Showing posts with label Wellness Programs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wellness Programs. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 26, 2022

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Volume XXIV, Issue i

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The Sixth Circuit’s Epic Enforcement of Employment Arbitration Agreements with Class Action Waivers

By Stephen S. Zashin*

In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the U.S. Supreme Court made it unequivocally clear: arbitration is the favored means of handling employment disputes. See 138 S. Ct. 1612, 200 L.Ed.2d 889 (2018). In doing so, the Court held that arbitration agreements containing class action waivers do not violate the National Labor Relations Act and are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reinforced that mandate. See Williams v. Dearborn Motors 1, LLC, No. 20-1351, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 26350 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2021).

In Williams, the Sixth Circuit relied on Epic in upholding the enforcement of an employer’s mandatory arbitration agreement requiring employees to waive their right to pursue claims on a class basis. Further, the Sixth Circuit held an employee could not premise a retaliation claim on his termination for refusing to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement.

The plaintiffs in Williams worked at a car dealership for several months when the dealership presented an arbitration agreement to all employees and required them to sign in order to continue employment. The arbitration agreement included a “class waiver” provision, which required employees to litigate all disputes with the dealership individually, rather than on class action basis. Additionally, the class waiver provision required employees to opt-out of class actions and waive all rights to any monetary recovery in any such action.

One of the plaintiffs refused to sign the arbitration agreement, and the dealership terminated his employment. The other plaintiff opposed the arbitration agreement, but ultimately signed and continued to work at the dealership. The plaintiffs then filed a lawsuit asserting discrimination claims and sought to represent a class of the dealership’s current and former employees whom the dealership required to sign the arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. One plaintiff also alleged the dealership unlawfully terminated him in retaliation for refusing to sign the arbitration agreement. The district court dismissed the class claims, along with the individual retaliation claim.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit arguing that the arbitration agreement’s class waiver provision was unlawful and violated their rights under various antidiscrimination laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Furthermore, the one plaintiff argued his termination for refusing to sign the arbitration agreement constituted unlawful retaliation under those laws. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments.

Unlike the antidiscrimination laws at issue in Williams, the underlying claims in the Supreme Court’s Epic decision were wage and hour claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Nonetheless, the Williams Court found Epic’s holding applied in the antidiscrimination context. Recognizing the FAA’s broad mandate in favor of arbitration and prior decisions enforcing employment arbitration agreements with class action waivers, the Sixth Circuit noted, absent an “express statement [in the antidiscrimination laws] barring the use of class waivers, such policies are enforceable under the FAA with respect to employment discrimination claims.” Id. at *9. As Title VII, the ADA, and ADEA contain no such “express statement,” the court held “none of the civil rights laws that plaintiffs rely on supports the notion that a class waiver constitutes an unlawful employment practice, which plaintiffs assert is the basis for the class-based discrimination claims in the complaint.” Id. at *19. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the class claims alleging discrimination.

The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of the individual retaliation claim premised on the plaintiff’s termination for refusing to sign the arbitration agreement. In order to set forth a viable retaliation claim, the plaintiff must have engaged in “protected activity.” The Sixth Circuit found that, by refusing to sign the arbitration agreement, the plaintiff did not engage in any such activity. Rather, the court explained the plaintiff’s “opposition to the class waiver was based on his belief that it violated the procedural requirements under the [antidiscrimination laws] by depriving him of a method of litigation and type of remedy. The refusal to sign did not constitute protected activity because it was not based on a reasonable belief that he was opposing allegedly ‘discriminatory acts.’” Id. at *21. The court cautioned that the plaintiff may have had a viable retaliation claim if the arbitration agreement required him to waive substantive statutory rights under the antidiscrimination laws, e.g., the right to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. However, the dealership’s arbitration agreement, including its class waiver provision, did not interfere with the plaintiff’s substantive rights under the antidiscrimination laws. Accordingly, the court found his retaliation claim baseless and properly dismissed.

In sum, the Sixth Circuit’s Williams decision reinforces the mandate in favor of arbitration as a means to resolve employment disputes, including discrimination claims, and employers’ rights to include class action waivers in their arbitration agreements and to terminate employees who refuse to sign them. Employers should consult with counsel to discuss implementing arbitration agreements with their workforce or revising existing agreements to include class action waivers.

*Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor & Employment Law, has successfully litigated class arbitration issues in state and federal courts including successfully arguing a class action arbitration issue before the Ohio Supreme Court. If you have questions relating arbitration agreements or any other employment law issues, please contact Stephen at ssz@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.

Employers May Utilize Wellness Programs to Encourage Employees to Get a COVID-19 Vaccine

By Brittany A. Mallow*

The U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and the U.S. Treasury (collectively, the “Government”) recently issued FAQs (available here) to clarify how employers may encourage employees to get vaccinated using incentives/surcharges through the employer’s group health plan. Essentially, a group health plan may offer participants a premium discount for receiving a COVID-19 vaccination if the discount complies with the final wellness program regulations.

