Showing posts with label Discrimination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Discrimination. Show all posts

Monday, May 18, 2026

Fourth Circuit Joins Sixth Circuit in Rejecting Contractually Shortened Filing Deadlines for Title VII and ADA Claims

By Stephen S. Zashin*

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently joined the Sixth Circuit in holding that employers cannot enforce contractual provisions that shorten the time employees have to bring claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

In Thomas v. EOTech, LLC, the Fourth Circuit reversed a lower court decision upholding a contractual provision requiring an employee to bring any employment-related claims—including termination, discrimination, and wage claims—within 180 days of the challenged event or action, even where federal law provided for a longer filing period. 169 F.4th 259 (4th Cir. 2026).

The Fourth Circuit explained that allowing employers to shorten statutory filing deadlines would undermine Congress’s “carefully integrated remedial scheme,” make the administrative remedy process more difficult for employees to navigate and could improperly influence how the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) prioritizes cases. Id. at 265-267.

However, the Fourth Circuit clarified that parties may still agree to shortened filing deadlines where there is no controlling statute to the contrary, provided that the shortened period is reasonable, and the agreement is not procured through fraud or duress. Id. at 269. The Fourth Circuit also distinguished its holding in Thomas from contractual provisions shortening the time-period to initiate arbitration, emphasizing that federal policy favors arbitration agreements. Id. at 267.

What Should Employers Do Now?


Employers—particularly those in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits—should review their employment agreements and other employment-related contracts for provisions that shorten filing deadlines for federal discrimination claims and revise accordingly.

Further, with both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits now aligned on this issue, multistate employers should consider adopting a uniform national policy that does not rely on contractual limitations periods for federal anti-discrimination claims, as other circuits may soon follow suit.

*Stephen Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Employment & Labor Law, regularly advises clients on all employment related matters, including employment discrimination matters. If you have questions about employment agreements or any employment law questions, please contact Stephen at ssz@zrlaw.com or (216)696-4441.

Monday, September 29, 2025

EEOC Mandates End to Enforcement of Disparate Impact Claims

By Lauren M. Drabic*

As a latest example of its shift in enforcement priorities, according to an internal memo obtained by Bloomberg Law, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has directed its investigators to close all pending charges alleging disparate impact discrimination by September 30, 2025. This directive comes in response to President Trump’s April 23, 2025, Executive Order entitled “Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy,” which directed all federal agencies to “deprioritize enforcement of all statutes and regulations to the extent they include disparate-impact liability.”

Unlike claims of disparate treatment, which involve allegations that an employer intentionally discriminated against an employee because of his or her race, sex, age, national origin, disability, or other protected characteristic, intent is irrelevant disparate impact claims. Instead, disparate impact claims challenge employment practices that appear neutral on their face, but that nonetheless adversely impact - i.e., disproportionately harm - individuals in a protected class. Under this theory, employers may be liable for discrimination if a facially neutral practice causes a significant, adverse effect on a protected group, unless the policy or practice is job-related and essential to business operations. Historically, employees have successfully challenged practices including pre-employment testing, height and weight requirements, physical strength tests, criminal background checks, and educational requirements when those practices did not relate to the requirements of the job and had no business necessity.

The current administration has targeted disparate impact liability as a hindrance on the ability of employers to make hiring and other employment decisions based on merit. As a result, of the EEOC’s directive, the agency will close out all charges of disparate impact discrimination by September 30, 2025. However, this will not fully extinguish these claims. Instead, individuals who have filed charges alleging only disparate impact discrimination will receive a Notice of Right to Sue letter, which will allow them to pursue their claims in court within a specified timeframe. This could lead to a short-term influx of disparate impact claims in federal court. For charges alleging both disparate impact and disparate treatment, the EEOC will proceed with its investigation but focus exclusively on the disparate treatment claims.

The EEOC’s memo marks the latest example of the current administration’s shift in priorities and the ever-changing landscape of Title VII (Z&R has highlighted other recent examples here and here). However, it does not change the state of the law. Disparate impact discrimination remains unlawful under both Title VII and Ohio’s anti-discrimination statutes. Z&R will continue to monitor developments and stands ready to assist employers with strategic guidance on all matters related to Title VII.

*Lauren M. Drabic is an OSBA-certified specialist in labor and employment law and has extensive experience representing employers in discrimination, harassment, and other workplace enforcement matters. If you have questions about the changes occurring under Title VII, contact Lauren M. Drabic (lmd@zrlaw.com) by email or at 216.696.4441.

Thursday, June 5, 2025

Supreme Court Erases Sixth Circuit’s Extra Burden on Majority-Group Plaintiffs

By David P. Frantz and Stephen S. Zashin*

Today, in another significant shift for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United States Supreme Court has unanimously vacated the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s long-standing “background circumstances” requirement.

The Sixth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes Ohio, has long required majority-group Title VII plaintiffs to clear an extra hurdle before proceeding under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework (the burden-shifting test courts apply when discrimination is alleged only via circumstantial evidence). This “background circumstances” rule—also followed in the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits—required white, male, heterosexual, or other majority-group employees to show additional evidence, such as statistics indicating a pattern of bias against majority employees or proof that a minority decisionmaker made the challenged employment decision, before a court would infer discrimination. Writing the lead opinion for the Court, Justice Jackson observed that Congress “establish[ed] the same protections for every ‘individual’—without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group,” leaving “no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs.” The Court remanded for application of the ordinary prima-facie standard.

The most intriguing part of the opinion perhaps stems from the concurrence by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. They question whether McDonnell Douglas remains a useful framework. Such a dialogue signals that the Supreme Court could pursue even more far-reaching changes to Title VII down the road.

Today’s decision removes an evidentiary hurdle that existed only within the above-named Circuits and aligns majority- and minority-plaintiff claims under the same threshold test. Employers in Ohio and elsewhere should expect courts to assess termination, promotion, demotion, and hiring disputes involving majority employees without the now-defunct background circumstances prerequisite.

Ames arrives as Title VII doctrine continues to evolve rapidly. As covered in our recent alerts, a Texas federal court has just vacated key portions of the EEOC’s harassment guidance, and the Trump Administration continues to curtail DEI programs through executive orders and agency memoranda. With Title VII’s rules and enforcement in flux, employers should revisit every corner of their compliance program—policies, job postings, promotion and discipline files, RIF plans, complaint procedures, and training materials—to ensure they withstand the next challenge. Zashin & Rich can conduct a top-to-bottom review, fortify weak spots, and guide decision-makers before a new lawsuit or EEOC charge.

*David P. Frantz (an Ohio State Bar Association Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law) and Stephen S. Zashin (Z&R’s Managing Partner) have extensive experience representing employers in discrimination, harassment, and other workplace enforcement matters. If you have questions about the changes occurring under Title VII, please contact David P. Frantz (dpf@zrlaw.com) or Stephen S. Zashin at (ssz@zrlaw.com) via email or by phone at 216.696.4441.

Wednesday, May 21, 2025

Texas Court Clears Path for Rollback of EEOC Gender Identity Guidance

By Ami J. Patel and Stephen S. Zashin*

On May 15, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas vacated portions of the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace, holding that the agency exceeded its statutory authority by interpreting Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to include harassment based on gender identity. The court found that the EEOC's guidance was contrary to Title VII’s plain text by expanding the definition of “sex” to include “sexual orientation and gender identity” which is according to the court, “beyond the biological binary: male and female.” Next, the court found that the EEOC guidance “contravenes Title VII by defining discriminatory‘ harassment’ to include transgender bathroom, pronouns, and dress preferences. ”Therefore, the court found that the EEOC’s guidance went beyond summarizing existing law and instead “fundamentally expands Title VII to include harassment based on gender identity,” specifically by treating the denial of access to bathrooms aligned with a person’s gender identity, enforcement of dress codes inconsistent with gender identity, and the intentional use of names or pronouns inconsistent with a person’s gender identity as unlawful harassment. The court described the EEOC’s Guidance’s reliance and interpretation of Bostock v. Clayton County as a “misreading of Bostock.” (Note: Bostock is the case which held that terminating an employee for being homosexual or transgender violates Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination).

Following the court’s May 15, 2025 ruling, the EEOC announced that it could not rescind or revise the Guidance due to the Commission’s lack of quorum—a procedural issue that has persisted since the start of the new administration. In the meantime, the EEOC has labeled and shaded the vacated provisions on its website and is currently reviewing other materials for consistency with the court’s decision.

Employers should take note that while the vacated provisions no longer carry legal weight, the underlying issues remain active and contested. EEOC investigators and plaintiffs may continue to explore similar theories under other frameworks, and state or local laws may impose independent obligations related to sexual orientation or gender identity. While the exact contours of Title VII continue to grow hazy, Employers should continue to handle complaints involving gender identity thoughtfully, with an emphasis on consistency, documentation, and awareness of jurisdiction-specific requirements. Zashin & Rich will continue to monitor developments in Title VII enforcement and is available to assist with any questions regarding compliance or policy updates.

