue that the court should consider the NLRB rule changes invalid on the face of the regulation, the court added.

The board approved the rule changes (RIN 3142- AA08) in December 2014. The Senate and House disapproved the NLRB regulatory action (S.J. Res. 8), but President Barack Obama vetoed their Congressional Review Act resolution March 31, allowing the rule changes to go into effect April 14.

The rule changes require employers to respond to the filing with a statement of position before a pre-election hearing is opened by an NLRB regional office.

Under the amended rules, pre-election hearings are generally to be devoted only to issues necessary to determine whether an election should be conducted. Other issues, including the unit inclusion or eligibility of employees may be deferred to post-election proceedings if they affect a small percentage of a voting unit.

Lawsuit Challenged NLRB Rulemaking.


The Associated Builders filed the lawsuit Jan. 13, shortly after the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and allied groups filed their challenge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, D.D.C., No. 15-cv-9).

The Texas plaintiffs filed a motion for expedited summary judgment in their case, while the NLRB filed its own partial motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the NLRB motions and denied the business coalition's request for summary judgment.

The Texas groups argued that the rule improperly restricts employers' ability to litigate threshold issues before a union election, citing new requirements for preelection hearings and said the new rule is inconsistent with Section 9(c)(1) of the act, which provides for "an appropriate hearing upon due notice" before an election is held.

The court, however, found language in the new rule that grants great deference to the board and its regional directors in conducting pre-election hearings "significant."

Because the business groups were challenging the NLRB rule on its face, the court said, "even if the New Rule ordinarily limits the timing and scope of the preelection process, the deference granted a Regional Director to extend and expand those limits renders Plaintiffs' challenge unavailing."

The court said the plaintiffs had "not pointed to any binding authority which establishes the language of 29 U.S.C. § 159 prevents the Board from requiring the filing of a Statement of Position prior to a pre-election hearing, requires the Board to permit employers to introduce evidence concerning voter eligibility in a preelection hearing, or prevents the Board from delaying consideration of voter eligibility prior to an election."

Employee Privacy Argument Rejected.


The court also rejected the coalition's challenge to a new rule provision requiring an employer to release information, including the personal phone numbers and e-mail addresses, of employees in connection with an election proceeding.

The challengers said information could be misused by unions, but the court said the plaintiffs hadn't explained how employee privacy would be compromised under the new rule.

The court also wasn't persuaded by an argument that the rule change would result in accelerating elections and truncating the time for debate and discussion before a representation election.

The new rule gives regional directors responsibility for setting election dates and instructs them to consider "the desires of the parties, which may include their opportunity for meaningful speech about the election."

"[O]nce again," the court wrote, "in light of the fact that Plaintiffs raise a facial challenge to the New Rule, this discretion alone renders it virtually impossible for Plaintiffs to show the election period in every set of circumstances violates free speech."

The court further said the challengers failed to show that the NLRB rule changes were arbitrary or improper under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Judge Robert L. Pitman wrote the opinion.

Littler Mendelson PC represented the business groups. NLRB attorneys represented the board.

Tuesday, June 2, 2015

Unions Take Advantage of the NLRB’s “Quickie” Election Rules

By Sarah K. Ott*

The National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”) recently released data revealing a significant increase in union-filed representation petitions since the NLRB implemented its new “ambush” election rules on April 14, 2015 (“New Rules”). The New Rules completely changed the decades-old representation election process, saddled employers with added administrative obligations, and significantly limited an employer’s ability to argue bargaining unit issues prior to a representation election. The New Rules also significantly shortened the time after a petition is filed that an election may be held. Under the New Rules, an election may be held as soon as thirteen days after a union files a petition. Zashin & Rich described the anticipated changes in the New Rules in a recent Employment Law Quarterly Article titled “NLRB Pulls a Fast One: Final “Quickie” Election Rules for Union Elections Adopted” (Winter 2015 Employment Law Quarterly, Vol. XVII, Issue i). This “quickie election” process is expected to allow employers little time to mount an effective campaign to educate employees about the downsides of unionization. The NLRB’s new data suggests that unions are taking advantage of the benefits of the New Rules to employers’ detriment.

From March 13 to April 13, 2015 (the month prior to the New Rules’ effective date), unions filed 212 representation petitions. During the month immediately following the New Rules’ implementation, from April 14 to May 14, 2014, the NLRB received 280 election petition filings. This number is also well above the monthly average of representation petition filings for 2012 and 2013 which were 164 and 165 respectively. If some unions sat on petitions for representation until the New Rules came into effect in order to take advantage of the changes, there may be some leveling off in the number of election petition filings in the coming months. However, some effects of the New Rules are independent of the increase in election petition filings.

In addition to the significant increase in the number of petitions filed immediately following the New Rules implementation, the number of days between the filing of a petition and an election has plummeted. In 2012 and 2013, elections were typically held 38 days after a petition was filed. For representation petitions filed since April 14, 2015, elections are being scheduled for a median of 23 days after the petition was filed (a reduction in employer campaign time of 40%). Even if the number of election petition filings falls off, that would not affect the median number of days between the filing of a petition and an election. It appears clear that, as anticipated, the New Rules have drastically tilted the field against employers by reducing one of the most valuable resources available in combatting an organizing campaign: time.

The NLRB data confirms that the New Rules are a massive shift toward unions. The National Labor Relations Act grants employers the right to oppose unionization and explain to their employees why unionization is not in their best interests. However, the New Rules reduce the time employers have to make their arguments and educate their employees. While employer groups have challenged the New Rules in federal courts, this week, a federal judge in Texas rejected one such effort contending that the New Rules violate the National Labor Relations Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. While a case filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce remains alive in the D.C. Circuit, employers must be prepared for the likelihood that the New Rules are here to stay.

Employers who oppose unionization should consider regular communication about the perils of union representation with employees prior to an organizing drive. In addition, employers should consult with counsel about legal means to avoid unionization. Additionally, upon receiving notice that a union has filed a representation petition regarding their employees, employers should immediately seek counsel as the New Rules do not afford employers the luxury of time and the numbers show that unions have taken advantage of the New Rules.

Sarah K. Ott practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about the NLRB’s new election rules, please contact: Sarah K. Ott | sko@zrlaw.com | 216.696.4441

Thursday, March 19, 2015

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Winter 2015, Volume XVII, Issue i

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Changes to Ohio’s Menacing, Stalking, and Protection Order Laws Help Employers Defend Against Threats of Workplace Violence

By David R. Vance*

Pursuant to recent legislation, Ohio employers now have an added defense to help prevent workplace violence: the ability to file for a protection order based upon an individual’s threats against the company or its employees. This change in the law provides employers an important tool to help protect employees and customers.

Ohio’s updated menacing, stalking, and protection order laws, which went into effect in September 2014, fixed a void that left employers in a compromised position when facing threats of workplace violence. Ohio’s prior menacing, aggravated menacing, and menacing by stalking laws prohibited individuals from knowingly causing another person (i.e., the victim) to believe that they would harm the victim (or their property, unborn child, or family member). The amended language now states that the victim’s belief that the offender will cause them harm may be based on the offender’s words or conduct directed at or identifying the victim’s employer.

In addition to the amendments to the menacing and stalking laws, the legislature added a provision (Ohio Revised Code § 2903.215) that allows employers of two or more alleged victims of a violation of Ohio’s menacing, aggravated menacing, or menacing by stalking laws to file a motion for a temporary protection order. In instances where a criminal proceeding against the offender is pending and the offender’s threat(s) or conduct identified the employer or was directed at the employer, the employer may file a motion for a temporary protection order in the already pending criminal proceeding. Additionally, in cases involving menacing by stalking, even when no criminal proceeding is pending, employers may file a petition for a civil protection order if the offender’s pattern of conduct identified the employer or was directed at the employer.