HIPAA Compliance


Generally, employers may not charge different premiums under their health plans based on the health factors of their employees. However, the Government advised that HIPAA permits exceptions for both vaccination surcharges and incentives, provided that a plan complies with the requirements for “activity-only” wellness programs. These requirements include:
  • The total amount of non-tobacco-related incentives/surcharges may not exceed 30 percent of the cost of coverage under the health plan;
  • Employers must provide a reasonable alternative to avoid the surcharge if it is medically inadvisable for an individual to receive the COVID-19 vaccine;
  • Individuals must have the opportunity to qualify for the reward (or avoid the penalty) at least once per year;
  • The full reward under the activity-only wellness program must be available to all similarly situated individuals; and,
  • The program must be reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease.

30 Percent Rule


As established under HIPAA, employers may encourage participation in certain types of wellness programs by offering incentives of up to 30 percent of the total cost of an employee’s health insurance premiums for self-only coverage. Therefore, any surcharge imposed on an unvaccinated worker cannot exceed more than 30 percent of the total cost of their health insurance premiums for self-only coverage when combined with any existing surcharge.

Many employers have existing wellness programs and may not have much wiggle room to add additional incentives/surcharges and remain under the 30 percent cap.

Reasonable Alternative


The Government advised that a “reasonable alternative” to a surcharge may require an attestation that the individual will follow the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (“CDC”) masking guidelines for unvaccinated individuals. Additionally, an employer is permitted to require a doctor’s note related to whether the vaccine is medically inadvisable.

ACA Affordability Rules


The FAQs also confirm that employers should disregard vaccination incentives when determining compliance with the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”) affordability rules, but employers should include vaccination surcharges in the premium cost when performing affordability calculations. For example, if a COVID-19 vaccination wellness program reduces an employee’s individual premium contribution by ten percent, employers should disregard the reduction for purposes of determining whether the offer of that coverage is affordable in assessing liability for the employer’s shared responsibility payment. However, if a surcharge increases an unvaccinated employee’s individual premium contribution for coverage by ten percent, employers should include the surcharge when assessing affordability.

Employers wishing to impose a surcharge should rerun ACA affordability calculations to ensure compliance with affordability rules. However, employers considering utilizing the incentive approach should not face ACA affordability concerns, as their plans presumably already satisfied the requirements.

Eligibility/Coverage


The FAQs make clear that plan sponsors cannot condition eligibility for benefits on vaccination status. Thus, employers cannot deny unvaccinated health plan participants benefits or eligibility for coverage. Although there is an exception to the general prohibition on discrimination based on a health factor for wellness programs that meet federal standards, this exception is available only for premium discounts or rebates, or modifications of otherwise applicable cost-sharing mechanisms, and not for denying eligibility for benefits or coverage based on a health factor.

EEOC’s Lack of Guidance


The Government cautioned that compliance with their regulations is not determinative of compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”), as the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) enforces those laws.

The EEOC has remained silent on how wellness plans can comply with the ADA and GINA. Despite the EEOC’s silence, it is comforting to note that no court has ever determined that a wellness plan that complies with the Government’s regulations violates either the ADA or GINA. Additionally, the EEOC regulations governing the applicability of the ADA to wellness programs defer to HIPAA when it comes to health-contingent wellness programs, and the EEOC has not provided any reason to believe that would change for COVID-19 vaccine incentives.

Best Practices

  1. Re-calculate incentive limits to ensure that the incentive, taken together with all other non-tobacco incentives, does not exceed the 30% HIPAA incentive limit.
  2. Establish ways to earn incentives for reasonable alternatives/accommodations for those who cannot get vaccinated due to a medical reason, disability, or a religious exemption.
  3. Ensure affordability standards are met under the ACA.
  4. Notification rules: Open enrollment periods are either underway, closed, or about to commence for most employers; thus, it may not be logistically possible to implement a vaccine incentive/surcharge program for commencement in the near future. However, if an employer chooses to modify the group health plan by implementing a wellness program mid-year, it must communicate the modification to employees at least 60 days in advance.
*Brittany A. Mallow practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions utilizing wellness programs to encourage COVID-19 vaccinations or any other employment law issues, please contact Brittany at bam@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.

Scripture vs. Shots – How Employers Should Respond to Religious Objections to COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates

By Katie McLaughlin*

In the wake of COVID-19 vaccine mandates, an increasing number of employees have claimed religious exemptions. How should employers respond when their employees object to vaccine mandates on religious grounds?

Religious Discrimination Under Title VII


Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of religion and requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodations" to employees’ “sincerely held” religious beliefs, practices, or observances. Title VII defines religion broadly – protected religious beliefs need not be formally recognized. However, employees’ objections cannot be based solely on social, political, or personal preferences or nonreligious concerns about the possible effects of the vaccine. Employers must distinguish between political objections that happen to be religious and objections that are religious at their core.

Most major organized religions do not openly oppose vaccines. For example, Pope Francis stated he believes that everyone has an ethical duty to get vaccinated. In fact, only two religions formally oppose vaccination – Christian Scientists and the Dutch Reformed Church. However, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) stated that a religious group’s acceptance or nonacceptance of a belief is not determinative under Title VII. Employers must not lose sight of this statement from the EEOC and should not deny religious accommodations requests based solely on religious doctrine or statements from religious leaders like Pope Francis. The below considerations apply to not only employees who oppose the vaccine altogether on religious grounds, but also employees who wish to wait until an alternative version or specific brand of the COVID-19 vaccine is available.