*Ami J. Patel (Z&R’s Practice Leader for Trade Secrets/Non-competes) and Stephen S. Zashin (Z&R’s Managing Partner) have extensive experience representing employers in discrimination, harassment, and other workplace enforcement matters. If you have questions about the changes occurring under Title VII, please contact Ami J. Patel (ajp@zrlaw.com) or Stephen S. Zashin at (ssz@zrlaw.com) via email or by phone at 216.696.4441.

Thursday, March 20, 2025

THE DIE HAS BEEN CAST ON DEI: EEOC & DOJ Issue new Technical Assistance Documents Targeting “DEI-Related” Discrimination

By Lauren M. Drabic and Dylan C. Brown*

Backlash against Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programs has risen in recent years. The Trump administration has made restricting DEI a clear priority, issuing multiple Executive Orders and memoranda targeting DEI programs in the federal government and striving to limit DEI in the private sector. Yesterday, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Department of Justice also weighed in on DEI, issuing two joint technical assistance documents aimed at educating employees and employers about unlawful discrimination related to DEI in the workplace.

The first document (available here), entitled “What to Do if You Experience Discrimination Related to DEI at Work,” is a one-page overview. It states, “DEI policies, programs, or practices may be unlawful if they involve an employer or other covered entity taking an employment action motivated—in whole or in part—by an employee’s race, sex, or another protected characteristic.” The document advises that DEI initiatives may lead to unlawful disparate treatment if an employer takes “an employment action motivated (in whole or in part) by” an individual’s protected class, including as to: “hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, compensation, fringe benefits, exclusion form training, exclusion from mentoring or sponsorship programs, exclusion from fellowships, [and] selection for interviews (including placement on candidate slates).” The guidance also advises that employers are prohibited from “limiting, segregating, and classifying" employees based on protected characteristics “in a way that affects their status or deprives them of employment opportunities,” and that, “[d]epending on the facts, DEI training may give rise to a colorable hostile work environment claim.” It emphasizes that “Title VII’s protections apply equally to all racial, ethnic, and national origin groups, as well as both sexes,” and urges affected employees to promptly contact the EEOC due to “strict time limits for filing a charge.”

The second document (available here), entitled “What You Should Know About DEI-Related Discrimination at Work,” is structured as a detailed question-and-answer guide that provides clarity on how DEI programs and initiatives might conflict with Title VII. Here, the EEOC states its position that there is “no such thing as ‘reverse ’discrimination,” and advises that the EEOC will apply “the same standard of proof” to all claims regardless of an individual’s race or other protected status. It further states that employers cannot defend discriminatory practices by citing business interests in diversity or client preferences, as Title VII explicitly rejects a “business necessity” defense to intentional discrimination. Additionally, it states that employers may violate Title VII by segregating employees during DEI training or restricting workplace opportunities based on protected traits. These ideas extend beyond employees to cover applicants, interns, apprentices, and participants in training programs.

Notably, these guidance documents do not create new laws. Rather, they serve as guidance about rights as they relate to DEI based on the current state of the law under Title VII, EEOC regulations, and Supreme Court precedent.

Does This Mean DEI Programs Are Now Illegal?


The short answer is no. As long as an employer’s DEI program complies with Title VII and other federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination, it remains lawful. As was the case before the issuance of these assistance documents and President Trump’s Executive Orders, employers cannot discriminate against applicants or employees based on their race, sex, national origin, age, disability, or other protected class – regardless of whether the employees are in the majority or minority of their protected class. This means that any DEI program or policy that has the purpose or effect of giving preferential treatment to employees in hiring, training, or other employment decisions is unlawful under Title VII. For example, DEI programs that require employers to meet certain hiring quotas or to consider an employee’s race, sex, or other membership in a protected class in employment decisions is unlawful. However, DEI policies that simply aim to expand opportunities to create a more diverse workforce, implement policies and procedures that apply equitably to all employees, and foster an environment of inclusion do not violate the law.

What Should Employers Do Now?


Many employers remain committed to DEI as part of their core values. Maintaining a DEI program may open employers to potential exposure for claims of discrimination by employees/applicants if they believe the policy resulted in adverse employment practices against them. However, such programs are not inherently unlawful, and there are steps that employers who wish to maintain these programs can take to decrease legal risk. For example, employers should ensure that their DEI programs do not have the purpose or effect of giving preferential treatment to candidates or employees who are members of acertain protected class when it comes to making employment decisions. Employers should also be mindful about focusing on all aspects of DEI, including emphasizing the importance of “equity” and “inclusion” in addition to “diversity.” As it relates to diversity, rather than aiming for diversity in and of itself as an end result, employers should focus on removing barriers and increasing opportunities for diverse candidates. In addition, employers should ensure any training, educational programming, resource groups, and other DEI-related activities are inclusive and not restricted to members of a certain group.

Zashin & Rich will continue monitoring DEI developments and can assist employers with strategic guidance on moving forward with DEI questions or concerns.

*Lauren M. Drabic has years of experience representing employers in all areas of employment and labor law. She regularly defends employers against claims of discrimination and retaliation in federal and state court and before administrative agencies and advise employers, including on DEI policies. Dylan C. Brown represents public and private employers in all facets of labor and employment law. For assistance in navigating the evolving landscape surrounding DEI programs, compliance with Title VII, and anti-discrimination laws at both the federal and state levels, contact Lauren M. Drabic (lmd@zrlaw.com) or Dylan C. Brown (dcb@zrlaw.com) via email or by phone at 216.696.4441.

Tuesday, January 28, 2025

DEAD ON ARRIVAL: Federal Affirmative Actions Plans Ended

By Scott DeHart and Ken Hurley*

With the stroke of a pen, President Trump demolished a sixty-year cornerstone of federal anti-discrimination law that required federal government contractors to prepare and adhere to affirmative action plans.

The Executive Order titled “ENDING ILLEGAL DISCRIMINATION AND RESTORING MERIT-BASED OPPORTUNITY” was signed by the President on the evening of his first full day in office, Tuesday, January 21st. Among other changes, the EO formally revokes “Executive Order 11246 (Equal Employment Opportunity)” which was signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson on September 24,1965. EO 11246 has long prohibited federal contractors and federally assisted construction contractors and sub contractors, who do over $10,000 in Government business per year, from discriminating in employment decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, gender identity or national origin. EO 11246 also imposed the requirement on such contractors to take affirmative action to ensure that equal opportunity is provided in all aspects of their employment. President Barack Obama in 2014 amended that order via Executive Order 13672, which added “sexual orientation or gender identity” to the list of protected classes.

The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), an agency within the United States Department of Labor (DOL), has been the federal entity primarily responsible for ensuring that employers comply with EO 11246. OFCCP also enforces Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides disability protections for federal workers, and the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974. OFCCP has promulgated and enforced its detailed regulations, requiring federal contractors to prepare and follow annual “affirmative action plans.” The revocation of EO 11246 substantially curtails the authority and the scope of responsibilities of the OFCCP.

“The [OFCCP]……shall immediately cease: Promoting ‘diversity’; holding Federal contractors and subcontractors responsible for taking ‘affirmative action’; and allowing or encouraging Federal contractors and subcontractors to engage in workforce balancing based on race, color, sex, sexual preference, religion, or national origin,” Trump’s order reads.

Sweeping changes to federal-level affirmative action and DEI programs were widely anticipated after Trump’s electoral victory in November 2024. During the first Trump administration (2017-2021), many had predicted the demise of OFCCP and the downfall of EO11246. However, OFCCP remained active during Trump’s presidency, instituting new types of audits and issuing new Directives and regulations that were widely seen as contractor-friendly. Many of these efforts were predictably rescinded at the outset of the Biden administration. This time, President Trump has taken more immediate and decisive action, essentially obliterating the OFCCP. Trump’s order came just a day after he rescinded multiple Biden-era executive orders, including several others pertaining to diversity and affirmative action.

The impact of Trump’s rescission of EO 11246 (and subsequent EOs that modified and expanded it) is enormous. President Trump has given contractors 90 days to continue their compliance with the existing regulatory scheme, but the recission of EO 11246 all-but certainly marks the end of mandatory “affirmative action plans” for federal government contractors (for at least the next four years). President Trump’s EO also requires each federal government contractor “to certify that it does not operate any programs promoting DEI that violate any applicable Federal anti-discrimination laws.”

President Trump’s Executive Order may present a lose-lose decision for government contractors. While his Order effectively renders a contractor’s affirmative action plan or DEI policy unlawful, Ohio law still requires contractors to develop affirmative action plans. Section 153.59 of the Ohio Revised Code prohibits the Department of Development from expending capital funds appropriated by the General Assembly unless the project to receive those funds develops an affirmative action plan. Specifically, the statute requires contractors to develop “an affirmative action program for the employment and effective utilization of disadvantaged persons whose disadvantage may arise from cultural, racial, or ethnic background, or other similar cause, including, but not limited to, race,religion, sex, disability or military status as defined in section 4112.01 of the Revised Code, national origin, or ancestry.” Section 125.111 of the Revised Code implements the same requirements for contracts with cities, villages, counties, townships,and any other political subdivision. President Trump’s order creates a dilemma for businesses that work on government contracts: their affirmative action efforts, which will still be necessary to comply with state contracts, will likely place these contractors into noncompliance with their federal contracts.