The changes to the laws arose in part out of concerns following an incident involving a Cincinnati-area company. After a former employee made threats to go on a shooting spree on the company’s premises, the former employee was charged with menacing. Eventually, the charge was dropped because the threats were directed generally at the company and not at specific employees. Under previous Ohio law, the company was without recourse to seek a protection order against the former employee.

The changes in the laws address the seriousness and reality of threats of workplace violence and provide needed legal recourse to employers faced with difficult and potentially deadly scenarios. Previously, employers would have to rely on the individuals targeted by a threat to seek a protection order against the offender. Now, employers have the ability to take legal action without relying on their employees, who may be hesitant or fearful of initiating legal action against an offender.

Employers should take all threats of workplace violence seriously and should seek guidance immediately upon learning of a threat. To help ensure the safety of their employees and customers, it is crucial that employers address threats in a timely manner and take necessary action, which may include seeking a protection order.

*David R. Vance, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about workplace protection orders or labor and employment law, please contact David (drv@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Train on Your Own Time: Firefighters Not Entitled to Overtime Pay for Hours Spent Training

By Jonathan J. Downes*

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which covers Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee, recently concluded a city did not have to pay firefighters for hours spent in paramedic training. Misewicz v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 771 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014). The city required firefighters to obtain paramedic certification but did not compensate them for the training time. Rejecting the firefighters’ arguments that the time constituted “hours worked” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the court found this time fell under an FLSA exception.

Generally, the FLSA requires employers to pay their employees a minimum wage for all hours worked and pay overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours in a work week. Time spent attending employer-sponsored training programs is typically considered compensable as hours worked. However, U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations provide two exceptions. First, under Code of Federal Regulations Section 787.27, employers do not have to count “[a]ttendance at lectures, meetings, training programs and similar activities” as working time if: (1) attendance is outside the employee’s regular working hours; (2) attendance is in fact voluntary; (3) the training is not directly related to the employee’s job; and (4) the employee does not perform any productive work while at the training. In addition, pursuant to Code of Federal Regulations Section 553.226(b), training time for employees of state and local governments is not compensable if it occurs (1) outside regular working hours (2) at specialized or follow-up training (3) that is required for certification purposes of private and public sector employees whether by a particular governmental jurisdiction or by law.

In Misewicz, the case turned on whether the firefighters’ training time fell under the Section 553.226(b) exception. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit focused on whether the training was “required by law for certification.” Tennessee law does not require firefighters to be certified paramedics. However, Tennessee does require all employees performing paramedic-level care to obtain paramedic certification. Here, the city required all firefighters to obtain that paramedic certification within three years of employment.

The key issue was whether the exception’s “required by law for certification” requirement should focus on the employees’ job description or actual duties performed. The firefighters argued that the court should make its determination based on the employees’ job description which included duties that required state law certification. According to the firefighters, since the applicable job description was for fire recruits, state law did not require paramedic certification and the city should have to pay for their training time. The city argued the determination should hinge on whether state law required certification for the duties the employees actually performed. Once certified, firefighters spent one-half of their shift performing paramedic duties and responded to emergency medical services incidents much more frequently than fire suppression incidents.

Ultimately, the Misewicz Court ruled in the city’s favor: whether the training is “required by law for certification” hinges on whether the employer actually hired the employee to perform duties that require state certification, determined by whether the employer asks the employee to regularly perform those duties after training. Since the city hired the firefighters to perform both firefighting and paramedic duties, the exception applied. Therefore, the city did not violate the FLSA by failing to pay the firefighters for their paramedic training.

This is the first Sixth Circuit decision to interpret the FLSA “hours worked” Section 553.226(b) training exception. The Court rejected the argument that the city had to meet both “hours worked” training exceptions to escape liability under the FLSA. Therefore, employers do not have to compensate employees for training time if the employee training meets the Section 553.226(b) exception alone.

Public employers should review any compensation provided for training time. If employers pay for training necessary to obtain certification required by, for example, the Ohio Revised Code, the employer may not have to pay employees for that time. However, public employers must also remember to consider whether the employees utilize that certification in their day-to-day job. Employers should contact counsel with any questions about this “hours worked” training exception or the Misewicz decision.

*Jonathan J. Downes, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, has extensive experience advising public entities and employers. For more information about the Misewicz decision or the FLSA applied to public employers, please contact Jonathan (jjd@zrlaw.com) at 614.224.4411.


Paid Sick Days Ahead for All? The Healthy Families Act Reappears… Again

By Helena Oroz*

As the white fluffy stuff turns into hard, dirty, slowly melting stuff in cities and towns across our fair region, summer 2014 still seems like a distant memory . . . but one hot topic from our Summer ELQ remains hot as can be: paid sick leave.

Currently, three states – Connecticut, California, and Massachusetts – mandate paid sick leave, as well as a growing number of cities. Paid sick leave proponents got quite a boost from President Obama’s State of the Union Address on January 20, 2015, which was chock full of graphics, including one that showed thirty-two other countries are apparently more civilized than the United States when it comes to paid maternity leave. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sotu at 17:50). The graphic was on a split-screen with the President during the following portion of his speech:

Today, we are the only advanced country on Earth that doesn’t guarantee paid sick leave or paid maternity leave to our workers. Forty-three million workers have no paid sick leave. Forty-three million. Think about that. And that forces too many parents to make the gut-wrenching choice between a paycheck and a sick kid at home. So I’ll be taking new action to help states adopt paid leave laws of their own. And since paid sick leave won where it was on the ballot last November, let’s put it to a vote right here in Washington. Send me a bill that gives every worker in America the opportunity to earn seven days of paid sick leave. It’s the right thing to do.

That bill, the Healthy Families Act, was previously introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate in March 2013 but stalled in committee. In a joint statement issued January 14, 2015, Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) and Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) promised to reintroduce the bill in the coming weeks. On February 12, 2015, they kept that promise. The bill (H.R. 932/S. 497) requires:
  • employers with 15 or more employees for each working day during 20 or more workweeks a year to permit each employee to earn at least one hour of paid sick time for every 30 hours worked, up to a maximum of 56 hours (seven days) of paid sick time in a calendar year.
  • small employers (those with fewer than 15 employees) who opt out of proving paid sick time to provide at least 56 hours of unpaid sick time in a calendar year to each employee.
  • employers to allow employees to use the time to: (1) meet their own medical needs; (2) care for the medical needs of certain family members (including a domestic partner or the domestic partner's parent or child); or (3) seek medical attention, assist a related person, take legal action, or engage in other specified activities relating to domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.

The Act would vest investigative and enforcement authority in the Secretary of Labor, but also authorize civil actions for damages by employees against employers who violate the Act.

As expected, proponents of the bill argue that it is critical to help working families and to fill gaps left by the Family and Medical Leave Act and other leave laws. Opponents focus on potentially untenable costs, especially to small businesses, and the possibility of employee abuse.

Considering the current composition of the U.S. Congress, it also seems likely that this one-size-fits-all proposition will stall once more, so why all the commotion? Perhaps more important than the outcome of the bill is the momentum built around this issue. Even more states and cities are enacting or considering their own paid leave laws, just as President Obama has called on them to do, including the following:
  • Tacoma, Washington City Council voted on January 27, 2015 to require businesses in the city to provide their employees with at least three days of paid sick leave beginning in 2016.
  • Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Mayor Michael Nutter signed mandatory paid sick leave into law on February 12, 2015, requiring employers with ten or more employees to permit each employee to earn at least one hour of paid sick leave for every 40 hours worked, effective in 90 days.
  • State-wide mandatory paid sick time legislation requiring all employers to provide seven paid sick days per year is currently pending in Oregon (introduced prior to the State of the Union address).