“Sincerely Held” Religious Beliefs


If an employee raises a religious objection, an employer should generally assume the objection is based on a sincerely held belief. Employers can only question an employee’s belief if they have an objective basis to do so. The EEOC identified four factors that can create doubt as to the sincerity of an employee’s religious belief:
  • Whether the employee has acted in a way inconsistent with the claimed belief;
  • Whether the employee is seeking a benefit or an exception that is likely to be sought for nonreligious reasons;
  • Whether the timing of the request is questionable (for example, the request follows closely after the same employee’s request for the same benefit for different reasons); and
  • Whether the employer has other reasons to believe that the employee is seeking the benefit for secular reasons.
If an employer has an objective basis, it can ask the employee to discuss their beliefs, describe how the employee follows them, provide written materials about the tenets of their faith, and/or request statements from others who have observed the employee discussing or practicing those beliefs. A religious leader may provide an exemption letter to bolster the employee’s claim, but it is not required. Additionally, an employer should not assume that an employee’s belief is not sincere because it deviates from the commonly followed tenets of the employee’s religion or the employee adheres to some common practices but not others. Although prior inconsistent conduct is relevant to the question of sincerity, an employee’s beliefs may change over time. An employee’s newly adopted or inconsistently observed practice may nevertheless be sincerely held.

Employers should use caution when questioning employee beliefs. For example, in EEOC v. Consol Energy, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an employee was entitled to nearly $600,000 in damages because his employer failed to accommodate his religious concerns regarding a biometric hand scanner.

Reasonable Accommodations


If an employee’s religious belief is sincerely held, Title VII requires employers to provide the employee reasonable accommodations. For employees who refuse to get the COVID-19 vaccine due to a sincerely held religious belief, reasonable accommodations include mask wearing, remote work, social distancing, etc. Much will depend on the specific circumstances. Employers must ensure that the accommodation is legitimate and non-retaliatory. However, employers do not have to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if doing so would impose an “undue hardship” on the employer’s legitimate business interests. The EEOC identified six factors employers can consider in denying a religious accommodation as unduly burdensome:
  • The accommodation is too costly;
  • The accommodation would decrease workplace efficiency;
  • The accommodation infringes on the rights of other employees;
  • The accommodation requires other employees to do more than their share of hazardous or burdensome work;
  • The accommodation conflicts with another law or regulation; and
  • The accommodation compromises workplace safety.
Employers should rely on objective information, and not on speculative hardships that may arise as a result of a religious accommodation. Common relevant considerations during the COVID-19 pandemic may include whether the employee works indoors or outdoors, works in a solitary or group setting, or has close contact with other employees or members of the public who are medically vulnerable. The number of fully vaccinated employees, how many employees and nonemployees physically enter the workplace, and current CDC recommendations are also relevant. If more than one reasonable accommodation could eliminate a religious conflict, an employer should consider the employee’s preferences but is not obligated to provide the reasonable accommodation preferred by the employee.

If an employer is faced with requests from multiple employees for religious accommodations, the determination of whether a particular proposed accommodation imposes an undue hardship depends on its specific factual context. If an employer grants one employee a religious accommodation related to the vaccine, it is not required to grant the requests of all employees who seek a religious accommodation for the vaccine. Additionally, the cumulative cost or burden on the employer is relevant when multiple employees seek similar accommodations. However, employers should keep in mind that a mere assumption that many more employees might seek a religious accommodation in the future is not evidence of undue hardship.

Finally, employers have the right to discontinue a previously granted accommodation if it is no longer being used for religious purposes and/or the accommodation poses an undue hardship on their operations due to changed circumstances. However, employers should discuss their concerns with employees before revoking accommodations and consider alternative accommodations that do not impose an undue hardship.

Takeaways


Before imposing vaccine mandates, employers should develop a system for considering and responding to religious objections. Employers should use caution when questioning an employee’s religious beliefs. So as to avoid inconsistent treatment, employers should strongly consider using a form attestation to be completed by the employee that identifies the employee’s belief system and the belief, practice, or observance that prohibits the employee from getting the COVID-19 vaccine. Employers should consult with counsel when drafting such attestations.

*Katie McLaughlin practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions regarding COVID-19’s continued impact on the workplace or other employment matters, please contact Katie at kem@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.

Weeded Out: Pennsylvania Court Greenlights Employee Claims for Discipline Based Upon Status as a Certified Medical Marijuana User

By Jessi L. Ziska*

Pennsylvania’s Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”) prohibits employers from discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise discriminating or retaliating against an employee based upon their status as a certified medical marijuana user. However, as the MMA does not expressly include a private right of action, it remained unclear whether Pennsylvania employees have a right to bring a lawsuit alleging a violation of the MMA. Last August, a state appellate court answered that question in the affirmative. See Palmiter v. Scranton Quincy Clinic Co., LLC, No. 498 MDA 2020, 2021 PA Super 159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021). Accordingly, Pennsylvania employers must exercise caution as they may face private lawsuits for making employment decisions based upon an employee’s or applicant’s status as a certified medical marijuana user.

Background


The plaintiff in Palmiter worked as a medical assistant and submitted to a drug test after a new company acquired the hospital where she worked. In connection with the drug test, the employee notified the laboratory that she had a medical marijuana prescription and provided a copy of her legal certification. Nonetheless, her new employer informed her of her termination on account of her drug test. The employee then sued her employer arguing, in part, that her termination violated the MMA and public policy. The trial court overruled the employer’s objections to this claim, and the employer appealed the trial court’s decision.