Employers who do business with the federal government should remain attentive to the fast-paced and sweeping changes that are underway in the early days of the second Trump presidency.


*Scott DeHart represents public and private sector employers in all aspects of labor and employment law including employment discrimination, collective bargaining, union avoidance and affirmative action plans. Ken Hurley represents public and private employers in all facets of labor and employment law. For assistance in navigating the landscape of affirmative action, DEI, and anti-discrimination law at the federal and state levels, contact Scott DeHart (shd@zrlaw.com) or Ken Hurley (kjh@zrlaw.com) at 614-224-4411.

Friday, April 19, 2024

Title VII Suits Involving Job Transfers – No Harm vs. Some Harm vs. Significant Harm – What is the Standard?

By Natalie M. Stevens and Kimana A. Bowen*

On April 17, 2024, in a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Muldrow v. St. Louis that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires “some harm” in the job transfer context.

The Opinion


Background

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant employer “discriminate[d] against” her based on sex “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of her employment in violation of Title VII. Specifically, the plaintiff, a female Sergeant in the St. Louis Police Department, alleged she was transferred to another unit, and replaced by a male, and that while her rank and pay remained the same, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not.

The Eastern District of Missouri granted the defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision holding that the plaintiff must, but could not in this case, prove that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage”; rather, the transfer only caused “minor” changes in her working conditions.
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 30 F.4th680, 688 (8th Cir. 2022).

Title VII Standard

Title VII provides that it is unlawful for a private employer or a state or local government “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1).

Several courts have interpreted the statute to require that a transfer subject an individual to “worse treatment” or “harm,” and that the harm be “significant.”

In Muldrow v. St. Louis, the Supreme Court held that the requirement that the harm be “significant” would be adding words to the statute that Congress enacted, holding:
To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment. The transfer must have left the transferee worse off but not significantly so. The transferee does not need to establish an elevated threshold of harm. This would impose a new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as applied demands something more of them than the law as written.

No. 22-193, slip opinion, at p. 6.

What Now for Employers?

Employers should ensure that they have Equal Employment Opportunity and Anti-Discrimination policies and that any transfers are for legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons.

*Please contact ZR Team member Natalie M. Stevens (nms@zrlaw.com) or Kimana A. Bowen (kab@zrlaw.com) [1] if you have questions relating to the interplay of job transfers and Title VII.

[1] Presently barred in D.C. only.

Wednesday, October 6, 2021

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Volume XXIII, Issue ii

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Employers, OSHA’s Emergency Temporary Standard is Coming. Are You Ready?

By David R. Vance*

The Biden Administration recently announced that it directed the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard (“ETS”) requiring employers to have their employees test negative for COVID-19 each week or get vaccinated. The ETS applies to employers with 100 or more employees. For additional information about the ETS, please see Zashin & Rich’s alert available here. This article provides helpful information for employers that intend to require weekly testing, as compared to mandating the vaccine. Employers with mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policies should also require testing for employees who are exempt from their mandatory vaccination policy based on a medical reason or a sincerely held religious belief.

Depending on the size of your workforce and its level of vaccination, weekly testing can present a significant administrative burden that requires additional staff or the reshuffling of job duties. In addition to creating a weekly testing infrastructure and possibly hiring new employees, additional employer testing considerations include when employees will test, how will employees report their test results, how will employers store the test results, should employers pay employees for the time it takes to test, where will employees test, etc.

While the ETS likely will address some of these questions, the government already has addressed some. For example, the Department of Labor has stated that the Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay employees for employer mandated testing, particularly when such testing occurs during the employee’s normal workday. Employers also likely must compensate non-exempt employees for mandatory tests occurring outside normal work hours. The time involved with taking a COVID-19 test, including the time it takes to receive the test results, varies widely based on the type of test. Since employers should pay employees for testing time, employers will want to limit the time spent testing to the greatest extent possible.

For most employers, the most efficient and cost-effective testing method is rapid antigen testing completed at the employer’s location. Most antigen tests are easy to administer, can detect the presence of COVID-19 in just 15 minutes, and numerous companies provide them.

The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in significant growth in the rapid test industry. The expected testing requirement under the ETS works similarly to requiring attendees at concerts or sporting events to test negative for COVID-19 before entering such events. Companies like KOACORE (www.koacore.com) have handled many of these types of events and can provide the rapid antigen tests and other testing solutions.

Unfortunately, rapid tests remain increasingly difficult to obtain. Once OSHA issues its ETS, they likely will become even more difficult to obtain. Employers that intend to allow employees to test weekly, as compared to mandating the vaccine, should begin discussions with third party providers (like KOACORE) to ensure they have tests readily available when the ETS takes effect.

We expect legal challenges to OSHA’s ETS. While it is difficult to discern the outcome of any such challenges, OSHA may have a difficult time proving the need for the emergency temporary standard. Regardless, employers should plan as if the ETS will take effect. By controlling the method of testing, employers can control the associated costs and timing of such testing. Doing so also avoids constant employee questions relative to testing locations, types of approved tests, and delayed PCR test results, among other questions.

As with all things COVID-19 related, a number of moving parts exist and employers should contact counsel to evaluate their options and intended plans of action.

*David R. Vance, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, regularly advises clients on labor and employment matters. If you have questions regarding COVID-19’s continued impact on the workplace or other employment matters, please contact David at drv@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.

NLRB: Vague “Savings Clause” Fails to Salvage Overbroad Arbitration Agreement

By Scott H. DeHart*

Arbitration is a popular alternative to litigating employment disputes in court and for good reason: arbitration has many distinct advantages that may include lower costs, quicker results, simpler procedures, and greater confidentiality. Arbitration’s favored status with employers received a major boost in 2018, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). In Epic Systems, the Court held arbitration agreements containing class action (or collective action) waivers - and which require that employment disputes resolve by individualized arbitration – do not violate the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).

Surely with such a ringing endorsement of mandatory employment arbitration agreements from the nation’s top Court, employers could expect little scrutiny of such policies by the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) right? Unfortunately, as illustrated by a recent Board decision, the Board did not read Epic Systems to allow employers to run roughshod over employees’ collective-bargaining rights.

In Brinker Int’l Payroll Company L.P., 370 NLRB No. 137 (June 11, 2021), the Board found that a company had committed an unfair labor practice (“ULP”) by compelling its employees to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement that unlawfully restricted the employees’ access to the Board and its processes. Although the company attempted to narrow the scope of its policy with a “savings clause,” the Board found that the savings language did not salvage the company’s unlawful policy.

Since at least 2013, Brinker required its employees (as a condition of their employment) to sign an agreement that required “binding arbitration” of “all disputes involving legally-protected rights (e.g., local, state and federal statutory, contractual or common law right(s)) regardless of whether the statute was enacted or common law doctrine was recognized at the time this agreement was signed.” In 2015, the Board held that Brinker’s policy violated the NLRA. Applying the labor law precedents at that time, the Board found unlawful Brinker’s policy because it required employees to waive their right to pursue class and collective actions in any forum. The Board also found the policy unlawful because it restricted employees’ rights to file ULP charges with the Board. The Board sought enforcement of its ruling against Brinker in the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That case remained pending in 2018 when the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Epic Systems. Based on the Supreme Court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board’s order and returned the case to the Board for additional proceedings.

Taking up Brinker’s arbitration policy for a second time, the Board explained that the FAA’s mandate (to enforce arbitration agreements) is not absolute – it can be overridden by a contrary command from Congress. The Board’s power and responsibility to prevent ULPs is one such command – in other words, “the FAA does not authorize the maintenance or enforcement of [arbitration] agreements that interfere with the right to file charges with the Board.” Brinker, 370 NLRB No. 137, Slip op. at *2. The Board explained that an arbitration agreement that expressly prohibits an employee from filing ULP is unlawful. However, the inquiry does not stop there. The Board established a balancing test in Boeing, 365 NLRB No. 154 (2017) to evaluate whether employer policies pass muster under the NLRA. Under Boeing, some policies are always lawful to maintain (Category #1), others are always unlawful to maintain (Category #3), and others require individual scrutiny by the Board (Category #2).

The Board considered the language of Brinker’s policy and found that it made arbitration the “exclusive forum for resolving all disputes” with Brinker’s employees, which would include claims brought under the NLRA. Because this language restricted employees’ access to the Board, the Board found Brinker’s policy unlawful.

“But wait!” responded Brinker – the mandatory arbitration agreement had a “savings clause” that told employees that the agreement “does not limit an employee’s ability to complete any external administrative remedy (such as with the EEOC).” Surely this would stop employees from wrongly interpreting the policy as a restriction on their right to file ULP charges? Not quite, according to the Board.