Stay tuned.

*Helena Oroz, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about paid sick leave or labor and employment law, please contact Helena (hot@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


What Goes Around: Another Cold and Flu Season Comes to a Close

Patrick M. Watts*

Last year, as hospitals treated patients with the Ebola virus in the United States for the first time, many people worried about the spread of the dangerous virus. In particular, employers may have wondered how to accommodate employees affected by the virus or isolation periods intended to prevent spreading the illness. Should an individual be exposed to the Ebola virus, local and state public health authorities will likely monitor that person for signs of the virus and may recommend or require isolation during the virus’ 21-day incubation period. For more specific information, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) provides comprehensive information on preventing the spread of Ebola on its website. Thankfully, the Ebola virus has not spread in the United States. However, the annual cold and flu season remains a threat to employee health and employer productivity.

As cold and flu season comes to a close, employers can benefit from understanding employment laws addressing employee leaves due to illness. Cold and flu season can take a toll on employers, as illness affects employees’ attendance and productivity. Some reports tally the cost of lost productivity at up to seven billion dollars or 111 million missed work days. The flu also poses a serious threat to those with compromised immune systems, such as the elderly, those with cancer, and pregnant women. The contagious nature of the flu means that it can spread through offices quickly thanks to shared surfaces and human contact. Moreover, the CDC has stated that the flu vaccine appears to be less effective this year because of mutations to the current strain; so, even people who received the vaccine still may fall ill with the flu.

The two main employment-related laws implicated by cold and flu season are the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals in the workplace based on a disability or a perceived disability. The ADA applies when an employer makes disability-related inquiries of employees or requires medical examinations. A disability-related inquiry is one that is likely to elicit information about an individual’s disability (e.g., asking about a compromised immune system). The ADA prohibits disability-related inquiries and medical examinations unless they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. This occurs when an employer has a reasonable belief that an individual’s ability to perform essential job functions is impaired or that the individual is a direct threat to cause harm due to a medical condition. Except in the case of a severe flu pandemic (determined by the World Health Organization, Department of Health and Human Services, and CDC), neither of these exceptions apply in the case of common cold or flu, so employers should be careful about requiring medical examinations (including taking employee temperatures) and in wording inquiries regarding employee health. The ADA also prohibits employers from excluding individuals from the workplace based on a disability or perceived disability, so if an employer chooses to require ill employees to stay at home, it should apply the policy consistently.

By contrast, the FMLA allows up to 12 weeks of leave for serious medical conditions for employees who have worked at least 1,250 hours in a 12 month period for a covered employer. Typically, the FMLA does not cover colds or the flu unless it is severe or complications from the illness arise. The FMLA applies if the sick individual has been incapacitated for at least three full calendar days and either: (1) sees a doctor two or more times within 30 days; or (2) consults with a doctor and receives a regimen of continuing care (i.e., a prescription for medicine). Close family members of sick individuals also may qualify for FMLA leave to provide care for a parent, spouse, or child. Some employers may wish to prevent the spread of illness by accommodating sick employees with the option to work from home. However, employers ought to keep in mind that employees on FMLA leave cannot be required to work, even remotely, during leave.

While Ohio does not require employers to provide paid sick days to employees, some states mandate a certain number of paid sick days each year. Employers who wish to restrict or prevent the spread of a virus around the workplace have several options. Allowing employees who feel under the weather to work remotely may keep other employees from catching a contagious illness. Minimizing meetings and conferences also reduces the chances of employees coming into contact with individuals with the cold or flu. Finally, practicing simple hygiene habits, such as encouraging hand washing, covering one’s mouth when coughing or sneezing, and disinfecting frequently-used surfaces like telephones or door handles can help prevent the spread of germs. For more on the cold and flu, the Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, and World Health Organization all provide comprehensive information on the prevention and treatment of the cold and flu on their websites.

*Patrick M. Watts, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act or other questions related to employee leave, please contact Patrick at (pmw@zrlaw.com) or (216) 696-4441.


NLRB Pulls a Fast One: Final “Quickie” Election Rules for Union Elections Adopted

By George S. Crisci*

After a prior failed attempt beginning in 2011 to “modernize” its rules governing union elections, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recently adopted its final rules, which will make it significantly more difficult for employers to run an effective campaign against unionization. The rules, which have been published in the Federal Register, go into effect on April 15, 2015.

These “quickie” election rules amend the NLRB’s representation case procedures and, in most cases, will reduce the time between the filing of an election petition and the election date. As a result, the employer’s timeframe to educate its employees on the realities of union representation is limited.

Many of the critical changes limit the circumstances under which pre-election hearings will be held. For example, disputes regarding individuals’ ineligibility to vote (e.g., due to supervisor status) generally will not be resolved before the election. This bypassing of important legal issues potentially creates a “lose-lose” situation for employers. Employers may face liability for treating employees as supervisors during a campaign if the NLRB decides later those employees are not supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Similarly, employers may face liability if these employees participate in the campaign and the NLRB decides later that they are supervisors under the NLRA and that their involvement in the campaign constitutes “supervisor interference” with the election and grounds for holding a new election.

Important changes resulting from the new rules include the following:
  • Within two business days of receiving the petition for an election, employers must post a Notice of Petition for Election.
  • Pre-election hearings generally will be scheduled to be held eight days after service of the hearing notice.
  • Non-petitioning parties (e.g., employers or rival unions) must submit Statements of Positions one business day before the pre-election hearing identifying issues with the petition. Failure to identify an issue generally precludes litigation on the issue.
  • Along with the Statement of Position, employers must submit a preliminary list of prospective voters, identifying their job classifications, shifts, and work locations.
  • Issues for pre-election hearings generally will be limited to ones that are necessary to determine whether an election should be held.
  • Other issues, including voter eligibility (e.g., supervisor status), often will be resolved after the election.
  • In cases where a pre-election hearing is held, parties are no longer automatically entitled to file post-hearing briefs. Instead, the NLRB’s regional director has discretion to decide whether to allow post-hearing briefs.
  • Elections are no longer automatically delayed pending the outcome of a party’s request for review of the regional director’s decision following a pre-election hearing. Elections only will be stayed when ordered by the NLRB.
  • Employers must provide a final list of eligible voters (referred to as an “Excelsior List”), which now must include personal email addresses and phone numbers (if available to the employer) and must be submitted to the regional director within two days (formerly seven days) of the approval of an election agreement or the direction of an election.
  • Petitions for an election can now be filed electronically.

Since their adoption, the new election rules have become the subject of legal and congressional challenges. In two lawsuits, a number of pro-employer organizations have asked the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and the Western District of Texas to strike down the new rules. Both lawsuits assert that the NLRB’s new rules violate the NLRA and the Administrative Procedure Act. The lawsuit pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also asserts that the new rules violate employer free speech and due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. In addition to these legal challenges, the Senate and the House recently passed a “joint resolution of disapproval” of the new rules under the Congressional Review Act in an attempt to block the NLRB’s implementation of the rules. The resolution now heads to the President, who is expected to veto it. Zashin & Rich will provide periodic updates on the impact of these challenges on the enforceability of the NLRB’s new election rules as they proceed.

Overall, the NLRB’s new election rules change long-standing procedures governing the election process and reduce pre-election litigation (and the time associated with such litigation), while likely increasing post-election litigation. Employers subject to a union election should familiarize themselves with these changes to avoid making any procedural errors during the election process.