Superior Court Decision


The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding individual employees can maintain private causes of action against their employer under the MMA and public policy. In reaching its decision, the court reviewed the language of the MMA along with similar state medical marijuana laws across the country to find that “an implied private cause of action” existed under the MMA. In doing so, the court held the state legislature’s intent in enacting the MMA sought to protect employee-patients certified to use medical marijuana from employers who would penalize employees for availing themselves of the benefits provided under the MMA.

Impact on Pennsylvania Employers


Under the Palmiter Court’s holding, Pennsylvania employers can face private lawsuits for disciplining, terminating, or otherwise discriminating against an employee or job applicant based on the individual’s status as a certified user of medical marijuana. However, the MMA does not require employers to accommodate medical marijuana use in the workplace and allows employers the right “to discipline an employee for being under the influence of medical marijuana in the workplace or for working while under the influence of medical marijuana when the employee’s conduct falls below the standard of care normally accepted for that position.” See 35 P.S. § 10231.2103(b)(2). Accordingly, before taking an adverse action, Pennsylvania employers should ensure that they have adequate evidence to show the adverse action is not merely premised upon the individual’s status as a certified medical marijuana user.

What About Ohio?


Compared to Pennsylvania’s MMA, Ohio’s medical marijuana law is more employer friendly. For example, under Ohio law:
  • Employers do not have to permit or accommodate an employee’s use, possession, or distribution of medical marijuana;
  • Employers may refuse to hire, discharge, discipline, or otherwise take an adverse employment action against a person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of that person’s use, possession, or distribution of medical marijuana; and
  • Employers can establish and enforce a drug testing policy, drug-free workplace policy, or zero-tolerance policy.
See R.C. § 3796.28(A)(1)-(3).

Given that medical marijuana laws vary by state, employers should review state medical marijuana laws and consult with counsel prior to making employment decisions based upon an employee’s status as a medical marijuana user.

*Jessi L. Ziska practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about employment issues relating to medical marijuana or any other employment law matters, please contact Jessi at jlz@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.

New Year, New Minimum Wages: States Increase Minimum Wage for 2022

By Jzinae N. Jackson*

On January 1, 2022, several states, including Ohio, increased their minimum wage. Ohio’s minimum wage increased from $8.80 to $9.30 for non-tipped employees and from $4.40 to $4.65 for tipped employees. In 2022, Ohio’s minimum wage law applies to employers with gross revenue of $342,000 or more. Employers whose gross revenue is below that threshold are only subject to the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour for non-tipped employees and $2.13 for tipped employees. Additionally, for minors aged fifteen years or younger, Ohio employers are only required to pay the federal minimum wage.

While most states have not yet scheduled minimum wage increases beyond 2022, several states, such as California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Virginia, and others have scheduled increases over the next few years, with the end goal of $15.00 per hour. Additionally, minimum wage increases in some states will not take effect until later in 2022. For example, Oregon’s and Nevada’s increases become effective on July 1, 2022. Employers should also recognize that some municipalities have higher minimum wages than the state minimum wage.

The following table lists all 2022 minimum wage increases by state (unless otherwise noted, all increases are effective January 1, 2022):


State

Standard

Tipped

Arizona

$12.80

$9.80

California

$15.00 for employers with 26 or more employees.

 

$14.00 for employers with 25 or less employees.

$15.00 for employers with 26 or more employees.

 

$14.00 for employers with 25 or less employees.

Colorado

$12.56

$9.54

Connecticut

(effective July 1, 2022)

$14.00

$7.62 for service employees

 

$5.77 for bartenders

Delaware

$10.50

$2.23

Florida

(effective Sept. 30, 2022)

$11.00

 

$7.98

 

Illinois

$12.00

$7.20

Maine

$12.75

$6.38

Maryland

$12.50 for employers with 15 or more employees.

 

$12.20 for employers with 14 or less employees.

$3.63

Massachusetts

$14.25

$6.15

Michigan

$9.87

$3.75

Minnesota

$10.33 for employers earning $500,000 or more annually.

 

$8.42 for employers earning less than $500,000 annually.

$10.33 for employers earning $500,000 or more annually.

 

$8.42 for employers earning less than $500,000 annually.

Missouri

$11.15

$5.575 (tipped employees must be paid half the state minimum wage rate)

Montana

$9.20

$9.20 for employers earning more than $110,000 annually.

 

$4.00 for employers earning $110,000 or less annually.

Nevada

(effective July 1, 2022)

$9.50 for employers offering health benefits.

 

$10.50 for employers not offering health benefits.

$9.50 for employers offering health benefits.

 

$10.50 for employers not offering health benefits.

New Jersey

$13.00 for employers with 6 or more employees.

 

$11.90 for seasonal employees and employers with 5 or less employees.

 

$10.90 for agricultural employees.

$5.13

New Mexico

$11.50

$2.80

New York

(effective Dec. 31, 2021)

$13.20

 

$15.00 for fast food employees.

$8.35

Ohio

$9.30 for employers earning $342,000 or more annually.