Yes, employers might salvage an otherwise overbroad arbitration agreement with a “savings clause” stating that employees “retain the right to file charges with the Board, even if the agreement otherwise includes claims arising under the [NLRA] and within its scope.” But the savings language must explicitly inform employees that they retain the right to file charges and to access the processes of administrative agencies (even if “the Board” or “the NLRB” is not named specifically). Brinker’s “savings clause” made a reference to an “administrative remedy,” but it named the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and not the NLRB. This reference to the EEOC, a “competing” federal agency according to the Board, canceled out any benefits that the savings clause might have had to “safeguard employees’ right to file [ULP]” charges. The Board assigned Brinker’s agreement to Boeing “Category #3” (always unlawful) and ordered Brinker to rescind its arbitration agreements.

Brinker is a cautionary tale about the importance of careful, clear, and explicit drafting and misplaced reliance on “savings” clauses. The lesson applies not only to companies with mandatory arbitration agreements, but any company that maintains employee handbooks or other various policies. A “savings clause” can shape the interpretation (and enforceability) of an arbitration agreement or other policies, but employers should not haphazardly or vaguely write them. The savings clause should adequately safeguard employees’ NLRB rights. Sometimes employers do not want to mention in their documents anything that might invite or inspire employees to consider organizing – for example, specific references to “Section 7” or “collective bargaining” rights or the “NLRB” or “unfair labor practices.” However, the Brinker decision reminds employers that if their language remains too vague, then they might invite scrutiny from the NLRB.

*Scott H. DeHart, a member of the firm’s Columbus office, regularly advises clients on labor and employment matters, including issues relating to arbitration agreements and employee handbooks. If you have questions about the NLRB’s Brinker decision or other employment related issues, please contact Scott at shd@zrlaw.com or (614) 224-4411.

In it for the Long Haul: Long COVID and Reasonable Accommodations

By Marcus A. Pringle*

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to present employers with a multitude of practical and legal issues impacting their workforces. One such issue revolves around employees suffering from long-term effects of COVID-19, i.e., Post-Acute COVID-19 Syndrome or “long COVID,” and whether an employer must provide these employees with reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

Under the ADA, a covered “disability” includes a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Employers cannot discriminate against individuals with disabilities and have a duty to reasonably accommodate employees/applicants with disabilities, unless doing so creates an undue hardship. A reasonable accommodation is a change or adjustment to a job or work environment that permits a person with a disability to perform their job. For example, reasonable accommodations can include a modified work schedule or leave, reassignment, or providing/modifying equipment to aid the employee.

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, individuals suffering from long COVID experience “a wide range of new, returning, or ongoing health problems . . . four or more weeks after first being infected,” including, but not limited to: difficulty breathing or shortness of breath; tiredness or fatigue; worsening symptoms after physical or mental activities; difficulty thinking or concentrating; chest or stomach pain; headaches; and dizziness. Furthermore, COVID-19 can cause long-term damage to organs including the heart, lungs, and brain.

In July, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) jointly issued guidance (available here) addressing long COVID as a disability under the ADA and related statutes. The guidance does not address Title I of the ADA, which covers private employers, and states that “employment is outside of the scope of this guidance document.” However, the guidance still provides information on how government agencies and courts may apply the ADA with respect to employees suffering from long COVID.

In the joint guidance, HHS and the DOJ state that long COVID can meet the definition of a disability under the ADA. In making this determination, an individualized assessment is necessary, i.e., whether a particular person’s symptoms substantially limit a major life activity. The guidance provides the following as examples:

  • “A person with long COVID who has lung damage that causes shortness of breath, fatigue, and related effects is substantially limited in respiratory function, among other major life activities.”
  • “A person with long COVID who has symptoms of intestinal pain, vomiting, and nausea that have lingered for months is substantially limited in gastrointestinal function, among other major life activities.”
  • “A person with long COVID who experiences memory lapses and ‘brain fog’ is substantially limited in brain function, concentrating, and/or thinking.”

The guidance also advises that individuals suffering from long COVID may be entitled to reasonable accommodations. While it does not address employment-related accommodations, the guidance provides examples in other contexts, including allowing a student additional time to take a test on account of difficulties with concentrating and allowing a service animal to accompany an individual experiencing dizziness.

In light of the HHS/DOJ’s guidance, it is possible that the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission and courts may take a similar approach with respect to the ADA and long COVID. As such, employers should consider whether long COVID may trigger the ADA’s (and similar state laws’) protections and requirements, including providing employees with reasonable accommodations. As the ADA requires an individualized approach, employers should contact counsel with questions regarding whether an employee with symptoms of long COVID may qualify as disabled and the types of accommodations that they may have to provide.

*Marcus A. Pringle practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about the HHS/DOJ’s long COVID guidance or questions about the ADA and reasonable accommodations in general, please contact Marcus at map@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.

EEOC Releases New Resources on the Workplace Rights of LGBTQ+ Employees

By Jantzen D. Mace*

In June, to honor Pride Month and the anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County, the EEOC released new resources to educate employees, applicants, and employers about the rights of all employees to remain free from sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in employment. The EEOC released the new resources online which include a new landing page and a new technical assistance document titled: “Protections Against Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.” The EEOC confirmed that these resources rely on previously voted positions adopted by the Commission and do not represent a change in EEOC policy.

The EEOC’s new landing page consolidates information and resources regarding the scope of protections against sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in the workplace. The page also contains information about harassment, retaliation, and how to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Additional resources include links to EEOC statistics and updated fact sheets about recent EEOC litigation and federal sector decisions regarding sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.

The technical assistance document, accessible through the new landing page, contains a series of questions and answers which should help the public understand the Bostock decision and the EEOC’s positions on the laws that the agency enforces. The Q&As address issues concerning Title VII coverage of employers, employees, and types of discriminatory actions that may fall under the statute’s protections, as well as issues more closely related to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

Employers should take note of the following points raised by the Q&As:
̶ Workplace Attire. Covered employers may not require a transgender employee to dress in accordance with the employee’s sex assigned at birth. Prohibiting an employee from dressing or presenting themselves consistent with that person’s gender identity constitutes sex discrimination.

̶ Bathrooms, Locker Rooms, and Showers. Employers may have separate, sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms, and showers for men and women, or may choose to have unisex or single-use bathrooms, locker rooms, and showers. Where an employer has separate bathrooms, locker rooms, or showers for men and women, employers should allow transgender individuals to use the facilities of the gender with which they identify.

̶ Pronouns and Names. The use of pronouns or names that are inconsistent with an individual’s gender identity may amount to harassment, which includes unwelcome conduct that is based on gender identity. To be unlawful, the conduct must be “severe or pervasive” when considered along with all other unwelcome conduct based on the individual’s sex (which includes gender identity), such that the conduct creates a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or offensive. Though accidental misuse of a transgender employee’s preferred name or pronouns does not violate Title VII, intentional and repeated use of that individual’s wrong name or pronouns could contribute to an unlawful hostile work environment.
The new landing page and technical assistance document are part of the EEOC’s effort to ensure that the public can find accessible, plain language materials in a convenient location on the EEOC’s website. “All people, regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity, deserve an opportunity to work in an environment free from harassment or other discrimination,” EEOC Chair Charlotte A. Burrows said. “The new information will make it easier for people to understand their rights and responsibilities related to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.” They also provide a good resource for employers hoping to address these topics.

The new landing page can be accessed at the following link: https://www.eeoc.gov/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-sogi-discrimination.

*Jantzen D. Mace, a member of the firm’s Columbus office, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. For more information about these resources or the rights of LGBTQ+ employees, please contact Jantzen at jdm@zrlaw.com or (614) 224-4411.

Safer Federal Workforce Task Force Issues COVID-19 Workplace Safety Guidance for Federal Contractors and Subcontractors

*By Scott Coghlan

On September 9, 2021, the Biden Administration announced a six-point COVID-19 Action Plan to combat the coronavirus. The Action Plan directed the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) applicable to private employers with 100+ employees that will mandate full vaccinated status or weekly negative COVID-19 tests for such employees. OSHA has not issued the ETS and the Action Plan did not set a deadline for the issuance of the ETS.

On that same date, President Biden issued an Executive Order directing the White House’s Safer Federal Workforce Task Force (Task Force) to issue new guidance (Guidance) regarding vaccination requirements and other COVID-19 safety measures for federal contractors and subcontractors. On September 24, 2021, the Task Force published its COVID-19 safety protocols. The Guidance imposes three primary requirements on federal contractors and subcontractors:
  1. Employees of covered contractors must be fully vaccinated, except for those that are legally entitled to an accommodation;
  2. Covered contractor workplaces must require masks and physical distancing for all employees, visitors and others; and,
  3. Covered contractors must designate a person to coordinate COVID-19 workplace safety efforts at covered contractor workplaces.

Which Federal Contracts Are Subject to the Guidance?

The following delineates the contracts or contract-like instruments entered into with the Federal Government subject to the Guidance:
  • For services, construction or a leasehold interest in real property;
  • For services covered by the Service Contract Act;
  • For concessions, including any concessions contract excluded by Department of Labor regulations; or
  • Entered into with the Federal Government in connection with Federal property or land and related to offering services for Federal employees, their dependents or the general public.
The Guidance does not apply to grants, contracts under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, under certain values set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation or subcontracts that relate solely to for the provision of products. Notably, the Guidance also does not apply to covered contractor employees who only perform work outside of the United States.