Employers must understand the impact that the new rules will have on their ability to run an effective campaign against unionization. Following the filing of a petition for an election, the time an employer has to lawfully educate employees on the perils of unionization is critical to countering the union’s efforts, which typically have been underway for months prior to an employer’s receipt of an NLRB petition. As the NLRB’s new election rules will greatly reduce the employer’s Post-Petition Campaign time, employers should develop strategies to avoid, anticipate, or counter unionization efforts before a union files a petition. In doing so, employers must be cautious and ensure that they are protecting their interests and not violating the NLRA. Employers no longer can afford to be surprised by the filing of an election petition because the very short timeline to conduct an election provides little opportunity to recover from such lack of knowledge. Once the NLRB’s quickie election rules take effect, non-unionized employers will have to implement an on-going, legitimate union-avoidance campaign to keep pace with union and NLRB efforts to unionize their workforce.

*George S. Crisci, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of private and public sector labor relations. For more information about the NLRB’s new election rules or labor and employment law, please contact George (gsc@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.


Z&R SHORTS


Congratulations!

Zashin & Rich is pleased to announce that the Ohio State Bar Association recently certified Helena Oroz and David Vance as specialists in Labor and Employment Law. 

Zashin & Rich is proud to announce that it has been named to the BTI Client Service A-Team 2015. Zashin & Rich received special recognition in “Best at Handles Problems” and “Best at Provides Value for the Dollar.” Additionally, BTI recognized Stephen Zashin, the head of the firm’s Labor and Employment Groups, as one of only 29 labor and employment “Client Service All-Star” attorneys in the country.

Best Lawyers®
Z&R is happy to announce the following Z&R Labor and Employment Group lawyers have been selected for inclusion in Best Lawyers in America 2015:

  • George S. Crisci – Employment Law Management, Labor Law – Management, and Litigation – Labor and Employment
  • Jon M. Dileno – Employment Law – Management
  • Jonathan J. Downes – Employment Law – Management and Labor Law – Management
  • Stephen S. Zashin – Labor Law – Management

Upcoming Speaking Engagements

Wednesday, April 1, 2015
Drew C. Piersall presents "The Intersection of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act and Workers' Compensation:  Managing Disabilities“ at 10:00 a.m. at the Ohio County Home Association's annual conference to be held at the Salt Fork Lodge and Conference Center in Cambridge, Ohio.

Wednesday, April 8, 2015
Jonathan Downes presents “Social Media”  at the JFSHRA - HR Bootcamp for Supervisors beginning at 9:30 a.m. at the Union County JFS Building.

Thursday, April 16, 2015
Jonathan J. Downes presents “Social Media Challenges for Law Enforcement and Public Employers” for the Miami Valley Risk Management Association in Mason, Ohio. See mvrma.com for details.

Monday, April 20, 2015
George Crisci presents “Determining Worker Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits” at the Unemployment Compensation from A to Z, which begins at 9:00 a.m. at the Doubletree Hotel in Independence, Ohio.
To register, go to http://www.nbi-sems.com.

Wednesday, May 6, 2015
Jonathan Downes and Drew Piersall present “Social Media – Employment Law Issues” and “The Intersection of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act and Workers' Compensation:  Managing Disabilities” at the 2015 OJFSDA Annual Training Conference at the Hyatt Regency Columbus on High Street. 

Friday, May 8, 2015
Jonathan Downes conducts Legal Update at the Ohio Association of Public Safety Directors Annual Conference at 11:15 a.m. at the Reynoldsburg Police Department.

Monday, June 8, 2015
Patrick Watts presents at the Lake, Geauga, Ashtabula SHRM Annual Conference.

Friday, December 12, 2014

What’s Theirs is Theirs and What’s Yours is Theirs – The NLRB Rules that Employees Have a Right to Use Employer Email Systems For “Non-Work” (Union Organizing)

By Patrick J. Hoban*

On December 11, 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), by a 3-2 vote of its members, declared that employers who give employees access to employer email systems must permit those employees to use the employer’s email system for “statutorily protected communications” under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) (i.e., union organizing, complaining about working conditions, criticizing supervisors) during nonworking time. Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 126 (December 11, 2014)(“Purple Communications”).

In ruling that Section 7 includes the right for employees with access to employers’ email systems to use employer systems for “non-work” communications, the NLRB overruled the seven-year old precedent established by Register Guard, 351 NLRB 110 (2007). Under Register Guard, employers could lawfully prohibit employees from using employer email systems for non-work purposes; including activities protected by Section 7, without demonstrating a business justification, so long as the employer did not apply its ban discriminatorily (e.g., prohibit only union organizing communications). However, in Purple Communications, the NLRB stated that Register Guard was “clearly incorrect,” “failed to adequately protect employees’ rights,” and “abdicated [the Board’s] responsibility to adapt the Act to the changing patterns of industrial life.”

The NLRB’s decision in Purple Communications turned on its evaluation of employer-operated email systems as the standard method of workplace communication among employees. Based on this, the NLRB reaffirmed the central importance of employee communications workplace to the exercise of Section 7 rights. The NLRB then considered: the expanded use of email in the workplace; the fact that employers frequently allow employees personal use of employer email systems; and the percentage of employees who telework. The NLRB concluded that, in many workplaces, email has “effectively become a ‘natural gathering place’” for employees, just like a lunch room. Accordingly, the NLRB concluded that the Register Guard decision overvalued employer property rights to their email systems and undervalued work email as a means of employee communication under Section 7.

To accommodate its rejection of Register Guard, the NLRB established a new analytical framework to evaluate employee use of employer email systems. Under the NLRB’s new analysis, there is now a legal presumption that employees (who have access to the employer’s email system for work purposes) have a right to use employer email systems for non-work purposes, including Section 7-protected communications, during non-working time. An employer may rebut this presumption only by demonstrating that special circumstances exist which justify restricting the employees’ rights to use employer email. However, any employer-asserted harmful consequences of email use restrictions must be actual, not speculative. Additionally, the NLRB cautioned that such circumstances will rarely justify total bans on employee non-work use of employer email.

The NLRB further stated that its decision only applies to employee use of employer email systems and not to non-employees’ use of employer email systems (e.g., use by non-employee union organizers). Additionally, the NLRB clarified that employers are not required to grant employees use of email systems if they do not already do so. Employers may also: continue to enforce justifiable restrictions on email use (e.g., prohibiting large attachments or audio/video segments); continue to monitor their computer systems for legitimate managerial reasons (e.g., prevention of email use for harassment); and notify employees they have no expectation of privacy when using employer email systems.

This new Purple Communications will take effect immediately – and will be applied to all pending NLRB cases. According to the Board, applying the new standard only prospectively would “continue a fair-reaching, wrongful denial of [employees’ Section 7] rights.” The NLRB also justified immediate application of the new standard by relying on an employer’s ability to present evidence of special circumstances that justify restrictions imposed on employees’ use of employer email systems.

Although many commenters believe the Purple Communications will be appealed to a federal circuit court, subject to further review, the decision has far-reaching implications. Employers must now rethink and potentially retool their employee email use policies. Most obviously, employers who grant employee access to their email systems for work purposes can no longer prohibit them from using email for non-work purposes during non-working time. The decision also leaves unanswered questions regarding employer monitoring of employee emails involving Section 7 activity under the NLRB’s unlawful surveillance and retaliation standards. Additionally, employers faced with employee emails criticizing terms and conditions of employment, supervisors, and/or management must carefully consider whether such communications are protected prior to disciplining or counseling employees. Yet, as a potential benefit to employers, if employees chose to engage in union organizing through employer email, employers may be able to take appropriate, lawful actions to educate their employees concerning the many negative consequences of union organization prior to the filing of a representation petition.