 

$7.25 for employers earning less than $342,000.

$4.65

Oregon (effective July 1, 2022)

$13.50

 

$13.50

 

Rhode Island

$12.25

$8.36

South Dakota

$9.95

$4.975 (tipped employees must be paid half the state minimum wage rate)

Vermont

$12.55

$6.28

Virginia

$11.00

$2.13

Washington

$14.49

$14.49


*Jzinae N. Jackson regularly advises clients on labor and employment matters, including state and federal wage and hour law compliance. If you have questions about minimum wage laws or labor and employment matters more generally, please contact Jzinae at jnj@zrlaw.com or (216) 696-4441.



Z&R SHORTS


Please join Z&R in welcoming Katie McLaughlin and Brittany Mallow to its Employment and Labor Groups


Katie McLaughlin’s practice encompasses all areas of labor and employment law. Katie graduated cum laude from Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, where she served as Editor-in-Chief of the Cleveland State Law Review. As a law student, Katie participated in Cleveland-Marshall’s Civil Litigation Clinic, where she advised clients on unemployment claims and landlord-tenant disputes. Prior to law school, Katie worked as an insurance underwriter.

Brittany Mallow represents both public and private sector employers in all aspects of labor and employment law. Brittany graduated, cum laude, with her J.D. from Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, where she was a Cleveland-Marshall Law Justice Scholar and Cleveland-Marshall Law Alumni Association Life Member Scholar. Brittany also earned her M.B.A. from Cleveland State University. During law school, Brittany served as Vice Chair of the Moot Court Team and Treasurer of the International Law Society. As a Member of the Moot Court Team, Brittany competed in several national moot court competitions, winning Best Petitioner’s Brief and advancing to the final four at the Herbert Wechsler National Moot Court Competition. Brittany also gained valuable legal experience while serving the Cleveland community as a student in the Community Advocacy Law Clinic at Cleveland-Marshall.

Please join Z&R in congratulating its attorneys for the following achievements:


CONGRATULATIONS


Super Lawyers List | 2022
George Crisci, Jon Dileno, Jonathan Downes, Michele Jakubs, Amy Keating, Drew Piersall, Christopher Reynolds, Jonathan Rich, Richard Stahl, Patrick Watts, Jeffrey Wedel, Andrew Zashin, Stephen Zashin

Rising Stars List | 2022
David Frantz, Kyleigh Weinfurtner

Best Lawyers | 2022
George Crisci, Jon Dileno, Jonathan Downes, Amy Keating, Drew Piersall, Christopher Reynolds, Jonathan Rich, Richard Stahl, Jeffrey Wedel, Kyleigh Weinfurtner, Andrew Zashin, Stephen Zashin

Best Lawyers Top Listed Firm | 2022
First-Tier Rankings in Ohio for 7 years

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

EMPLOYMENT LAW QUARTERLY | Volume XVII, Issue iii

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Quiet Changes to Employment Laws: Federal Agencies Recognize Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination

By Ami J. Patel*

In June, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that all states must issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in other states. The legalization of same-sex marriage affects the way employers provide benefits to same-sex employees. Marriage is not the only front on which LGBT rights are evolving. With much of the public and the media’s spotlight on changes in the law regarding same-sex marriage, people may not realize that several federal agencies already interpret anti-discrimination laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the Department of Labor (“DOL”), and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) all take the position that statutes and orders prohibiting sex discrimination, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity (e.g., identifying as transsexual or transgender). These federal agencies reason that discrimination on the basis of gender identity is a form of sex discrimination. The EEOC and the DOL have stated further that prohibitions against sex discrimination protect discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well. Therefore, an individual may file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, as a form of sex discrimination. Indeed, the EEOC has reported an increase in sexual orientation and gender identity-based charges, from 765 filed in 2013 to 1,093 filed in 2014.

Ohio’s anti-discrimination laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, but Ohio courts have yet to interpret state law to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. While Ohio courts generally interpret Ohio’s discrimination law to match federal anti-discrimination protections, Ohio’s 10th district appellate court ruled in its 2014 decision in Burns v. Ohio State Univ. College of Veterinary Med., 2014-Ohio-1190, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1101 (10th App. Dist. 2014), that the state’s prohibition of sex discrimination does not extend to sexual orientation discrimination. Given the rapidly changing legal landscape regarding LGBT rights, Ohio courts’ stance may soon shift. Regardless, employers should be aware that employees experiencing sexual orientation or sexual identity discrimination may seek recourse with state or federal agencies or the court system.

*Ami J. Patel practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about your employment policies in light of legal changes regarding LGBT individuals, please contact Ami at (ajp@zrlaw.com) or 216.696.4441.



How Much Is That Doggie In the Window? Or, Rather, How Much Do Employers Have to Pay Police Officers To Care For Those Police Doggies

By Brad E. Bennett*

Years ago, we watched with bated breath as the French mastiff Hooch helped Detective Scott Turner (Tom Hanks) apprehend a murderer. Sadly (*spoiler alert*), Hooch died in the film’s final minutes. However, had he lived and Detective Turner continued to use Hooch in police work, the Cypress Beach Police Department may have faced a question now facing many police departments, officers, and courts – should police departments pay for off-the-clock time spent caring for police dogs?