The Executive Order requires that contracts contain a clause that specifies that the contractor or subcontractor shall comply with all guidance for contractor and subcontractor work locations published by the Task Force. The prime contractor must include this clause in contracts with first-tier subcontractors and subcontractors must ensure that the clause exists with lower tier subcontracts.

When Do the Guidance Requirements Go Into Effect?

For contracts awarded before October 15, 2021, the requirements must become part of the contract when an option is exercised or an extension is made. Between October 15 and November 14, 2021, federal agencies must include the requirements in the solicitation documents. From November 14, 2021 forward, the requirements must be made part of any new contract.

Important Definitions

The Guidance has many defined terms, but those of primary importance are:
  • A covered contractor – means “a prime contractor or subcontractor at any tier who is a party to a covered contract.”
  • A covered contractor employee – means “any full-time or part-time employee of a covered contractor working on or in connection with a covered contract or working at a covered contractor workplace” and “includes employees of covered contractors who are not themselves working on or in connection with a covered contract.” The phrase “in connection with” refers to employees who perform tasks necessary to perform the contract but are not directly engaged in performing the actual work such as human resources and billing personnel.
  • A covered contractor workplace – means “a location controlled by a covered contractor at which any employee of a covered contractor is working on or in connection with a covered contract is likely to be present during the performance for a covered contract” but “does not include a covered contractor employee’s residence.”

The Primary Requirements Imposed on Federal Contractors and Subcontractors

Vaccination

The Guidance requires fully vaccinated covered contractor employees by December 8, 2021 unless they are legally entitled to an accommodation due to a medical condition or sincerely held religious belief, practice or observance. After that date, all such employees must be fully vaccinated by the first day of the performance of a newly awarded covered contract. This includes employees that have already had COVID-19 and employees working remotely from home. The Guidance also provides for an “urgent, mission-critical” exception if a federal agency requires covered contractor employees to commence work before becoming fully vaccinated. In that case, the covered contractor must ensure that the employees are fully vaccinated within 60 days of their beginning work on the contract.

Covered contractors are not required to provide vaccines to their employees nor are they required to pay employees for their time and expense for getting vaccinated (Note: This differs from the forthcoming OSHA ETS which will require employers to provide employees with paid leave to get vaccinated and to recover from vaccine side effects). However, covered contractors must verify each employee’s vaccination status by having the employee show or provide one of the following documents (a digital copy such as PDF, digital photograph or scanned image is acceptable):
  • A copy of the immunization record from a health care provider or pharmacy
  • A copy of the COVID-19 Vaccination Record Card
  • A copy of medical records documenting the vaccination
  • A copy of immunization records from a public health or State immunization information system or
  • A copy of any other official documentation verifying vaccination that states the vaccine name, date(s) of administration of the vaccine and the name of the health care professional or clinic site that administered the vaccine

Mask and Social Distancing Requirements

Covered contractors must ensure that all individuals, including covered contractor employees and visitors, comply with published CDC guidance for masking and physical distancing at covered contractor workplaces. In areas of high or substantial community transmission, even fully vaccinated persons must mask indoors. In areas of low or moderate community transmission, fully vaccinated persons do not need to mask indoors. Regardless of transmission levels, fully vaccinated persons do not have to physically distance.

Consistent with CDC guidelines, covered contractors may provide exceptions to masking and/or physically distancing if an individual is alone in an enclosed office or while eating or drinking, if physical distancing is maintained. Similarly, if a workplace risk assessment determines that wearing a mask would create a safety risk, an exception to masking is permitted. Exceptions must be approved in writing by the person designated by the contractor to ensure compliance with the Guidance.

Covered contractors are required to check the CDC COVID-19 Data Tracker County View website at least weekly to determine the level of community transmission in all areas where they have a covered contractor workplace in order to determine the appropriate safety protocols. When the community transmission level rises from low or moderate to substantial or high, the contractor is instructed to put it place more protective safety protocols consistent with CDC guidelines. However, when the community transmission level is reduced from high or substantial to moderate or low, the level must remain at the lower level for at least two weeks before a contractor may implement safety protocols recommended for the lower community transmission rate.

Designation of a Person to Coordinate COVID-19 Safety Efforts

Covered contractors must designate one or more persons to ensure compliance with the Guidance and its workplace safety protocols. The designated persons must provide information on required COVID-19 safety protocols to covered contractor employees and all other individuals at a covered contractor workplace. Communication of these safety protocols may occur by email, websites, signage or other means in a readily understandable manner.

What About Work From Home Employees?

Individuals authorized to work from home under the covered contract must comply with the vaccination mandate. This is true even if the employee never works at a covered contractor workplace or Federal workplace during the performance of the contract. However, residences are not considered covered contractor workplaces so work from home employees do not have to comply with masking and physical distancing while in their residence.

Will Federal Contractors Have to Comply with OSHA’s Forthcoming ETS?

Yes. Covered contractors will need to comply with other workplace safety standards, including OSHA’s forthcoming ETS for employers with 100 or more employees.

What Should Employers Do Now?

Employers should consider taking the following steps now in order to follow the new Guidance:
  • Review existing contracts or current bids for solicitation to see if the Guidance applies to your contract, workplace and employees
  • Designate a company representative to implement the Guidance
  • Create a plan to obtain employee vaccination verification
  • Develop a protocol to ensure weekly review of the CDC COVID-19 Data Tracker County View and the manner in which updated transmission levels and safety protocols will be communicated to employees, visitors, vendors or others that are likely to be present at a covered employer workplace
  • Determine how medical and religious based vaccination and mask requirements accommodation requests will be processed and what accommodations are available
  • Ensure that you are prepared to amend existing contracts with lower tier subcontractors to include the mandatory clause requiring compliance with all guidance published by the Task Force

*Scott Coghlan chairs the firm’s Workers’ Compensation Group and regularly advises clients on all workers’ compensation and OSHA related matters. If you have a question about the Ohio BWC’s or OSHA’s response to COVID-19 or any other workers’ compensation or OSHA related questions, please contact Scott at sc@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.

Z&R Shorts

Please join Z&R in welcoming Sarah Moore and Marcus Pringle to its Employment and Labor Groups


Sarah Moore has served both public and private sectors for over 25 years regarding labor and employment matters. Sarah has utilized traditional, modified, and IBB bargaining models in negotiations with unions that include AAUP, AFSCME, Cleveland Building Trades, CWA, IAFF, IBEW, FOP, NCF&O, OAPSE, OEA/NEA, OFT/AFT, OPBA, Laborers, SEIU, Steelworkers, Teamsters, and UAW. She regularly supports management with contract administration and handles arbitrations and factfinding proceedings. Sarah also litigates labor issues before state and federal courts (including injunctions and mandamus actions) and administrative agencies (ULPs and representation matters). Sarah advocates on employment matters in state and federal courts, including issues of benefits and pay, discrimination, harassment, restrictive covenants, as well as constitutional and contract-based claims. She has also litigated workers’ compensation appeals, negligence, and special education cases.

Marcus Pringle's practice encompasses all areas of employment and labor law. Marcus has experience defending against charges of discrimination and retaliation, sexual harassment, unfair labor practices, and workers’ compensation matters. Marcus earned his law degree from Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, where he was the Director of Operations for the Entertainment and Sports Law Association, Executive Assistant for the Great Lakes Sports and Entertainment Law Academy, and member of the Trial Advocacy Team. Marcus earned his B.S. in Broadcast Journalism from the Pennsylvania State University and is a graduate of Hudson High School.

Upcoming Speaking Engagements


October 14, 2021
Stephen Zashin presents “Trade Secret Boom: Key Trends in Non-Compete and Trade Secret Cases” with Justin Flamm at the Ohio State Bar Association’s 58th Annual Midwest Labor and Employment Law Seminar in Columbus, Ohio. Information regarding day one of the OSBA’s Midwest Seminar can be found here.

October 15, 2021
Sarah Moore presents “Technology Changing the Labor Law Practice: Negotiations, Mediations and Arbitrations” with Paul Unger, Daniel Zeiser, and R. Jessup Gage at the Ohio State Bar Association’s 58th Annual Midwest Labor and Employment Law Seminar in Columbus, Ohio. Information regarding day two of the OSBA’s Midwest Seminar can be found here.

Friday, January 15, 2021

About Time: Ohio Makes Significant Changes to its Anti-Discrimination Law, Including Reducing the Statute of Limitations to Two Years

By Stephen S. Zashin*

For years, Ohio lawmakers have attempted to revise Ohio’s anti-discrimination laws, which are codified in Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112. On January 12, 2021, Governor DeWine signed into law House Bill 352 (“HB 352”), which makes significant changes, mostly in employers’ favor, to Ohio’s anti-discrimination laws.

Most notably, under HB 352, the statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims is reduced from six years to two years. Also, before pursuing a lawsuit in court, potential plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”). Among other changes, the law eliminates individual supervisor liability for certain types of claims, simplifies some of the nuances specific to age discrimination claims, and codifies a defense employers may use to refute sexual harassment claims. These changes become effective on April 12, 2021.