In the end, Purple Communications creates a new Section 7 right for employees to use employer email systems for protected concerted activity during non-working time. Employers should review their current email use polices in light of this decision and consider how to best adjust them to maintain effective and efficient operations while complying with the law. Zashin & Rich will provide additional updates on this issue and will assist employers seeking compliance with this new standard.

*Patrick J. Hoban, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of private and public sector labor relations. For more information about the Purple Communications decision or labor & employment law, please contact Pat | pjh@zrlaw.com | 216.696.4441

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Alaska Supreme Court Establishes Broad "Union Relations" Privilege for Communications Between Union Representatives and Bargaining Unit Employees

*By George S. Crisci, Esq

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska established a broad “union relations” privilege that appears to be the first of its kind in public sector employment, if not the entire country.  In Peterson v. State of Alaska, No. S-14233, Opinion No. 6693, 2012 Alaska LEXIS l04 (Alaska July 20, 2012), the Court established a “union relations privilege” that “extends to communications made: (1) in confidence; (2) in connection with representative services relating to anticipated or ongoing disciplinary or grievance proceedings; (3) between an employee (or the employee’s attorney) and union representatives; and (4) by union representatives acting in official representative capacity.”  The Court added that, “The privilege may be asserted by the employee or by the union on behalf of the employee.”

The case involved a discharged employee who unsuccessfully grieved his discharge (because the union opted not to pursue arbitration) and then filed suit for wrongful termination. The labor agreement provided that only the union, and not any private counsel, could represent an employee in the grievance process. However, the union representative communicated with the discharged employee’s private counsel regarding strategy. The employer (which was the State) subpoenaed the union representative and the union’s grievance file for a deposition, including all communications between the union representative and the employee’s private counsel.

The Court recognized that no existing privilege (including the attorney-client privilege) covered these types of communications, so it decided to create a new privilege under Alaska’s Rules of Evidence, which provides that no person has a privilege “[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... by these or other rules promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court ....” Although the New York courts (for New York public sector employees) and the National Labor Relations Board (for private sector employees) had protected certain communications between union representatives and employees, those decisions involved attempts to gain access to communications while the disciplinary or grievance proceedings were pending.  The Alaska Supreme Court’s ruling appears to be the first to provide protection after those proceedings have concluded and covering communications with a private attorney (who was contractually excluded from the disciplinary/grievance process) involving strategy for a court action.

The Court did establish two limitations on this new privilege. First, “[l]ike the attorney-client privilege, the union-relations privilege extends only to communications, not to underlying facts.” Thus, a union representative who also is a fact witness to certain events cannot refuse to provide relevant information under the guise of a privilege. Second, “the privilege is applicable only when the union representative is acting in an official union role because protecting informal conversations would extend the privilege too far, unnecessarily burdening the search for truth.”

Ohio does not have such a union-relations privilege, and it remains to be seen whether any such privilege would be established.  Ohio’s Rules of Evidence have a similarly broad, but not precisely worded, rule that allows the courts to establish privileges under the common law. To this point, there are no cases where a union or an employee has attempted to assert such a privilege.

*George S. Crisci, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, represents public and private employers in all aspects of workplace law. For more information about union-relations or labor & employment law, please contact George (gsc@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.

Thursday, July 30, 2009

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Summer 2009, Volume XI, Issue iii

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U.S. Supreme Court Holds That Plaintiff Bringing ADEA Disparate-Treatment Claim Must Prove That Age Was the “But-For” Cause of Employment Action

By Jessica T. Tucci

The U.S. Supreme Court recently held in Gross v. FBL Financial Services , Inc., 557 U.S. ___ (2009), that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The court stated that the burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision.

In Gross, the plaintiff began working for FBL Financial Services (FBL) in the early 1970s and was promoted to the position of claims administration director in 2001. But in 2003, when the plaintiff was 54 years old, he was reassigned to the position of claims project coordinator. At the same time, FBL transferred many of the plaintiff’s job responsibilities to the newly created position of claims administration manager. That position was ultimately given to another younger employee, who was then in her early forties, and had previously been supervised by the plaintiff. The plaintiff considered his reassignment a demotion and filed suit in district court alleging an ADEA disparate-treatment claim against FBL.

The district court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict for the plaintiff if he proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that FBL “demoted [him] to claims project coordinator” and that his “age was a motivating factor” in FBL’s decision to demote him. The jury was further instructed that the plaintiff’s age would qualify as a “‘motivating factor’ if it played a part or role in [FBL]’s decision to demote [him].” The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.

FBL appealed the jury instructions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury had been incorrectly instructed under the standard established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the court discussed the burden of persuasion in cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Price Waterhouse Court held that if a plaintiff shows that discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action regardless of the unpermitted consideration.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the decision of the Eighth Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII is materially different than ADEA with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion. The court stated that the burden-shifting framework does not apply to ADEA claims. The text of ADEA does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a “motivating factor.” Rather, the court cited to ADEA, which states in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer…to…discriminate…, because of such individual’s age.” The court emphasized that “because of” age means that age was the “reason” that the employer decided to act.

The court finally held in Gross that a plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse action. Employers should recognize that employees maintain the burden of persuasion in ADEA disparate-treatment claims when analyzing the merits of such a case.

Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals Holds Age Discrimination Plaintiffs Must Make An Election of Remedies

By Jason Rossiter*

The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals held that Ohio Revised Code (“R.C.”) 4112.02 and 4112.99 age discriminations claims are not exempt from the election of remedies provisions of R.C. 4112.08. As a result, a person who files a charge alleging age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEOC”) or Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”) is barred from later filing an age discrimination lawsuit.

In Neal v. Franklin Plaza Nursing Home, the Plaintiff, a nurse’s assistant, filed a lawsuit against her employer alleging wrongful termination of her employment pursuant to R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.99. The employer fired her for sleeping on the job, refusing to take a patient to the bathroom, and failing to maintain acceptable standards of respect for the residents. The Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge claiming that her employer discriminated against her because of her age, 71, and replaced her with an individual under 40 or substantially younger than her.

On appeal, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals cited the Ohio Supreme Court decision Smith v. Friendship Village of Dublin, Ohio. In Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether employees alleging handicap discrimination who had filed a charge with the OCRC were barred from instituting suit under R.C. 4112.99. The Smith Court reasoned that no election of remedies applied to a handicap discrimination suit under R.C. 4112.99 because, in contrast to age discrimination, no election of remedies scheme existed.

The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals also cited a federal Northern District of Ohio case, Senter v. Hillside Acres Nursing Ctr. Of Williard, Inc. In that case, the District Court held that a plaintiff who first files an age discrimination charge with the OCRC may not later bring a civil lawsuit under any provision of R.C. 4112. Additionally, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals stated that the filing of a claim with the EEOC constitutes a filing with the OCRC and precludes a plaintiff from pursuing a civil action in common pleas court under R.C. 4112.99. Thus, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals’ decision specifically rejected the Southern District of Ohio’s 2001 decision in Sterry v. Safe Auto Ins. Co., which held to the contrary in 2001.

As a result of this decision, employers should recognize that the Cuyahoga Court of Appeals prohibits an employee who files an age discrimination charge with the EEOC or OCRC from bringing a private age discrimination claim under R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.99.

*Jason Rossiter has extensive experience representing employers in litigating and arbitrating workplace disputes in Ohio, California and throughout the country. For more information about age discrimination or any other employment-related tort, please contact Zashin & Rich at 216.696.4441.