The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) generally requires employers to compensate employees for all hours worked. “Work” includes “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer.” Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944). In addition, the FLSA requires that employers compensate employees for activities performed before or after the employee’s regular work shift if the “activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principle activity” for which the employee is employed. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956).

Courts and the Department of Labor have concluded that time-spent off-the-clock caring for police dogs constitutes work and an “integral and indispensable part” of the officer’s principle activity of employment.Specifically, time spent training the dog at home and the dog’s “care” are compensable.  U.S. Dept. of Labor Wage and Hour Opinion Letter August 11, 1993. “Care” includes: bathing, brushing, exercising, feeding, grooming, related cleaning of the dog’s kennel or transport vehicle, administering medicine for illness, and transporting the dog to and from the veterinarian. So how much time must an employer compensate law enforcement personnel for these activities and at what rate?

Generally, employers must pay employees a rate of at least one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1). However, employers may calculate law enforcement personnel overtime over a longer time-period, up to 171 hours in 28-day period. 29 U.S.C. §207(k). In addition, the FLSA allows employers and employees to agree upon different straight-time hourly rates where the employee performs “two or more kinds of work.” 29 U.S.C. §207(g). In the event an employer agrees upon a different straight-time hourly rate for dog-care, it must ensure that it only pays that different rate for dog-care and not law enforcement activities.

How much time a police department must compensate its personnel to care for police dogs varies by court.In one case, the court concluded the District of Columbia had to pay its officers 30-minutes per day (seven days/week) for “the care, feeding, and grooming” of the police dogs. Levering v. District of Columbia, 869 F. Supp. 24 (D.C. Cir. 1994). However, another court upheld the City of Cincinnati’s agreement, reached through a collective bargaining agreement, to compensate its canine officers for 17 minutes of straight-time per day. Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2001). There, in finding the agreement Cincinnati reached with its police union reasonable, the court considered the following additional benefits the City provided (among others): take-home vehicles; concrete-based fenced dog kennel at the officer’s home; payment of food and veterinary care; and the benefit of having a highly trained police dog as a family pet.

Employers that maintain police department canine units should review their compensation system to ensure they are properly compensating those caring for the canines. When determining what constitutes proper payment, in addition to an hourly rate, employers may consider other benefits provided. Employers should attempt to reach an agreement with personnel on a reasonable amount of compensation and contact counsel with questions.

*Brad E. Bennett, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices at the firm’s Columbus office.He is well versed in all areas of labor and employment law including FLSA compliance.If you have questions about the FLSA and police department canine units, please contact Brad (beb@zrlaw.com) at 614.224.4411.




My Employee Said What on Facebook?

By Drew C. Piersall*

“Ok we got Bin Laden . . . let’s go get Kasich next . . . who’s with me?” “[C]an’t believe what a snake my boss is. . . . he needs to keep his [creepy] hands to himself . . . just an all around d-bag!!” “If you are on public assistance, you may not have additional children and must be on birth control (e.g. an IUD).” These are statements that employees made on Facebook for which they received discipline, yet courts and an arbitrator reached different conclusions regarding the appropriateness of the discipline.

The decisions raise many questions. Can employers discipline employees for comments, posts, etc. that employees make while off-duty on non-employer social media sites? What standards apply to employee off-duty conduct? The arbitrator evaluating whether the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction had just cause to terminate the employee who made the Bin Laden comment above considered these issues. State of Ohio, Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., (Pincus, Mar. 6, 2013). There, four employees who worked in the same correctional institution “liked” the corrections officer’s Bin Laden Facebook comment, which he posted off-duty. The officer’s Facebook profile included his job location and public employee status. Once the employer learned of the comment, it investigated and ultimately discharged the officer. However, the arbitrator concluded that the officer’s statement was nothing more than empty words. In addition, the employer’s “E-mail, Internet, and On-line Services Use” policy did not place the employee on notice that the policy covered his off-duty conduct. As a result, the arbitrator concluded that while officer’s alleged threat justified a 14-month suspension, the employer did not have just cause to terminate his employment.

The First Amendment protects a public employee’s right “to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). A public employee must show the following to establish the First Amendment protected his or her speech: (1) the employee spoke as a private citizen rather than pursuant to official duties; (2) the speech involved a matter of public concern; and (3) the employee’s “interest as a citizen” in commenting on the matter outweighed the State’s interest, “as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2011).

Employees have raised the First Amendment as a defense to their social media posts in a number of contexts with varying results. For example, the court affirmed the discharge of the children’s services worker who made the above (and many other) comments about people who received public assistance. Shepherd v. McGee, 986 F.Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Or. 2013). The court reasoned that since her comments were banter “rather than speech intended to help the public actually evaluate the performance of a public agency,” they stood “on the periphery of First Amendment protection.” The court also emphasized the heightened government interest that existed since the employee held a “public contact role.” In addition, the employee’s statements impaired her ability to do her job – testify at proceedings, since her statements raised credibility issues for prosecutors.

In evaluating employee conduct, discipline, and social media use, it is helpful for employers to have social media and computer use policies. However, employers must be cautious about the content and prohibitions included in such policies. The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) analyzes whether employers violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which guarantees employees the right to join unions and engage in “concerted activity” for the purposes of “mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. §157. In the social media context, the NLRB considers whether an employee could reasonably construe a rule or policy to chill the employee’s exercise of their Section 7 rights.