Statute of Limitations Decrease to Two Years

Prior to the passage of HB 352, Ohio had one of, if not, the longest statute of limitations in the United States for employment discrimination claims – six years. In addition to subjecting Ohio employers to increased liability, this lengthy timeframe presented significant obstacles in litigation, for example, with respect to witness recollection and document retention. Under HB 352, the statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims becomes two years, subject to certain tolling provisions.

Individuals Must File a Charge First

HB 352 also requires claimants file a charge of discrimination with the OCRC and satisfy certain procedural requirements prior to filing a lawsuit in court alleging employment discrimination. This OCRC charge-filing requirement does not apply to claimants seeking only injunctive relief. Previously, plaintiffs could either immediately file a lawsuit in court, file a charge with the OCRC, or even pursue a lawsuit and an OCRC charge simultaneously.

Age Discrimination Claims Simplified

With respect to age discrimination claims, the current law includes a confusing hodgepodge of provisions, with a different statute of limitations applying depending on the specific provision implicated. Under HB 352, the statutory scheme for age discrimination claims is simplified. As with other employment discrimination claims, age discrimination claims will have a two-year statute of limitations and an employee must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Individual Employees and Supervisors No Longer “Employers”

HB 352 also amends the definition of “employer” under Ohio Revised Code 4112.01(A)(2) by eliminating its reference to any “person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer.” In doing so, the General Assembly “declare[d] its intent that individual supervisors, managers, or employees not be held liable” for certain discriminatory acts prohibited under Ohio Revised Code 4112. However, individuals still face personal liability for specific types of claims. For example, individuals may still be liable for claims based upon allegations that they engaged in retaliation, aided or abetted a discriminatory act, or obstructed another from complying with the law. In his testimony in support of HB 352, co-sponsor Representative Jon Cross explained that “personal liability remains if it is determined the supervisor acted outside the scope of their employment, retaliated against the claimant, or directly engaged in discrimination.”

Other Legal Concepts Codified

Finally, HB 352 codifies a number of legal concepts that courts have developed through their decisions. For example, HB 352 codifies what is commonly known as the Faragher-Ellerth defense, which Ohio courts have applied for years. Employers may use this defense in response to hostile work environment claims based on allegations of sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisor. For an employer to avoid liability under this defense, it must prove that: (a) it exercised reasonable care to prevent or promptly correct any harassing behavior; and (b) the employee failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. This defense is not available, however, in cases where the supervisor’s harassment resulted in a tangible employment action against the employee, such as a firing or reassignment. In codifying this defense, HB 352 does not reference other types of hostile work environment claims, such as harassment based on race.

HB 352 also confirms that employment discrimination claims under Ohio Revised Code 4112 are “tort actions” subject to Ohio’s laws setting caps on monetary awards for non-economic and punitive damages.

Overall, HB 352 provides many favorable changes for employers to Ohio’s discrimination laws, including shortening the statute of limitations, requiring employees to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit, limiting individual liability, clarifying age discrimination claims, and confirming existing case law on a number of pro-employer issues. If you have questions about how these changes impact your business, please contact counsel. At a minimum, given the codification of the above-referenced defense to sexual harassment claims, employers should review their policies to ensure that they expressly prohibit harassing behavior and provide a reasonable reporting mechanism to address quickly and effectively any such claims.

* Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law and is the head of the firm’s Employment and Labor Groups. If you have questions about House Bill 352 or labor and employment matters more generally, please contact Stephen at ssz@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441

Tuesday, June 16, 2020

Breaking News from the U.S. Supreme Court: Title VII Prohibits Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Transgender Status

By David R. Vance*

On June 15, 2020, in a landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, one of three consolidated cases before the Supreme Court, resolves a circuit split over the scope of Title VII’s protections for homosexual and transgender persons.

Title VII makes it “unlawful … for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual … because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In Bostock, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer violates Title VII if it intentionally fires an employee based, in part, on sex, which includes an employee’s sexual orientation and gender identity.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that discrimination on the basis of an individual’s sexuality or gender identity necessarily “requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex.” The Supreme Court further stated that an "individual’s homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions … because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex."

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision, employers should:
  • Review and, if necessary, update their policies to specifically prohibit discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation and gender identity; and
  • Train employees, particularly those in management and human resources, that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
It is imperative that employers address the Supreme Court’s decision quickly and thoroughly.

*David R. Vance, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Employment & Labor Law, regularly advises clients on labor and employment matters, including equal employment opportunity policies, employer handbooks, and employment decisions. If you have questions about the Supreme Court’s recent decision, please contact David at drv@zrlaw.com or (216)696-4441.

Tuesday, June 9, 2020

Pandemic Fallout Continues: Employment Related COVID-19 Lawsuits Begin to Surge

By Tiffany S. Henderson*

COVID-19 has changed the world as we know it, including the world of work.

With new COVID-related laws, regulations, and guidance impacting virtually every aspect of the employment relationship, a surge of COVID-19 related lawsuits is sure to follow. Per information available through LexisNexis, as of June 5, 2020, plaintiffs have filed approximately 2,544 state and federal COVID-19 related lawsuits. The following is a summary of the various types of COVID-19 related labor and employment lawsuits that employees have filed:

  • Unsafe work environment. Lawsuits alleging an unsafe workplace (i.e., an employer failed to sanitize or take appropriate measures to prevent spreading COVID-19) caused COVID-19-related sickness and/or death.
  • Discrimination. Lawsuits alleging that employers denied a work from home request or otherwise failed to accommodate COVID-19-related concerns due to disability, age, or another protected class.
  • Leaves of Absence. Lawsuits encompassing employee allegations regarding COVID-related leaves of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), or state laws.
  • Wage and Hour. Lawsuits alleging improper payment of wages under the Fair Labor and Standards Act or similar state/local laws for work completed before or after COVID-19-related business closures, remote work completed by non-exempt employees, or “off the clock” employer temperature checks or COVID-19 testing.
  • Unlawful Termination. Lawsuits alleging retaliation or employment termination for complaining about exposure to COVID-19 in the workplace, including whistleblower complaints.
  • Other. Lawsuits alleging violations of the notice provisions of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) or the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).

As states begin to reopen, employers should expect increased COVID-19-related lawsuits and other activity:

  • In some states, including Ohio, pending legislation could extend workers’ compensation coverage to certain employees (generally first responders and other essential workers) under a rebuttable presumption that COVID-19 was contracted at work.
  • The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has reported receiving 1,342 COVID-related complaints since May 22, 2020.

What can employers do?

  • Review and follow all state and local reopening guidance applicable to your business.
  • Stay abreast of guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), including Interim Guidance for Businesses and Employers (accessible here).
  • Stay up to date on new COVID-19 laws, regulations, and guidance. Review COVID-19-related guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, OSHA, Department of Labor, and other relevant authorities.
  • Confirm all relevant policies and procedures are current, and ensure all management and human resources personnel are familiar with the revised policies.
  • Ensure Workplace Safety. Develop a plan for reducing COVID-19 transmission in the workplace and communicate the plan to employees. Emphasize appropriate workplace infection control practices like handwashing, sanitizing, and social distancing. Include a process for employees to report COVID-related concerns, and prohibit retaliation for using that process.

Each employment situation is unique, and employers must do what works best for their current situation and employees. As always, please consult Z&R to discuss your particular circumstances.

Z&R has developed form policies, request forms and other guidance documents related to COVID-19 issues. Z&R will continue to monitor the latest information governing employers. Previous Z&R articles addressing employer requirements and considerations during the COVID-19 pandemic can be found here:



*Tiffany S. Henderson practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions regarding COVID-19 and your workforce, please contact Tiffany at tsh@zrlaw.com or 216-696-4441.

Thursday, October 17, 2019

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Volume XXI, Issue iii

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City of Toledo Joins Cincinnati, Passes Salary History Ban

By Scott H. DeHart*

The City of Toledo passed Ordinance No. 173-19, which generally prohibits Toledo employers with at least fifteen employees from seeking an applicant’s prior salary information. Toledo joins a growing number of states and municipalities that have enacted similar bans, including the City of Cincinnati in March of 2019. Accordingly, Toledo employers should determine whether they are subject to the law and, if so, implement necessary changes to existing practices to ensure compliance with the ordinance when it becomes effective on June 26, 2020.

“Prohibition on Inquiring About or Use of Salary History”
Beginning on June 26, 2020, covered employers in Toledo cannot seek, use, or otherwise rely upon an applicant’s salary history during the hiring process. Notable exceptions include discussions of salary and benefit expectations, internal transfer or promotion, “voluntary and unprompted disclosure” of salary history, and applicants governed by a collective bargaining agreement. The ordinance also requires an employer to provide an applicant the applicable pay scale for the position following an offer of employment, but only upon “reasonable request.”

Remedies and Statute of Limitations
In the event the ordinance is violated, the applicant can seek “compensatory damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, the costs of the action, and such legal and equitable relief as the court deems just and proper.” The applicant must initiate any such action within two years.