New Ohio Supreme Court Prevailing Wage Decision Stays True To Long Standing Construction Industry Practices

By Michele L. Jakubs*

The Ohio Supreme Court recently issued an important decision interpreting Ohio’s prevailing wage law, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, Local Union No. 33 v. Gene’s Refrigeration, 2009-Ohio-2747. The Court held: (1) that a labor organization that obtains authorization to represent a single employee does not become an “interested party” with authority to pursue prevailing wage law violations on behalf of other employees performing work for the job; and (2) that only those employees working on the job site need be paid the prevailing wage.

The appellant Gene’s Refrigeration paid only its employees working on the job site the prevailing wage. It did not pay the prevailing wage to its employees working off-site fabricating items for the public project. The appellee Local 33, which was not the bargaining representative for Gene’s employees, received authorization to represent a single off-site employee. Despite only receiving authorization from one employee, it brought suit on behalf of all of Gene’s employees alleging it was an “interested party” under R.C. 4115.03(F)(3).

The court of appeals ruled that Local 33’s authorization to represent a single employee provided standing with respect to the entire project and all of Gene’s employees working on the project. The court of appeals further held that Gene’s, in addition to the employees working on-site, was required to pay the prevailing wage to all employees performing work on the public project including those working off-site. In a well reasoned decision, the Ohio Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals decision.

First, the Ohio Supreme Court in holding that Local 33 only represented the interests of the one employee from which it received authorization, the Court reasoned that the authorization of a single employee, particularly one not entitled to the prevailing wage, is insufficient to permit the Union to represent all those employees working on the job. The Court further reasoned that an employee’s authorization is similar to an attorney-client relationship, and the creation of such a relationship between one employee and the union cannot be imputed, without more, to all the other employees.

Revised Code 4115.05 fails to indicate specifically where the work must be performed in order to receive the prevailing wage. However, the Court determined that the legislative history of Ohio’s prevailing wage law suggests it was meant to be applied only to those working on-site. The Court also reasoned that a proper statutory interpretation of Ohio’s prevailing wage law leads to but one conclusion – only those employees working on the job site need by paid the prevailing wage. Importantly, the Court recognized that the construction industry since 1935 has applied “prevailing-wage laws only to workers on the project site,” and that any deviation from the industry practice would result in unworkable consequences.

Employers performing work on public projects can breathe a sigh of relief. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld what employers have been doing for the last 70 years – only paying on-site workers the prevailing wage. Additionally, a union cannot impute representation over an entire labor force by receiving authorization from a single employee.

*Michele L. Jakubs practices in all areas of employment litigation and wage and hour compliance and administration. For more information concerning changes to prevailing wage or any other employment issue, please contact Michele at 216.696.4441 or mlj@zrlaw.com.

The Ohio Supreme Court Holds That Cities Cannot Require Employees To Live Within City Limits

By George S. Crisci*

The Ohio Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of a 2006 state law, R.C. 9.481 that bars a political subdivision of the state (e.g., a city, county, township or school district) from requiring its employees to reside within that political subdivision as a condition of employment. Specifically, the Court determined in Lima v. State, 2009-Ohio-2597, that the General Assembly may enact laws pursuant to Section 34 Article II of the Ohio Constitution which provides “for the comfort, health, safety and general welfare” of all employees and no other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this power.

In Lima, the court consolidated the appeals of The City of Lima v. The State of Ohio and The City of Akron v. The State of Ohio et al. The issue before the Court was whether R.C. 9.481 overrides any conflicting law of a political subdivision, including residency requirements. Lima’s city charter required all city employees appointed by the mayor to live within the city limits. Akron’s city charter similarly required all classified and unclassified city employees to reside within the city for the duration of their employment. Both cities filed court actions seeking declarations that R.C. 9.481 was unconstitutional as applied to their residency requirements.

The cities of Lima and Akron argued that the General Assembly exceeded its authority when it passed R.C. 9.481 and violated the cities’ home rule authority to “exercise all powers of local self-government” under Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. However, the Court did not agree with the cities’ arguments.

The Court held that R.C. 9.481 provides employees more freedom and allows for their comfort and general welfare. The Court stated that it has repeatedly interpreted Section 34 as a broad grant of authority to the General Assembly and not as a limitation on its power to enact legislation. In fact, the Court noted that on at least three separate occasions it has upheld the constitutionality of statutes enacted pursuant to Section 34, Article II. Justice Pfeifer concluded his opinion by stating, “R.C. 9.481 is constitutional and, therefore, …municipalities may not require their employees to reside in a particular municipality, other than as provided in R.C. 9.481(B)(2)(b).”

Interestingly, the Court failed to discuss R.C. 9.481(B)(2)(b), which acts as the only exception to R.C. 9.481 and permits municipalities to require certain employees to live no farther away than adjacent counties to “ensure adequate response times * * * to emergencies or disasters.” Under the exception, cities could require certain employees to live within a particular distance from the city for safety reasons. The question then becomes what constitutes an “adequate” distance for response times.

Political subdivisions can no longer require their employees to live within city limits. However, R.C. 9.481(B)(2)(b) does grant political subdivisions the power to ensure that certain employees live close enough to the city to ensure adequate emergency response times.

*George S. Crisci is an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law.  George represents employers in all facets of employment law, and both public and private sector management in actions before the NLRB.  For more information concerning any labor or employment issue, please contact George at 216.696.4441 or gsc@zrlaw.com.

6th Circuit Holds: Title VII Does Not Create Third-Party Cause of Action for Retaliation

By Patrick M. Watts

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, U.S. App. LEXIS 12100 (6th Cir. 2009), that § 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not create a separate third-party retaliation claim for persons who have not personally engaged in a protected activity. In particular, the Court determined that the Plaintiff could not base his retaliation claim solely on the protected activity of another individual.

In Thompson, the Plaintiff worked as an engineer for the Defendant and began dating Miriam Regaldo shortly after the Defendant hired her in 2000.  In September 2002, Regaldo filed a claim with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the Defendant alleging that her supervisors had discriminated against her based on gender.  About three weeks later, the Defendant terminated the Plaintiff’s employment based on his performance.  The Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against the Defendant alleging the Defendant terminated him in retaliation for Regaldo’s, then fiancĂ©e’s EEOC charge.

The Plaintiff argued that the language of § 704(a) should protect claimants who are “closely related [to] or associated [with]” a person engaged in protected activity.  The Court declined the Plaintiff’s argument, and joined with the Third, Fifth and Eighth Circuits which all have unanimously rejected such third-party retaliation claims.  The court stated; “[P]laintiff and the EEOC request that we become the first circuit court to hold that Title VII creates a cause of action for third-party retaliation on behalf of friends and family members who have not engaged in protected activity. However, we decline the invitation to rewrite the law."

Instead the Sixth Circuit held that the plain language of § 704(a) explicitly identifies those individuals who are protected – employees who “opposed any practice made any unlawful employment practice” or who “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII.  The Court stated that § 704(a) clearly limits the class of claimants to those who actually engaged in the protected activity. Plaintiff’s claim failed because his relationship to Regaldo was the sole motivating factor in his complaint, and he did not claim that he engaged in any statutorily protected activity, either on his own behalf or on behalf of Regaldo.

The Court further held that it must look at what Congress actually enacted, not what it believes Congress might have passed were it confronted with the current facts.  The Court held that it was not “absurd” for Congress to limit the class of persons who are entitled to sue employees who personally opposed a practice, made a charge, or assisted or participated in an investigation.

Employers should recognize it is not enough for an employee to file a retaliation claim based on an association (e.g., spouse, friend) with someone engaged in a protected activity. Rather, an employee must have actually engaged in a protected activity to file a retaliation claim.