The NLRB has shown it will go to great lengths to protect employee speech. In Three D, LLC v. NLRB, the Second Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s ruling that an employee’s Facebook post that the employer was “[s]uch an asshole” was concerted, protected activity. No. 14-3284, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18493 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2015). The NLRB found the activity concerted because it involved multiple employees and protected because it involved workplace complaints about tax withholdings. Furthermore, the statements were within the NLRA’s protection because the comment at issue did not mention, let alone disparage, the employer’s products. Therefore, at least according to the NLRB, an employee may call their boss an “asshole” on social media without repercussion.

Beyond controlling and responding to employee use of social media, the prevalence of social media bleeds into the hiring process. Social media provides employers with another forum to post jobs and conduct background checks. However, employers should engage in social media checks with caution. First, employers should consider the accuracy of the information (e.g., potential for false profiles or accounts). In addition, by viewing a prospective employee’s social media account, the employer may incidentally obtain information regarding the individual’s race, gender, national origin, religion, age, disability, or genetic background. This knowledge could expose the employer to claims of discrimination. Therefore, any employer who chooses to review prospective employees’ social media accounts should take the following precautionary steps: (1) ensure the person reviewing social media accounts is wholly uninvolved in making the hiring decision; (2) only review publicly available social media; and (3) do not request social media account passwords during the hiring process.

The growing prevalence of social media has created a host of potential issues for employers. Given social media’s fast-paced growth and ever-changing nature, employers should constantly keep abreast of the current status of the law.

*Drew C. Piersall works in the firm’s Columbus office and practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have any questions about employee use of social media, please contact Drew (dcp@zrlaw.com) at 614.224.4411.



Employment Practices Liability Insurance – Do Not Wait to Notify Carrier of Claims

By Stephen S. Zashin*

Employers that wait too long to report claims to an Employment Practices Liability Insurance (“EPLI”) carrier may lose coverage. A federal court recently determined that an employer violated its EPLI policy when it waited nearly two years to notify its insurance carrier of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”). E. Dillon Co. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 1:14-cv-00070, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76295 (W.D. Va. June 12, 2015). As a result, the insurance carrier did not have to provide coverage for the EEOC Charge and subsequent litigation.

The employer twice waited too long to provide notice of claims to its EPLI carrier. First, the employer waited almost 23 months after it received notice of a pending EEOC Charge (Apr. 4, 2011) before notifying the insurance carrier (Feb. 28, 2013). During that time, the EEOC dismissed the Charge (Apr. 28, 2012), reversed course and found reasonable cause to believe the employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (Sept. 27, 2012) and scheduled mediation (Mar. 14, 2013). Later, the employer waited approximately five months after it was served with a lawsuit related to the Charge (Sept. 9, 2013) to notify the insurance carrier of the lawsuit (Feb. 3, 2014). The employer provided notice of the lawsuit eight days before court-scheduled mediation was to occur.

The insurance carrier denied both claims after it concluded the employer failed to provide timely notice. The insurance policy covered any “Employment Claim,” which specifically included EEOC proceedings, and required the employer to provide written notice of claims “as soon as practicable.” The insurance carrier concluded that the employer’s decision to wait nearly 23 months and five months respectively to provide notice of the claims violated the “as soon as practicable” requirement.

The court agreed and concluded that the employer’s failure to provide timely notice constituted a material breach of the insurance agreement.The employer’s notification delay was unreasonable because the insurance agreement specifically defined “Employment Claim” to include EEOC proceedings. In addition, the delay prejudiced the insurance carrier, because the carrier: lost the chance to investigate the claims, to direct the employer’s defense, and t0 attempt to resolve the matter before the EEOC found reasonable cause; and the EEOC’s proposed Conciliation Agreement ($178,000 payment) diminished any settlement leverage the insurance company may have possessed.The court concluded the length of delay alone was sufficient to find that the employer materially breached the insurance agreement. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered other court cases which held that any delay beyond 75 days, without reasonable excuse, was unreasonable.

Upon receipt of a potential claim, employers should carefully review their EPLI policy’s reporting requirements and work with their brokers to avoid losing coverage for failing to timely report.Finally, all employers should consider whether to purchase an EPLI policy.

*Stephen S. Zashin, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment law, is head of the firm’s Labor and Employment Groups.If you have questions about this article, please contact Stephen (ssz@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.



EEOC to Change Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act Regulations on Wellness Programs

By Patrick Hoban*

On October 30, 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking setting forth proposed changes to the regulations governing employer wellness programs in relation to Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”). GINA is a federal law that, in part, protects employees and applicants from discrimination based upon genetic information, including that of their family members. The proposed rule seeks to clarify the circumstances under which employers may offer inducements (i.e., wellness program incentives) in exchange for health-status information of employee spouses who participate in the employer’s group health plan.

A wellness program is “a program offered by an employer that is designed to promote health and prevent disease.” 42 U.S.C. 300gg-4(j)(1)(a). Wellness programs include a wide range of employer-sponsored services, from smoking cessation to workout programs to health assessments. Under GINA, wellness programs cannot condition employee inducements upon employee genetic information. “Genetic information” includes, among other things, information about employees and their family members’ (including spouses) genetic tests and family medical history.