Toledo has joined a growing number of jurisdictions outlawing inquiry into an applicant’s salary history, passing an ordinance similar to that passed by the City of Cincinnati just months earlier. Given this trend, employers should expect other cities to pass similar laws. Toledo employers should begin preparations and implement necessary changes to existing practices to ensure compliance with the ordinance when it becomes effective in June 2020.

*Scott H. DeHart, who works in the Columbus office, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about this ordinance or about inquiry into an applicant’s salary history, please contact Scott at shd@zrlaw.com or (614) 224-4411.





Use it or Lose it: U.S. Supreme Court Holds That Title VII Defendants Must Raise Charge-Filing Defense in a Timely Manner

By Tiffany Henderson*

Before an employee can file a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, the employee must file a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or the employee’s state’s equivalent of the EEOC. In Ohio, the state equivalent to the federal EEOC is the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. Generally, employees must file their Charge of Discrimination within 180 calendar days of the day the discrimination occurred or, if in a state like Ohio that has its own state agency, within 300 calendar days of the date that the discrimination occurred.

On June 3, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that Title VII’s “charge-filing requirement” is not “jurisdictional,” i.e., grounds for dismissal at any point during litigation. Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (June 3, 2019). Instead, employers must raise the objection in a timely manner or they forfeit the defense. So, if an employee sues its current or former employer under Title VII, and the employee incorrectly or insufficiently filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC or equivalent state agency, then the employer cannot wait until the later stages of the litigation to object on these grounds.

In Davis, an employee filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination against her employer alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the EEOC processed her charge, the employer fired the employee after she did not show up to work due to a conflict with a church commitment. The employee then attempted to amend her EEOC Charge to include an allegation for religious discrimination by making a handwritten notation on her EEOC intake questionnaire. However, she did not amend her formal EEOC Charge.

After the EEOC notified the employee of her right to sue, she filed a lawsuit in federal court and asserted claims including sexual harassment, retaliation, and religious discrimination under Title VII. After litigating the case for years, the employer moved – for the first time – to dismiss the religious-discrimination claim. The employer argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the claim because the employee failed to properly assert it in her EEOC Charge. The district court agreed and dismissed the claim. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and reinstated the claim. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and decide whether Title VII’s charge-filing requirement was a jurisdictional precondition that can be raised at any stage of a lawsuit or a “procedural prescription” that the employer must raise in a timely manner or risk forfeiting. The U.S. Supreme Court picked the latter.

In Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that Title VII’s language regarding the charge-filing requirement focuses on a party’s procedural obligations, not a court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court held that the charge-filing requirement is not “jurisdictional,” and thus an employer forfeits the objection if it does not raise it in a timely manner. The Court contrasted the “harsh consequences” of jurisdictional objections, which can dissolve a claim at any point in the litigation (even in front of the U.S. Supreme Court), against a party’s argument that the other party failed to comply with a claim-processing rule, which the objecting party forfeits if it “waits too long to raise the point.” The U.S. Supreme Court never specified what amounts to waiting “too long to raise the point.”

The U.S. Supreme Court also confirmed that the EEOC charge-filing requirement is mandatory. Accordingly, upon an employer’s timely objection, a Title VII plaintiff’s failure to abide by the requirement will prove fatal to their lawsuit. Employers who are facing a Title VII lawsuit should consult with counsel to determine whether this procedural defense may exist.

*Tiffany Henderson practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions regarding the U.S. Supreme Court’s Davis decision or any other employment law issues, please contact Tiffany at tsh@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.




Companies Must Make Reasonable Efforts to Maintain the Confidentiality of their Trade Secrets if They Want Courts to Protect Them

By Ami J. Patel*

For information to be considered a trade secret, it must be sufficiently secret to impart economic value because of (1) its relative secrecy and (2) the owner of the information must take reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information. Recent case law serves as a reminder that to obtain trade secret protection from the courts, the second, often overlooked component of the “trade secret” rule is pivotal. In litigating trade secret misappropriation under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) and applicable state law, it is not enough for companies to simply show the existence of a trade secret. Companies must show they took appropriate measures and had proper policies and procedures in place to protect their trade secret information.

A federal court recently reiterated this principle in Abrasic 90 Inc. v. Weldcote Metals, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2019). In Abrasic, defendant Joseph O’Mera was president and a director of the plaintiff Camel Grinding Wheels, U.S.A. (“CGW”), which produced abrasive products. In his capacity as president, O’Mera developed and oversaw various aspects of CGW’s operations, played the primary role in negotiating costs with CGW’s suppliers, and set CGW’s prices for its entire product line and approved all pricing discounts. In 2018, O’Mera left CGW to start a competing abrasives business for Weldcote Metals, Inc. (“Weldcote”). When he left, O’Mera took files containing information about CGW’s pricing, customers, and suppliers. Additional employees who also took files containing information about CGW’s pricing, customers, and suppliers, followed O’Mera to Weldcote. Further, O’Mera convinced one such employee to bring customer pricing documents from CGW’s shared drive.

CGW filed suit against its former employees and Weldcote and moved to enjoin the defendants from entering the abrasives business, from doing business with CGW’s suppliers or distributors, and from using the information at issue. The information at issue included compilations of CGW’s pricing and sales data. Notably, the court held that this type of information could be a trade secret under the law. However, the court denied CGW’s motion for a preliminary injunction under DTSA and the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, because CGW had taken “almost no measures to safeguard the information that it now maintains was invaluable to its competitors.”

According to the court, CGW could have taken the following data security measures, but did not:
  1. Requiring its employees to enter into non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements. CGW failed to require those with access to its supposed trade secrets to enter into non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements. The court described this as “among the most fundamental omissions by the company.”
  2. Establishing and implementing policies concerning the confidentiality of the company’s business information. CGW’s employee handbook did not have a policy regarding confidentiality beyond a “vague, generalized admonition about not discussing CGW business outside of work,” which “did not define, delineate, or specify which information was considered confidential.” The court determined this was “too broad and vague to confer meaningful protection over the information at issue.”
  3. Training company employees about their obligation to keep certain categories of information confidential. In the absence of a confidentiality policy, CGW further “did nothing to train or instruct employees about their obligation to keep certain categories of information confidential.”
  4. Ensuring all confidential information is returned to the company upon the cessation of employment of any employee with access to such information. Although CGW instructed departing employees to return CGW “property,” these employees “were not asked whether they possessed any of the information at issue or instructed to return or delete such information.” The court noted that merely requiring that departing employees return company property is not enough, and that company precautions “must go beyond normal business practices for the information to qualify for trade secret protection.”
  5. Ensuring that employees with responsibility for maintaining the security of sensitive company data and information are trained in data security and IT management. CGW’s IT management person had “no training in data security (or virtually any other area of IT management) and was ill-equipped to identify, much less champion, sound data security practices.”
  6. Ensuring that the company maintains and implements comprehensive data security policies and practices. CGW’s IT management practices were “grossly inadequate to prevent unauthorized access and use of the company’s purportedly valuable proprietary information.” Further, CGW’s IT person recommended to the company internally that it “take some basic steps to improve the security of the information at issue,” such as segregating access to documents on a need-to-know basis and adopting an “acceptable device use policy.” CGW, however, failed to implement “even these modest suggestions, further undermining its trade secret claim.”
  7. Restricting access to sensitive company information to employees on a need-to-know basis, such as assigning employees passwords to access the information. The entire contents of CGW’s shared drive were accessible to employees who did not need access to this information. Further, the IT management person always granted any request for access that was made of her and she “did not make any meaningful inquiry into whether the person needed access to the information.”
  8. Differentiating access and protective measures with respect to sensitive company information from those imposed with respect to non-sensitive company information. The court disfavored the manner in which the information was stored on CGW’s shared drive. CGW provided all employees with the same password to obtain access to the shared drive. Files were not encrypted, and there were no restrictions on employees’ ability to access, save, copy, print, or email the information. Further, there was no evidence that employees needed the authorization of the IT management person to obtain access to the shared drive. Rather, any employee could have enabled their own workstation to access the shared drive with minimal knowledge or assistance. Moreover, the documents on the shared drive were not segregated from other files that were not trade secrets and the documents were not labeled in any manner as “confidential” or “proprietary.” The court noted that it “takes virtually no effort and little sophistication to include a heading on an Excel spreadsheet identifying a document as ‘proprietary’ or ‘confidential,’ yet CGW failed even to do that much with respect to the information at issue.”

The lesson from Abrasic is clear: to claim information is a statutory trade secret, companies need to employ reasonable security measures to protect that information. While companies need not implement each and every measure discussed above, it is imperative that they take heed of these measures.

*Ami J. Patel practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions regarding protecting your company’s trade secret information or any other employment law issues, please contact Ami at ajp@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.




Letter of the Law: U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division Continues Issuing Opinion Letters

By Michele L. Jakubs*

In 2018, the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (“DOL”) reinitiated its practice of issuing opinion letters. The DOL’s opinion letters offer official guidance addressing how a particular law, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), applies in specific circumstances. These letters also serve as important guidance for other employers faced with similar circumstances and compliance concerns. Although the letters are not binding precedent, they can help bolster arguments made by employers.