Z&R Shorts


Zashin & Rich Welcomes Jessica Tucci
to its Employment and Labor Group Jessica’s practice encompasses all areas of public and private labor and employment related issues.

Jessica received her undergraduate degree in Labor Studies and Industrial Relations from the Pennsylvania State University. Prior to attending law school, Jessica worked as a union organizer for the Service Employees International Union Local 1199NY and as a campaign coordinator for the Prewitt Organizing Fund. Jessica then earned her law degree (J.D.) from The University of Dayton School of Law where she graduated cum laude and with track honors.

Jessica is admitted to practice law in the State of Ohio. She is a member of the Akron and Ohio Bar Associations.

Please join us in welcoming Jessica to Z&R!

SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS

46th Annual Midwest Labor and Employment Law Seminar
October 15 & 16, 2009
Hilton, Easton Town Center, Columbus, Ohio
Stephen Zashin will present “The New FMLA Regulations” and George Crisci will present “Latest Developments from SERBia”. To register go to www.ohiobar.org.

November 17, 2009
Patrick Watts will moderate a one day seminar presented by the Council on Education Management entitled “FMLA Hot Topics 2009” to be held in Cleveland, Ohio.  For more information go to www.counciloned.com.

Thursday, May 7, 2009

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Spring 2009, Volume XI, Issue ii

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2008 Unions Win Highest Rate Ever

By Patrick J. Hoban*

According to National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) data, unions won 66.8 percent of representation elections conducted by the NLRB in 2008. This figure represents the highest win rate since 1955 when unions won 67.6 percent of the elections in which they participated. The 2008 union election win rate is a 6.4 percent increase over 2007 and represents an 8.4 percent increase over 2004.

The number of voters eligible to participate in the elections also increased from 102,494 in 2007 to 108,587 in 2008. In 2008, unions organized 70,511 workers through NLRB elections, up from 58,260 in 2007.

Unions had the greater organizing success among both small and large collective bargaining units. Unions won 69.3 percent of elections in units of fewer than 50 employees, and 64 percent of elections in units of more than 500.

The industries with the highest percentage of wins were finance, insurance, and real estate (89.7 percent), followed by health care (74.3 percent). Other sectors where unions won at least 50 percent of the elections in which they participated included services (72.9 percent), transportation, communications, and utilities (70.8 percent), construction (66.2 percent), and retail (54.7 percent). Unions won less than 50 percent in wholesale (48.9 percent), communications (48 percent), mining (47.4 percent), and manufacturing (46.5 percent).

Representation elections by union affiliation also generally increased. Unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO won 64.5 percent of representation elections in 2008 compared with 59.5 percent in 2007. Unions in the Change to Win federation won 61.3 percent of the elections they participated in 2008. In 2007, the Change to Win federation won 52.4 percent of their representation elections. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) won 58.6 percent of the elections in 2008, up from 48.8 percent in 2007.

Notably, these NLRB statistics do not reflect the full extent of organizing by labor unions. Many unions organize through check-card recognition, neutrality agreements, and methods other than NLRB-run, secret ballot elections. These statistics, as well as the possibility that the Employee Free Choice Act may still become law, should encourage all non-union employers to review and revise workplace policies related to union organizing and monitor their workplaces for potential union organizing efforts.

*Patrick J. Hoban practices in all areas of labor and employment law, with a focus on private and public sector labor law. For more information on NLRB statistics or any other labor or employment issue, contact Pat at 216.696.4441 or pjh@zrlaw.com.



Discrimination Claims Rise To Highest Levels Ever

By Michele L. Jakubs*

Discrimination claims based on race, retaliation, sex, age, disability and other reasons filed from fiscal year 2007 to 2008 with the Equal Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) rose 15% from 82, 792 claims to 95,402 claims. This is the highest number of claims ever recorded in the 40+ year history of the EEOC. So, why all the new discrimination claims?

In short, discrimination claims tend to rise in tough economic times because more people lose their jobs and may become economically desperate. Tough economic times also can lead to poor communication by employers with their employees in the workplace. When employees are part of a layoff, termination, reduction in hours, or other employment decision they may not know why their employer made such a decision. If employees are left to guess as to why their employer made a certain decision, they may be more inclined to file a discrimination claim. Therefore, it is imperative that employers communicate to their employees the reasons for the particular decision.

Employers should prepare for even more discrimination claims in fiscal year 2009. According to one spokesman from the EEOC, job bias claims may rise to more than 100,000 claims in fiscal year 2009.

Age discrimination and retaliation claims saw the biggest rise in fiscal year 2008. Age discrimination claims rose 28.7% from 19,103 to 24,582 claims. Retaliation claims rose 22.6% from 26,663 to 32,690 claims.

These statistics emphasize that employers must maintain vigilant in their approach in understanding complying with employment laws.

COMPLAINTS FILED ANNUALLY WITH EEOC
Category FY 2007 FY 2008 Percent Change
Total Charges 82,792 95,402 15.2%
Race 30,510 33,937 11.2%
Retaliation 26,663 32,690 22.6%
Sex 24,826 28,372 14.3%
Age 19,103 24,582 28.7%
Disability 17,734 19,453 9.7%
National Origin 9,396 10,601 12.8%
Religion 2,880 3,273 13.6%
Equal Pay Act 818 954 16.6%
Source: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Complaints can be filed in multiple categories.)

*Michele L. Jakubs, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of employment litigation and wage and hour compliance and administration. For more information concerning discrimination or any other labor or employment issue, please contact Michele at 216.696.4441 or mlj@zrlaw.com.


President Obama Signs Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Into Law

By Stephen S. Zashin*

Recently, President Barack Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act into law in front of a crowd of onlookers. The Act overturns the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), which held that employees were required to file pay discrimination lawsuits against their employers within 180 or 300 days of an employer’s initial discriminatory compensation decision.

Ledbetter alleged that she worked at Goodyear for 19 years before discovering that Goodyear paid her significantly less than her male counterparts with the same or less experience. She filed a charge when she discovered the discriminatory pay decision of her employer. Ledbetter argued that each check she received while employed constituted a new act of discrimination, which reinitiated the 180-day statutory filing period. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, found Ledbetter’s argument unpersuasive.

The Court held that her complaint had to be filed within 180 days of the initial compensation decision by Goodyear to pay her less than here male counterparts, even if she did not know of the decision until 19 years later. The Court’s decision meant that the 180-day statute of limitations for filing a charge of discrimination began on the date the employer made the compensation decision, not on the date of the most recent paycheck. This decision precluded lawsuits by plaintiffs who alleged ongoing pay discrimination but did not discover it until years later.

The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act overturns Ledbetter and amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act to clarify at which point in time discriminatory actions qualify as an “unlawful employment practice.” According to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, unlawful conduct occurs when:
  1. an employer adopts a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice;
  2. an individual becomes subject to the decision or practice; or
  3. an individual is affected by application of the decision or practice, including each time compensation is paid. (Emphasis added).
Reason three, as indicated above, allows employees to file a claim against their employers any time a payment is received which is based on an employer’s discriminatory pay decision. Accordingly, the Act means that every paycheck or arguably any other pay practice resulting, in whole or in part, from an earlier discriminatory pay decision constitutes a violation of Title VII, the ADEA, ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. As long as an employee files a charge within 180 days of any discriminatory payment, their charge will be considered timely. In addition, employees who are victims of discrimination may receive up to two years of back pay.

Further, not only can paychecks represent new acts of discrimination, but the Act indicates that any type of compensation which is based on a discriminatory act constitutes an act of discrimination. For example, pension payments and 401(k) distributions based on an employee’s compensation may constitute separate acts of discrimination.