Employers covered by GINA (i.e., those with 15 or more employees) are prohibited from requesting, requiring, or purchasing employee genetic information, unless a statutory exception applies. One exception allows employers to obtain genetic information as part of employer-provided voluntary health or genetic services, including wellness programs. This exception only applies if: (1) the provision of genetic information is actually voluntary (i.e., employees are not required to provide the genetic information and there is no penalty for not providing it); and (2) the individual provides “prior knowing, voluntary, and written authorization.” 29 C.F.R. 1635.8(b)(2)(i).

The EEOC’s proposed rule adds an additional requirement that an employer’s wellness program must be “reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease.” This means the wellness program “must have a reasonable chance of improving the health of, or preventing disease in, participating individuals, and must not be overly burdensome, a subterfuge for violating [GINA] or other laws prohibiting employment discrimination, or highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease.”

The EEOC’s proposed rule explains that, under GINA, employers can offer limited inducements for information about the current or past health status of an employee’s spouse covered by the employer’s group health plan. The provision of this information must be part of a “health risk assessment,” (e.g., medical questionnaire or examination to detect high cholesterol) conducted in connection with the spouse’s receipt of health or genetic services as part of the employer’s wellness program. The wellness program inducements may take various forms, from discounts or rebates to the avoidance of a premium surcharge. The total inducements offered under the wellness program may not exceed 30 percent of the total annual costs of coverage. To be valid, the provision of the spouse’s information must meet the requirements of GINA’s wellness program exception discussed above (i.e., voluntary and with prior written authorization). Furthermore, the information provided in exchange for the inducement must be limited to current and past health status and cannot include genetic information such as results of genetic tests.

The proposed exception for inducements is limited to employee spouses who are covered under the employer’s group health plan. Employers may not provide inducements in exchange for employee genetic information or their biological or non-biological child’s genetic information or current or past health status. Employers may offer inducements for completion of health risk assessments that ask questions about family medical history and other genetic information; however, the employer must make it clear that the inducement will be available regardless of whether the specific genetic information questions are answered.

Prior to announcing the proposed rule, the EEOC initiated litigation taking issue with multiple employers’ wellness programs. See, e.g., EEOC v. Honeywell Int’l. Inc., N0. 0:14-cv-04517 (D. Minn. 2014); EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., N0. 1:14-cv-01019 (E.D. Wis. 2014). In Honeywell, the EEOC sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing the company from imposing surcharge penalties on employees and spouses that did not participate in biometric testing for health data including cholesterol and nicotine levels. The EEOC argued that the wellness program violated GINA and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court denied the EEOC’s motion, but noted that “great uncertainty persists in how the [Affordable Care Act], [Americans with Disabilities Act] and other federal statutes such as GINA are intended to interact,” with respect to wellness programs.

The EEOC’s proposed GINA rule comes on the heels of an April 2015 proposed rule (discussed by Z&R here) addressing, in part, amendments to the EEOC’s regulations and guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act relating to employer wellness programs. The comment period for the proposed Americans with Disabilities Act rule closed in June. The EEOC may make revisions in light of the comments before voting on the final rule. The EEOC is accepting comments on its proposed GINA rule until January 28, 2016. Employers can anticipate continued developments, and litigation, in this nascent area of employment law.

*Patrick Hoban, an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law, practices in all areas of labor and employment law. If you have questions about wellness programs, please contact Pat (pjh@zrlaw.com) at 216.696.4441.




Z&R SHORTS


Z&R Announces Its 2016 Super Lawyers and Rising Stars


Zashin & Rich is pleased to congratulate the following 2016 Super Lawyers:


Brad E. Bennett, George S. Crisci, Jon M. Dileno, Jonathan J. Downes, Michele L. Jakubs, and Stephen S. Zashin were named Super Lawyers. Helena Oroz, Ami J. Patel, and David R. Vance were named Rising Stars.



Super Lawyers is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high-degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The selection process includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations.



Super Lawyers Magazine features the list and profiles of selected attorneys and is distributed to attorneys in the state or region and the ABA-accredited law school libraries. Super Lawyers is also published as a special section in leading city and regional magazines across the country.

Please join Z&R in welcoming two new attorneys to its Employment and Labor Groups.


Lisa A. Kainec Joins Z&R Cleveland
Lisa is a legal and human resources professional with 20+ years of experience in employment law across multiple industries including retail, healthcare, municipal, professional services, construction and manufacturing. Lisa has worked in-house as a human resources executive and senior employment counsel at Jo-Ann Stores. Lisa was a Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment Law. Lisa devotes her practice to providing practical strategies for proactive workforce management as well as vigorous defense of employee claims and litigation.

Brad E. Bennett Joins Z&R Columbus
Brad has 18 years of employment law experience as an attorney and human resources professional across multiple industries including healthcare, aviation, retail, public sector and construction.  He represents public and private sector employers in all aspects of labor and employment law.  In addition to his litigation practice, Brad represents public sector employers in collective bargaining, grievance arbitrations, and impasse proceedings. Additionally, Brad has drafted civil service rules for municipalities, represents public sector employers before the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR), and counsels public employers regarding compliance with Ohio’s Open Meetings Act and Public Records Act.  Brad is an OSBA Certified Specialist in Labor and Employment.