Since 2018, the DOL has released a steady stream of opinion letters (available through this link). Just this year, the DOL already has issued over a dozen opinion letters offering guidance on specific issues under the FMLA and the FLSA. A summary of some important opinion letters is provided below.

Opinion Letter FMLA 2019-1-A (available here)

This opinion letter addresses whether an employer may permit employees to exhaust some or all available paid sick (or other) leave prior to designating leave as FMLA qualifying, even when the leave clearly is FMLA qualifying. The DOL’s answer is a resounding no.

The individual submitting this request for an opinion stated that employers often justify this practice pursuant to language in the FMLA regulations, 29 C.F.R. §825.700, which in relevant part states that “[a]n employer must observe any employment benefit or program that provides greater family and medical leave rights to employees than the rights provided by the FMLA.” However, the DOL’s response is clear that an employer may not delay the designation of FMLA-qualifying leave as FMLA leave. “Once an employee communicates a need to take leave for a FMLA-qualifying reason, neither the employee nor the employer may decline FMLA protection for that leave. Accordingly, when an employer determines that leave is for an FMLA-qualifying reason, the qualifying leave is FMLA-protected and counts toward the employee’s FMLA leave entitlement.” Further, pursuant to the FMLA regulations, “once the employer has enough information to make this determination, the employer must, absent extenuating circumstances, provide notice of the designation within five business days, and may not delay designating leave as FMLA-qualifying, even if the employee would prefer the delay.” 29 C.F.R. §825.300(d)(1).

The DOL reconciles the language in 29 C.F.R. §825.700, i.e., the regulation cited in the underlying request for an opinion, with the opinion set forth in its letter, stating “[o]f course an employer must observe any employment benefit or plan that provides greater family or medical leave rights to employees than the rights established by the FMLA, [b]ut providing such additional leave outside of the FMLA cannot expand the employee’s 12-week (or 26 week) entitlement. [If] an employee substitutes paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave, the employee’s paid leave counts toward his or her 12-week (or 26-week) FMLA entitlement and does not expand that entitlement.”

This opinion may create additional confusion for employers in the Ninth Circuit, which covers Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. In 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that an employee can decline FMLA leave and use paid leave instead, even though the underlying reason for leave would have been FMLA-qualifying. Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, 743 F.3d 123, 1244 (9th Cir. 2014). In issuing this opinion letter, the DOL noted its disagreement with the Escriba decision in a footnote.

Opinion Letter FLSA 2019-2 (available here)

This opinion letter addresses whether time spent participating in an employer’s optional volunteer program constitutes “hours worked” requiring compensation under the FLSA. The answer is no, unless such time is forced.

The program at issue in the opinion letter is an employer-sponsored optional community service program for employees, where employees can choose to engage in certain volunteer activities. Under the program, the employer compensates employees for time they spend on volunteer activities during normal working hours or while they are required to be on the employer’s premises, but activities which take place outside of normal working hours are not compensated. At the end of the year, the employer awards a monetary bonus to certain participating employees based on the total overall hours each employee volunteered.

Relying on a previous opinion letter concerning volunteer activities, the DOL notes that “[a]n employer may use an employee’s time spent volunteering as a factor in calculating whether to pay the employee a bonus, without incurring an obligation to treat that time as hours worked, so long as (1) volunteering is optional, (2) not volunteering will have no adverse effect on the employee, and (3) the employee is not guaranteed a bonus for volunteering.” FLSA 2006-4.

The DOL concluded that participation in the program at issue does not count as hours worked under the FLSA because: (1) the employer does not require participation in the program nor control or direct volunteer work; (2) employees do not appear to suffer adverse employment consequences if they do not participate in the program; and (3) the employer does not guarantee participating employees a bonus for volunteering.

The DOL also confirmed that an employer can use a mobile device application to track a participating employee’s time spent volunteering, provided that this application is not used to direct or control the volunteering activities.

Opinion Letter FLSA 2019-9 (available here)

This opinion letter addresses whether an organization used permissible rounding practices when calculating its employees’ hours worked. The organization at issue used payroll software to calculate its employees’ hours worked and wages. Based on clock in and clock out times, the software would convert an employee’s hours worked each day into a numerical figure that would be rounded based upon whether the third decimal fell below .005. For example, if the software initially calculated an employee’s hours worked in a single day to be 6.865, that figure would be rounded up to 6.87 for purposes of calculating the employee’s pay for that day. However, if the initial figure was 6.864, then the software would use 6.86 for purposes of calculating the employee’s pay for the day.

The DOL found that this rounding practice was consistent with the FLSA’s regulations. The DOL explained it has been its “policy to accept rounding to the nearest five minutes, one-tenth of an hour, one-quarter of an hour, or one-half hour as long as the rounding averages out so that the employees are compensated for all the time they actually work.” The specific rounding practice at issue was neutral on its face and appeared to average out. Therefore, the DOL opined that, consistent with the FLSA’s regulations, the rounding practice “will not result, over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees properly for all the time they have actually worked.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(b)

Conclusion

The key takeaways from the opinion letters summarized above are the following:
  • Employers may not permit employees to exhaust some or all available paid sick (or other) leave prior to designating leave as FMLA-qualifying. When an employer determines that leave is for a FMLA-qualifying reason, the qualifying leave is FMLA-protected and counts toward the employee’s FMLA leave entitlement.
  • Employers will not incur an obligation to treat an employee’s time spent volunteering as “hours worked” under the FLSA, so long as such time is not forced, i.e., (1) volunteering is optional, (2) not volunteering will have no adverse effect on the employee, and (3) the employee is not guaranteed a bonus for volunteering.
  • In determining employees’ hours worked, employers may use rounding practices, so long as those practices are neutral and average out so that the employer compensates its employees for all the time its employees actually worked.
The DOL’s opinion letters provide valuable insight regarding the intricacies of the FMLA and the FLSA and how these laws apply under specific circumstances. The attorneys at Zashin & Rich regularly provide guidance to employers regarding the nuances of the FMLA and the FLSA and counsel employers on such policies and procedures. Employers should consult with counsel to assess whether their FMLA and FLSA policies and procedures remain compliant with these ever-evolving laws.

*Michele L. Jakubs, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions regarding the DOL’s opinion letters, or the FMLA or the FLSA, please contact Michele at mlj@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.




Z&R SHORTS


Please join Z&R in welcoming Tiffany Henderson and Ryan Spitzer to its Employment and Labor Groups


Tiffany Henderson practices out of Z&R’s Cleveland office. Her practice encompasses all areas of private and public sector labor and employment law. Tiffany graduated from Bowling Green State University and received her Master of Public Administration and her Juris Doctor (cum laude) from Cleveland State University and Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, respectively. As a law student, Tiffany served as Student Bar Association President, Director of Pre-Law and Recording Secretary for the Black Law Students Association, and was a member of the mock trial advocacy team. Tiffany also received the Norman S. Minor Scholarship and Cleveland-Marshall Law Alumni Association Life Member Scholarship. Prior to joining Z&R, Tiffany served as an Assistant Attorney General at the Ohio Attorney General’s Office. Before practicing law, Tiffany worked with PPG in Cleveland, Ohio as an Information Technology Systems Analyst.

Ryan Spitzer practices out of Z&R’s Columbus office and represents public and private sector employers in all aspects of labor and employment law. Ryan graduated from the Ohio State University and earned his law degree cum laude from Capital University with a concentration in civil litigation. As a law student, Ryan participated in the Fall National Moot Court Team and was an extern for Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor at the Ohio Supreme Court. Prior to joining Z&R, Ryan worked for the Miami County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office where he handled both civil and criminal matters and was appointed as a Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney in multiple counties.


Congratulations to Stephen Zashin, Helena Oroz, and Jeffrey Wedel on their Recent Win before the Ohio Supreme Court


Z&R congratulates Stephen Zashin, Helena Oroz, and Jeff Wedel on their recent success before the Ohio Supreme Court in Gembarski v. PartsSource, Inc., 2019-Ohio-3231 (Aug. 14, 2019). The case is a significant win for employers. The Ohio Supreme Court held that when a single named plaintiff files an action on behalf of a class of employees, but is not bound by an arbitration agreement to which other members of the putative class action may be bound, the employer need not raise an arbitration defense at the pleading stage. Instead, the employer may wait and raise such a defense at the class-certification stage of the proceedings.

Upcoming Speaking Engagements


November 4, 2019
Jonathan J. Downes presents “Keys to Successful Negotiations” and “Negotiation Practice on Specific Issues” at the State Employment Relation Board (SERB) Advanced Negotiations Seminar. The seminar will take place at the State Library in Columbus, Ohio.

December 4, 2019
George S. Crisci will be part of a panel presentation entitled “Labor Law Hot Topics” at the Ohio State Bar Association’s National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) Updates seminar. The panel presentation will take place at the Ohio State Bar Association in Columbus, Ohio.