What Employers Should Do Now

Not surprisingly, the broadened statute of limitations for wage disparity claims will prompt increased litigation. Employers wishing to minimize the risks of liability should consider the following:

Audit Current Pay Documentation Practices: Employers should audit their compensation practices to determine whether sufficient documentation exists to support compensation decisions. Employers will need performance-based specifics underlying such decisions to defend wage disparity claims.

Develop Specific Criteria for Compensation Decisions: Employers should develop objective, measurable guidelines for compensation decisions and apply those guidelines consistently and uniformly within job classifications, work, groups, departments or business units.

Review Compensation Decisions: Employers should create a process to ensure that managers and supervisors do not have unfettered discretion when making compensation decisions. Rather, employers should consider adopting a review system to ensure rigorous scrutiny of compensation decisions similar to those employers already use when considering terminations, discipline, or other adverse actions.

Revise Document Retention Practices: Employers should review their current document retention policies to determine how long they maintain documentation regarding compensation decisions. In the post-Ledbetter world, employers likely will need to retain such information for as long as the employee receives any form of payments from the employer or any of its benefit plans (e.g., 401(k), etc.). Employers may need to consider electronic archiving given the voluminous nature of pay-related records.

Train Supervisors and Managers: Employers should train all supervisors and managers regarding any post-Ledbetter policy modifications to ensure that they understand those policies and, most importantly, the need to support objectively all compensation decisions.

Conduct Periodic Statistical Analysis of Compensation Data: Employers should analyze compensation data to determine if any statistical disparities exist across gender, race and ethnic lines. Once identified, an employer can make appropriate adjustments to eliminate any unexplained disparities.

*Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, has extensive experience defending employers involved in individual, class and collective employment litigation. For more information about the Fair Pay Act or any other employment or labor issue, please contact Stephen at 216.696.4441 or ssz@zrlaw.com.


U.S. Supreme Court Holds That Union Nonmembers Can Be Charged a Fee for National Litigation Expenses

By George S. Crisci*

In Locke v. Karass, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment permits a local union to charge nonmembers for national litigation expenses so long as (1) the subject matter of the litigation bears an appropriate relation to collective bargaining and (2) the charge is reciprocal in nature (i.e., the local union’s payment to the national affiliate is for “services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of their membership in the parent organization.”)

The state of Maine requires government employees to pay a service fee to the local union that acts as their exclusive bargaining agent even if those employees disagree with, and do not belong to, the union. The Maine State Employees Association (“the local”) is the exclusive bargaining agent for certain executive branch employees. A collective-bargaining agreement between Maine and the local requires nonmember employees whom the union represents to pay the local a “service fee.” The service fee includes a charge that represents the affiliation fee the local pays to its national union, the Service Employees International Union (“the national”).

The portion of the service fee at issue was the amount that helps the national union pay for litigation activities, some of which do not directly benefit the local union but rather directly benefit other locals or the national organization itself. The petitioners, i.e., nonmembers of the local, argued that the First Amendment prohibits charging them for any portion of the service fee that represents “national litigation,” that does not directly benefit the local.

The issue before the Court is whether the First Amendment permits a local union to charge nonmembers a fee to help pay for national litigation activities, some of which do not directly benefit the local union but rather directly benefit other locals or the national organization itself.

The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that the same standard should apply to national litigation expenses as to other national expenses. In particular, the Court found no basis for holding that national social activities, national convention activities, and activities involved in producing the nonpolitical portions of national union publications all are chargeable but litigation activities are not. The Court stated that a local nonmember can benefit from national litigation aimed at helping other locals if the national or those other locals will similarly contribute to the cost of litigation on the local union’s behalf should the need arise.

This case demonstrates that employers must understand the subtle nuances in the law in their administration of collective bargaining agreements.

*George S. Crisci, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law. George represents employers in all facets of labor and employment law, in both the public and private sector. For more information concerning any labor or employment issue, please contact George at 216.696.4441 or gsc@zrlaw.com.


Court Holds: Ohio Law Retaliation Based Claims Broader In Scope Than Under Federal Law

By Lois A. Gruhin

An Ohio Court of Appeals recently held in Hughes v. Miller that Ohio law is broader in scope than Title VII in terms of who has the obligation to refrain from retaliation. In particular, the court determined that no “person” may retaliate under Ohio law, while an “employer” must refrain from retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). The court held that a retaliation claim asserted by an employee against a co-employee is perfectly actionable under Ohio law, even though it is not under Title VII.

In Hughes, the plaintiff and defendant both worked as Cuyahoga Community College (“Tri-C”) police officers. The female defendant initially filed an internal complaint with Tri-C alleging that the male plaintiff committed various acts of sexual harassment against her. Tri-C conducted an internal investigation and disciplined the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit against defendant accusing her of defamation. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff and alleged that plaintiff filed his complaint against her in retaliation for her filing the internal complaint.

The trial court dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim under Rule 12(B)(6) for failing to state a claim. On appeal, the issue became whether the defendant’s counterclaim sufficiently set forth a claim for retaliation for participation in a “protected activity” in violation of R.C. 4112.02(I). The defendant argued that her act of filing an internal complaint against Hughes was a “protected activity.”

Under Ohio law, the court held that an employee may file a claim against a co-employee for retaliation if: (1) the claimant engaged in protected activity; (2) claimant’s engagement in the protected activity was known to the opposing party; (3) the opposing party thereafter took adverse action against the claimant; and (4) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. The court determined that the defendant sufficiently met the last three elements of the prima facie case. The court then looked for guidance from the United States Supreme Court (“USSC”) and Ohio Supreme Court in determining if the defendant’s claim was a “protected activity” under element one.

Ohio’s Supreme Court cited Crawford v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville and Davidson Cty., Tennessee, in which the USSC court held that an employee’s filing of an internal complaint with an employer constitutes “protected activity” under the opposition clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, protecting employees who disclose sexual harassment in such a manner from retaliatory conduct by the employer. In particular, the Crawford Court held that protection under the “opposition clause” of anti-retaliation statutes is not limited to cases where an employee initiates an internal complaint protesting sexual harassment. The Crawford Court found that the “opposition clause” extends protection to an employee who opposes sexual discrimination stemming from sexual harassment, not by initiating a complaint, but by answering questions posed to him or her during an employer’s internal investigation.

The court also cited Ohio Supreme Court case precedent, including Ohio Civ. Right Comm. v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., which held that Ohio law proscribes certain unlawful discriminatory practices by employers who fail to take corrective action in response to an employee’s opposition to a co-employee’s sexual harassment. The court also cited Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Lysyj which held that R.C. 4112.02(G) and 4112.01(I) are remedial statutes, which are to be construed “liberally in order to effectuate the legislative purpose and fundamental policy implicit in their enactment, and to assure that the rights granted by the statutes are not defeated by overly restrictive interpretation.” The court finally held that the defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiff was a “protected activity” under Ohio law, even though it would have been dismissed under federal law.

The decision in Hughes v. Miller highlights the subtle but profound distinction between Ohio and federal law retaliation based claims. Employers must understand that retaliation based claims under Ohio law are broader and more liberally construed than those under federal law.


Z&R SHORTS


George Crisci and Rick Hanrahan will present on developments in SERB decisions and COBRA respectively at the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association’s 9th Annual Labor and Employment Law Conference on June 25 and 26. Please contact CMBA at (216) 696-2404 for details and to attend.

Summer Is Near
Summer is quickly approaching and the weather is improving by the day making it the ideal time for employers to review their dress code and attendance policies with employees. Employers hiring seasonal help for the summer (e.g., students) also need to consider the impact the Fair Labor Standards Act has on such hiring including potential seasonal and recreational exemptions and the youth minimum wage.